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INTRODUCTION

Comparative research of criminal justice systems is still in its
infancy. It is not surprising, then, that when questions are asked
transcending the concerns of a single system very little is actually
known, and answers tend to be mostly in the nature of impressionistic
beliefs and vague hypotheses. One such belief, frequently voiced, is
that the rules of evidence under the common law adversary system of
criminal procedure present much more formidable barriers to conviction than do corresponding rules in the non-adversary civil law system.
This belief is then related to a more general feeling that the "higher
evidentiary barricades" to conviction somehow emanate from the very
nature of adversary proceedings and that their lowering smacks of
the "inquisitorial" continental procedure.1 Both beliefs are interesting
to a comparatist.
1A recent example of such views can be found in the vigorous dissent of justice
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Consider first the comparison of evidentiary barriers. Even if a
comparatist is skeptical about whether, in their practical implementation, evidentiary rules present very high barriers to conviction in any
modern criminal justice system, he will still have to recognize that
there might be less prominent differences among systems concerning
the difficulty of proving the defendant's guilt. If these differences
actually exist, their importance probably exceeds the relatively narrow
and technical field of evidence. True, it would be fallacious to infer
from a finding of relatively high evidentiary obstacles, that the criminal
justice system as a whole will find it difficult to maintain a high conviction rate. For it is possible, for instance, that grave evidentiary
problems arising for the prosecutor under one mode of proceedings
within a system will be instrumental in the development of alternative
and less demanding ways of processing criminal cases.' Similarly, it
would be erroneous to infer from relatively high evidentiary obstacles
to conviction that, as a result, the factfinding precision within the system is also high. Higher barriers to conviction not only decrease the
chances that an innocent person may be convicted but-perhaps in
equal measure-also increase the chances that the guilty may escape
punishment. Hence, by letting more guilty persons go free, the factfinding precision in the total volume of criminal cases may remain
unaffected or even be decreased. Notwithstanding all these limitations
on drawing broad conclusions from a narrow evidentiary point, the
comparison of evidentiary obstacles to conviction still seems to have a
larger significance. For it seems reasonable to assume that unequal
evidentiary difficulties in proving guilt, if indeed they exist, have
broader implications which somehow transcend the narrow bounds of
the law of evidence and affect the working of the whole machinery of
criminal justice. Perhaps they even exert an influence on the shaping
of doctrines and rules of substantive criminal law.
Assuming that the two evidentiary styles, that of the common
and that of the civil law, generate disparate problems of proving guilt,
can this phenomenon be related to the opposition between the adDouglas in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, and Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, at
406 U.S. 380 (1972). Believing that the rule requiring a unanimous jury verdict is essential
to the effective operation of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Justice
expressed his concern that the abandonment of the unanimity rule may "lower the
barricades" against easy conviction. The fact-determining process, he felt, may become
"stacked" against the accused and a step taken away from the accusatory system, presumably in the direction of continental "inquisitorial" procedure.
2 Suffice it to say here that, in a system like that of the United States, where the
overwhelming majority of criminal defendants plead guilty and the need for trial is thus
obviated, see TASK FORCE ON TnE ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON LAw

ENFORCEMENT AND

ADMinISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE

CouaRTs 134-35 (1967), prosecutors may be quite effective in obtaining convictions in spite
of carefully cultivated protective rules of evidence.

19731

EVIDENTIARY BARRIERS TO CONVICTION

versary and non-adversary models of criminal procedure? This is the
second major question of interest to the comparatist. In an age so
fascinated with constructing models it is tempting to test their explanatory force in the highly technical field of comparative law of evidence.
Equally interesting, perhaps, is the necessary propaedeutic to any such
pursuit: one must seek to ascertain-and the task is a difficult one
from either the civil or common law perspective-which procedural
ideas and structural patterns are embraced by the two broad classificatory labels of "adversary" and "non-adversary" procedure. Thus,
before exploring the possible relationship between procedural models
and evidentiary obstacles to conviction, one has to give, adapting
MallarmP's phrase to another purpose, "un sens plus pur aux mots de
la tribu."
The comparative study which follows will be in two parts. In the
first, more technical part, I shall contrast difficulties in proving guilt
that arise under the evidentiary rules of the common law and civil law
systems, in an attempt to test the validity of the general impression
concerning unequal obstacles to a successful prosecution.
But consider some of the problems involved in the comparison.
Within each of the two general legal systems, that of common and
that of civil law, proof processes change as we move from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. It is therefore only on a rather general level that styles
of factfinding exhibit certain common characteristics. Nor are evidentiary rules applied with equal rigor in all types of criminal cases,
even within a single jurisdiction. An additional difficulty resides in
the fact that, at least at first blush, there is so much highly complex
law on the common law side and so little law on the civil law side. Also,
there is in the law of evidence a very pronounced disparity between the
law on the books and actual practice. Everywhere so many tendencies
seem to be at work, often operating in opposite directions, that one is
tempted to suspect that a kind of self-canceling Brownian motion may
be the end-result. Finally, conceptual tools and systematic arrangements in the civil and common law differ so widely in the evidentiary
field, that one finds oneself groping for common denominators in order
to make issues comparable.3 All these difficulties require that I make
3 It is, of course, tempting to look for comparative statistics on the percentages of
prosecutions resulting in conviction in the two systems as an indicator of relative
evidentiary difficulties confronting prosecutors. Unfortunately, reliable and comparable
statistics on this score have not yet been compiled. But, even if such statistics were
available, it would be dangerous to draw far-reaching inferences from them in an attempt
to facilitate our inquiry here. The issues involved are highly complex. The screening and
selection of cases for trial is done in different ways in the two systems. For example, the
impact of the continental pretrial investigation would have to be correlated with the
effect of plea bargaining. Many other variables will become apparent as I continue the
discussion in the text.
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a few introductory remarks and a number of reservations before I
proceed to unveil the outline of this study.
The first remark concerns the problem of evidentiary styles. Do
distinct common and civil law evidentiary styles in fact exist, or are
they merely an invention of scholars? As I see it, they do exist and
they emerge from the confluence of three main factors. The first one
is the opposition, already alluded to, between adversary and nonadversary procedures. It produces, inter alia, such important contrasts
as the presentation of evidence solely by the parties as opposed to the
production of evidence by the judge. The second factor stems from
the difference in the structure of the adjudicating bodies. While in the
Anglo-American orbit rules of evidence were responsive to the demands
of trials to a jury of laymen, continental rules were tailored to meet
the needs of the mixed tribunal.4 Obviously, dissimilar evidentiary
problems arise in a system where guilt is determined by a body of
laymen, and in a system where guilt is established by a tribunal on
Despite all these reservations, the reader might still want at least some statistical
data as an illustration. Consider, then, statistics compiled for the French Cours d'Assises,
graciously made available to me by Mlle. Yvonne Marx, Centre Frangais de Droit
Compare, Paris. Those courts, which are not typical of continental adjudicative bodies,
see note 4 infra, are rough analogues of the common law court sitting with a jury: three
professional judges join nine jurors and decide both the issue of guilt and the sentence.
In 1967, only 5.299 of the defendants were acquitted by the Cours d'Assises; in 1968,
6.81%; and in 1969, 6.08%. As types of disposition other than those on the merits are
virtually nonexistent and statistically negligible, the reader may assume that in all
remaining cases defendants were convicted by the French courts. Now, if one bears in
mind that, over the same period, taking acquittals and dismissals together, only about
70% of defendants were convicted in the United States federal district courts, one would
be tempted to assume that these differences are very significant. I do not think, however,
that, in the absence of further analysis, such facile statistical comparisons have any real
meaning.
If, on the other hand, comparison of meaningful conviction/acquittal ratios, here and
on the Continent, did not reveal any significant differences, it would nonetheless be hasty
to conclude that prosecutorial evidentiary barriers too are not significantly disparate.
That would be similar to insisting that two runners assigned different obstacle courses
cannot cross the finishing lines at the same time.
4 The jury trial was transplanted to the Continent at the time of the French Revolution and in the wake of continental enthusiasm with English institutions. Somewhat
modified from the very beginning (for example, there was never a requirement of
unanimity), the continental jury never really became acculturated and soon suffered a
decline, for reasons admirably related in Mannheim, Trial by Jury in Modern Continental
Criminal Law, 53 L.Q. Rav. 99, 388 (1937). At present the jury trial has been retained
only in a small number of Western European countries (Austria, Belgium, Norway and
a few Swiss cantons) for the disposition of a narrow class of criminal offenses. Although
Lenin had a few kind words to say about the pre-revolutionary jury in Tsarist Russia,
trial by jury was not adopted following the revolution of 1917. See 4 V. LmnrN,
Soc=EmYA [SnEcr F WoRxsl 83-84 (2d ed. 1928). Nor have socialist countries of
Eastern Europe opted for the jury trial.
The prevailing contemporary continental system is that of a unified bench in which
the professional judge or judges are flanked by lay assessors. Even in France, after the
reforms of 1941, the "jurors" deliberate and vote with the professional judges, so that the
system remains that of "jury trial" in name only. Adjudication solely by professional
judges, while not unknown (for example, such is the practice in the Netherlands), is
usually employed in the disposition of minor offenses and is definitely not representative
of the modern continental style. In sum, the continental law of evidence is most profitably examined against the background of trial by a mixed tribunal.
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which lay and learned judges sit and deliberate together. The third
and final factor contributing to the emergence of distinct evidentiary
styles reduces to the circumstance whether or not the trial is preceded
by a purportedly non-partisan investigation, the results of which are
available to the judges. Imagine only the numerous consequences
stemming from the contrast between a factfinder who begins the trial
sterilized of any prior knowledge of the case and operates initially in
a factual vacuum, and a factflnder who is familiarized in advance of
the trial with summarized records of all testimony taken during the
preliminary investigation. The evidentiary style emerging from the
compenetration of these three main factors leads me to the first important reservation. In cataloguing and contrasting evidentiary hindrances
to a successful prosecution, I shall focus only on those aspects of the
proof-taking process which seem to me characteristic of the respective
evidentiary style. True, adopting this limitation gives rise to the
apprehension that representational accuracy may be diminished, but,
at the same time, it enables me to extract and contrast the more salient
features of each style while avoiding fruitless analysis of minutiae.
If the first reservation decreases the precision of my exposition,
the second is designed to increase it. Jurisdictions in both the common
law and the civil law systems, of course, have evolved several methods,
of varying degrees of formality, for processing criminal cases. In most
continental countries streamlined proceedings were devised for the
adjudication of less serious offenses, while more elaborate procedures
were designed for the disposition of cases involving serious crimes.5
However, the continental defendant does not decide which type of
processing will be followed in his case; the nature of the offense in5
Many continental countries distinguish between "criminal" and "noncriminal"
offenses, notably in the area of traffic, economic, and public nuisance offenses. Conduct
characterized as "noncriminal" (which often would be deemed "criminal" in America) is
handled by administrative agencies, the evidentiary rules of 'which are less demanding
than those encountered in the processing of criminal offenses. But even in the realm of
criminal offenses proper, crimes of different gravity (in terms of penalties authorized) are
usually entrusted to courts of differing original jurisdiction, and somewhat different
procedural and evidentiary rules apply. The less serious the crime, the less elaborate the
rules. See, e.g., THE GERw" CODE OF CPniMNAL PROCEDURE § 407 (The American Series
of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 10, H. Niebler transl. 1965) [hereinafter cited as WzsT
GERMAN CODE]; CODE OF CRBMNAL PROCEDURE art. 392 (Collection of Yugoslav Laws
XIX, M. Dama~ka transl., Belgrade 1969) (Yugoslavia) [hereinafter cited as YuuosIAv

CODE OF CPMnNAL PROCEDURE].

In France, where the distinction between administrative offenses and criminal offenses
has traditionally been rejected, analogous developments in the evidentiary field took place.
Thus, before the Cours d'Assises, which try the most serious crimes, quite stringent evidentiary rules apply. The latter are somewhat relaxed in cases of median gravity, considered by the Tribunal de Grande Instance. Still less demanding, at the bottom of the
judicial hierarchy, are Tribunaux d'Instance which have jurisdiction over cases that would
in the majority of other continental jurisdictions be classified as mere administrative
offenses. See, e.g., Statute No. 72-5 of Jan. 3, 1972, 92 Gazette du Palais No. 1, at 58
(1972). See generally 2 G. ST=Ar= & G. LAVASSEUR, DIOIT PimNAL GLNRAL ET PROcEiuRE PfiNALE 460 (2d ed. 1966).
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volved is decisive. In common law jurisdictions, meanwhile, it is the
defendant who determines the type of proceeding in which his case
will be processed, by using the pleading mechanism and by exercising
waiver. Neglecting this by no means unimportant difference,6 I shall
limit my comparison of prosecutorial evidentiary difficulties encountered
in prosecution only to those problems which arise in the processing of
cases where the full panoply of evidentiary rules applies. Accordingly,
cases tried to a common law jury, a miniscule fragment of the totality
of criminal cases, will be contrasted with continental criminal cases involving serious offenses, also only a segment of the total picture. I
believe that this second limitation will prove not to be too disappointing to the reader. I impose it in part because the possibility of having
to try a case to a jury influences both the law of evidence and substantive criminal doctrines of common law jurisdictions. More important, limitation to this small sector of the whole tableau will hopefully
provide the right starting point from which to undertake a more comprehensive comparison of criminal justice systems.
In organizing the first part of the present study, adjudicative factfinding activities will be divided, like Caesar's Gaul, into three parts:
activities preparatory to proof-taking, actual proof-taking, and the
weighing or evaluation of evidence. Evidentiary barriers to a successful prosecution arising in each phase will be analyzed separately in full
awareness that related processes are thus examined in artificial isolation. But, before I close the first part of my study, the results of the
analysis will be placed in a larger context and its implications briefly
surveyed. After drying my theme in the closet of evidentiary technicalities, I will place it in a broader, more natural habitat. Hopefully,
it will then regain its proper dimensions and its vitality.
Since my conclusion in the first part of the Article is that the fullfledged common law trial does place somewhat higher evidentiary barriers to conviction than does its continental counterpart, I shall reflect,
in the second part, on the possible nexus between this phenomenon
and the opposition between adversary and non-adversary procedures.
Of course, one cannot set his mind free to speculate about this theme
before obtaining a sufficiently clear idea of the essential characteristics
of adversary and non-adversary types of procedure. Unfortunately, as
6

Under the American system, for instance, the defendant, by refusing to plead guilty
and to waive the jury trial, can cause a relatively minor case to be processed in the most
elaborate, costly and time-consuming manner. On the Continent, simplified procedural
patterns are utilized in the disposition of less serious cases, and the defendant cannot
compel the court to dispose of the case either in a more or a less elaborate manner than
that prescribed for the type of crime in question. The implications of this difference in
approach will be explored later, see notes 97-101 infra & accompanying text.
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the reader will see, there is more than the usual degree of confusion on
this score. The terms "adversary" or "accusatorial" and "non-adversary" or "inquisitorial" are assigned, both here and in Europe, a variety of loose meanings. Therefore, before hazarding a few thoughts on
the relationship between evidentiary barriers and procedural models,
I shall have to discuss the most important ways in which the opposition
of the two rival models can be conceived, and attempt to isolate the
opposition most fruitful for the purpose of this comparative study.
Having completed this preliminary work, I shall then argue that
the level of evidentiary obstacles which prosecutors face in the two
systems may well be related to the nature of the two rival procedural
models, in that the latter are committed to an unequal degree to the
pursuit of truth. Whether or not the two models in fact set different
store by the discovery of truth will be discussed in the last sections of
the present study. In this manner, the explanatory force of procedural
models will be tested in a narrow technical field, and both "myopic and
' 7
panoramic vision cultivated simultaneously.
I.

COMPARISON OF EVIDENTIARY BAmUIERS TO CONVICTION
A.

Activities Preliminaryto Proof-taking
In both the civil law and the common law systems the judge must
first decide what evidence will be examined at trial. It is here that we
encounter one of the most often repeated generalizations in comparative discussion of the law of evidence. It is said that while common
law systems are mainly concerned with the issue of admissibility, civil
law systems admit all evidence that is logically relevant. It is tempting
to hypothesize from this that on the common law side of our comparison the prosecutor experiences greater difficulties than his continental
counterpart in transforming his informational sources into admissible
evidence. As usual, closer examination tends to lead to qualifications
and refinements. Do they destroy the generalization?
In seeking an answer to this question, two kinds of exclusionary
rules will, for the sake of clarity, be held apart throughout my discussion of this initial phase of adjudicative factfinding. First, evidence
may, of course, be excluded because of the belief that it may impede
the pursuit of truth. But, second, it may also be excluded for reasons
extraneous to truth-finding considerations and often at odds with them,
as in the case of reliable evidence obtained in an illegal manner. I begin with evidence excluded under the first rationale.
7 12 A. ToYNr, A STUDY OF HISTORY, RECONSIDERATIONS 132 (1961).
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1. Admissibility Rules Designed to Improve Factfinding Accuracy
Evidence which has passed the test of logical relevancy and has
been found suitable for rational inference may still fail to be admitted
under the common law rules of evidence. Some of these rules, more
rooted in experience than inspired by logic,' exclude certain classes of
logically relevant evidence, largely on the theory that its impact on the
trier of facts may be stronger than its actual probative weight. In contrast, continental law does not contain rules excluding relevant evidence
on the ground that factfinders might erroneously assess its credibility
and thus endanger factfinding precision. This is not the place to enter
into a discussion of how much of this omission is due to the fact that
continental decisionmakers are not solely untrained citizens and how
much is due to other reasonsf The fact is that lawyers trained in the
civil law system are nearly unanimous in their rejection of this first
type of exclusionary rules. They seem more optimistic than their common law brethren that the factfinders, lay or professional, will be capable of disregarding the influence of relevant but untrustworthy evidence-for example, some types of hearsay-and, having heard it,
exclude it from the calculus of decision. Paradoxically, in view of their
general attitude toward anticipating the future by legislation, they are
more pessimistic than common law lawyers about the wisdom of framing general rules rather than relying on a case-by-case approach. They
do not believe that it is possible to frame successfully legal rules based
on expectations about the impact of certain classes of evidence. "These
are good rules of thumb in an average case," they might say when confronted with common law rules of admissibility, "and perhaps professional judges could use them to good advantage when debating evidence informally with lay judges, in situations in which the concrete
circumstances of the case at hand seem to make the rules applicable.
SSee 4 J. WiGMORE, EviDNENc § 1171, at 395 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). Examples in
point would be the hearsay rules and the general prohibition against informing the trier
of fact of an accused's prior criminal record.
9
The discussion here centers primarily on the presence, as opposed to reasons for
the absence, of hearsay rules. Many scholars attribute these rules to the existence of the
jury trial, but this view is questioned by others. In any event, many common law
lawyers currently find exclusionary rules, although somewhat modified, to be imperative
even in nonjury cases. See generally Levin & Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury
Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 905 (1971).
Those who believe that the exclusionary rules are a necessary corollary of the jury
trial will probably classify it as one of the ironies of history that the transplantationlargely .rejected later, see note 4 supra-of the jury trial to the Continent signaled the
end of a comprehensive system of evidentiary law. Throughout its history on the Continent, the transplanted jury trial operated without an analogue of common law exclusionary
rules. For an explanation of this curious phenomenon, see Hammelmann, Hearsay Evidence: A Comparison, 67 L.Q. Rav. 67 (1951).
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However, it is not wise to ossify them into rules of law."" Obviously,
then, common law lawyers will search the civil law in vain for the
hearsay rule, rules excluding gruesome or inflammatory evidence, and
similar rules of "auxiliary probative policy."" They will also be surprised or even shocked to find that, although the defendant is said to
10 How can continental rule-skepticism in the evidentiary area be explained? Some
will, no doubt, be inclined to view this phenomenon as rooted in the alleged continental
desire to reduce technical complexity in processing criminal cases to a minimum, and thus
"lower the barriers" to conviction. The historical perspective suggests, however, a much
less dramatic explanation: that the skepticism is a response to bad experiences under the
medieval system of legal proof.
Medieval evidentiary law, designed for use in the inquisitorial procedure, was
basically the same all over the Continent. Strikingly characteristic of this law were rigid
rules concerning the quantity and quality of proof needed for a conviction. Circumstantial
evidence alone was regarded as insufficient proof of guilt in "ordinary" (mostly capital)
cases. The defendant could be convicted only upon the testimony of two unimpeachable
eyewitnesses or upon his (usually corroborated) confession. Where the investigator
gathered the legally required evidence, the court was legally bound to convict, irrespective of its subjective evaluation of that evidence. The reverse was, of course, also true.
No matter how persuaded of the defendant's guilt on the basis of circumstantial or
legally defective direct evidence, the medieval court was not authorized to convict and
sentence to the "ordinary punishment" (for the most part, death). For an excellent discussion of these rules in their French variant, see A. EsaraiN, HisTomE DE LA PRociD D
cahrmxIE x FRAc1C 260-83 (Frankfurt-am-Main 1969) (photocopy of the 1882 Paris
edition). The underlying policy of this system of legal proof is expressed with great
clarity in M. CAPPELLETTI, J. MERRY!MAN & J. PERhLo, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEm 13942 (1967), but the reader should bear in mind that this exposition deals with legal proof
in civil procedure, where there was more emphasis on "numerical jurisprudence" and
more juggling with "proof-fractions."
Although late into modernity many, like Leibnitz, believed that comprehensive rules
could be framed determining a priori the weight of evidentiary material, dissatisfaction
with the medieval system of legal proof in criminal matters reached its high point at
the time of the Enlightenment. There were two primary criticisms. First, the factfinders'
ability to make a subjective evaluation of the evidence was disregarded. Second, the
rigid and very demanding standards of proof in cases involving major crimes brought
about the widespread use of torture, which, because of the unavailability of two unimpeachable witnesses, was often the sole means of obtaining the required proof for
conviction-the defendant's confession. See note 215 infra.
Following the French Revolution the so-called system of "free evaluation of
evidence" replaced the medieval system of legal proof. Both rules affixing a priori
weights to evidence and rules requiring how many and which pieces of evidence must
be gathered for conviction were stricken from the books. The inspiration of these
reforms was not a desire to "lower the barriers" to conviction, but rather a desire to
improve the defendant's lot and, more generally, to further factfinding precision. But,
and this is of particular importance, the rejection of these rules was predicated on the
belief that it is impossible to determine satisfactorily in advance the impact of particular
evidentiary material on the factfinder.
It now becomes obvious why continental systems reject not only rules assigning
weight to evidence but also rules excluding evidence for the purpose of improving
factfinding precision. Although the two types of rules are analytically different, they
are both based on the theory that one can satisfactorily draft rules of evidence anticpating the impact of specific classes of evidence on the factfinder. The difference is
only that one type of rule says to the trier of fact, "This is reliable evidence and you
must attach such-and-such weight to it," while the other says to him, "This is spurious
evidence and you may not even consider it."
"'This is Wigmore's term. See J. Wicm O, supra note 8, § 1171, at 395.
For the sake of comprehensive presentation I should note that there are a few
basically civilian jurisdictions which consider hearsay evidence ordinarily inadmissible.
Thus, in Japan hearsay will not be admitted in the most formal type of proceedings
unless the opposing party consents to it. See THm CODE OF CRarIMi PROcEDUrM arts.
320, 326-27 (compiled by Liaison Section, General Secretariat, Supreme Court (Japan)
1949). This, however, is clearly outside the main current of the civil law.
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have the right to lie, 12 he is freely examined for evidentiary purposes
and not required to take an oath.'3
No matter how important the difference between the two systems
due to the absence in civil law of these exclusionary rules, the distance
may easily be overstated and even misunderstood. Various devices
leading to the exclusion of relevant evidence were developed on the
Continent so that not all evidence that is to a continental lawyer relevant is ipso facto admissible. The comparatist must detect these devices disguised by different labels and ascertain exclusionary side-effects of procedural rules designed by continentals to achieve other purposes.
Let me quickly survey some of these devices. In all continental
jurisdictions the judge has the power, seldom defined with precision by
written law, to refuse examination of evidence even though it appears
logically relevant and there is no specific exclusionary rule in point.
For instance, in many European jurisdictions the judge may refuse to
hear witnesses if there is reason to believe that, even if the witnesses
confirmed the contention of the party, their testimony would have no
influence on the fact-determination.' 4 By means of this important
12 See note 44 infra.
Is The "prophylactic" rule requiring that the defendant testify under oath is regarded
by continentals as unnecessary. The oath, they argue, will not prevent the guilty defendant from perjuring himself. Further, factfinders will take the defendant's unsworn
statement with a grain of salt in any event, and will draw useful inferences even from
his lies.
Perhaps more importantly, the requirement that the defendant testify under oath is
considered by continental lawyers as undesirable and unfair. It is precisely on this score
that lawyers from both Western and Eastern Europe criticize the common law requirement as "inquisitorial." For an example of Soviet views on this point see N. Ar sxzv &

V. LuxAsWzvics, LzEnN m IDi v Sovwsxo UooLovNox SuDoxRoizvoDsTvE ELEwNMs
IDEAs ix SOV3'ET CRUflAL PRoczzoINGS] 183 (1970). What is the thrust of the criticism?
The requirement of oath is said to be an unfair pressure on the guilty defendant either
to convict himself out of his own mouth by telling the truth, or else to suffer punishment for perjury by lying. In view of the incentive to testify so as to avoid possible
unfavorable inferences from his failure to take the witness stand, the defendant often
has little opportunity to avoid this "agonizing" alternative. Placing him in this predicament is even termed "inhumane." Cf. 2 IF. BoUZAT & J. Pn AT,
"uTf DE DRorT
PENAL ET DE CaIao0LrOIE 944 (1963). In the language of Garrity v. New Jersey,
385 U.S. 493 (1967), relating to a context not so remote from ours as it might appear
at first blush, see note 40 infra, the common law defendant is viewed by continental
lawyers as "having a choice between the rock and the whirlpool." Few continentals
realize that it is the fear of exposing the factfinder to unreliable evidence which underlies the oath requirement. But even if they were aware that the explanation lies in
what Wigmore termed "prophylactic rules of admissibility," J. WIGmoR, supra note 8,
§ 1172, at 397, the strength of their belief on this point is so great that I do not believe
they would retract their criticism.
14For example, the court may refuse to hear a witness because it is already
thoroughly convinced of the factual proposition the party purports to prove. It must
be borne in mind that the continental mixed panel decides both the question of ad.
missibility and the ultimate question of guilt. Thus, decisions to deny a motion to examine an item of evidence often amount to an interlocutory verdict. For an extensive
comparative discussion of this problem, see E. KREuzER, Die BzsTnzarrux DEs UEANGS
DER BEwzisAvyarsA
rm DEruIsCeN, aANz sisc ExN wrD ITALIzN SCHx STMwaOZzSS
77 et seq. (1964).
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power accorded to the continental trial judge, many items of evidence,
inadmissible under the common law rules (such as, for example, multiple hearsay), will, as a rule, be inadmissible in the continental court
as well.
Another continental device exerting an exclusionary effect is the
so-called "principle of immediacy." It reflects a violent reaction against
a much criticized feature of the medieval inquisitorial procedure. The
examiner who conducted the secret "inquisitio" was required to put
in the record every procedural step taken and all evidence heard. The
official "dossier" (acta inquisitionis) thus contained minutes describing, among other things, the results of proof-taking. At the close of the
investigation the file was, in all serious criminal cases, transmitted to
a panel of judges who based their decision solely or primarily on evidentiary items contained in the dossier. The judges seldom, if ever,
came into personal contact with the defendant or the witnesses. The
realization that "original" evidence is more probative than evidence
filtered through intermediary sources led to the adoption in modern
continental procedures of the principle that evidentiary sources be examined by the decisionmaker in their original rather than derivative
form. Perhaps the principle can best be explained to common law lawyers as an extension of the "best evidence rule" to all types of evidence. The precise meaning and reach of the principle vary as we go
from continental jurisdiction to jurisdiction and it is generally one of
preference only.15 But, no matter how restricted the meaning of the
principle, it will often require the judge to examine the original declarant of a statement. Clearly, then, at least some evidence which is excluded in common law countries as verbal or written hearsay will be
rejected by the continental courts as violative of the "principle of immediacy.""' Considering that on the common law side of our compari15 In probably the majority of continental jurisdictions the principle is construed
narrowly, solely as a device to eliminate the documentary curtain from the trial. Thus,
whenever possible, witnesses must be produced in court in place of introducing their

prior testimony. In West Germany, however, the principle is interpreted more broadly
so as to prohibit, inter alia, the examination of a hearsay witness with respect to the
truth of the statement he has heard, at least as long as there is an eyewitness available.
The hearsay witness may, however, be examined with respect to the fact that he has
heard the original statement. In this respect he is treated as an eyewitness regarding
circumstantial evidence. See 1 E. ScEIm; L

uND zum GmacnTsvE

xomqxTAR ZUR STRAFaPOZESSORnNUNG

AssxthsGSETz 254 (1964).

MIt must be noted in passing that continental legal doctrine often exaggerates the
extent to which the principle of immediacy actually reduces the impact of evidence
examined during the pre-trial stages of the criminal process. Consider only that the
typical continental presiding judge is expected to study the dossier in advance of the
trial: without familiarity with documents contained therein he could hardly be efficient
in carrying out interrogations. It would be unrealistic to deny that the dossier leaves
at least some imprint upon the mind of the presiding judge, who is, in turn, a very
influential member of the continental mixed tribunal. On this problem see Jescheck,
Germany, in TAE Accusan: A C010anA=Ta
STUDY 246, 247 (J. Coutts ed. 1966). A
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son there are numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule, with all the
obscurity of their refinements, the gap between the two systems on the
issue of using hearsay is not as wide as might appear at first sight.
It is also easy to attach too much significance to the absence in
the civil law of rules excluding the defendant's prior criminal record
and evidence of other crimes of which he has not been convicted. Continental judges will agree with their common law brethren that the defendant's prior criminal record per se should not play a part in the
guilt determination as proof of a propensity toward criminal activity.
The explanation will, however, be different, exemplifying the fact that
some problems, which in common law jurisdictions would be posed as
questions of admissibility, are treated by civilian lawyers as problems
of logical relevancy. For example, continentals would simply say that
the prior criminal record per se, that is, without regard to its possible
value as circumstantial evidence, is irrelevant because it is unsuitable
for logical inference. Only if, as in proof of modus operandi, a prior
conviction permits rational inferences, will continental judges use it
for evidentiary purposes3 7 Further, the continental judge will refuse
to hear evidence of other crimes with which the defendant has not been
formally charged or of which the defendant has not yet been convicted.
The presumption of innocence will be said to preclude the possibility of
according any weight to as yet undetermined criminal activity, and the
latter cannot be determined in court as it was not charged. s In conof continental jurisdictions have entrusted the examination of witnesses prithe parties and only subsidiarily to the judge (e.g., some Scandinavian counfour constituent republics of the USSR). Under this system familiarity on
of the presiding judge with the dossier is no longer imperative. There is
basically civil law jurisdiction known to me where the presiding judge must
interrogation although he knows nothing about the case: Japan. This arrangehowever, termed "illogical" even by Japanese authorities. See S. DANo,
374 (B. George transl. 1965). Other factors operating
JAPANESE CaMrMAL PROcEumau
so as to reduce the practical importance of the immediacy principle arise from exceptions to it. See note 19 infra.
'T Al this is not to say that practically important differences do not remain. Thus,
for instance, continental lawyers will attribute a broader meaning to "modus operandi."
Consider as an illustration the "Karsriihe case," so vividly described in S. BEDFoRD,
TMs FACES OF JUSTicE (1961). In offering support for his judgment in this case, the
West German judge denies that he accorded any weight to prior convictions per se.
He draws inferences, however, from the modus operandr established in prior proceedings: all prior thefts were "stupid, impulsive actions prompted by sudden temptation, doomed to failure," id. 180. This particular formulation of modus operandi would
not seem to common law lawyers "so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature,"
in McCormick's felicitous phrase. McCoaRcx's HANDBoox o T E LAw OF EvmaEcE §
190, at 449 (2d ed. 1972).
Specific references to the use of prior criminal records as evidence are seldom found
in continental legislation. But see WEST Ga mN CODE, supra note 5, § 243, and the
comments thereon in T. KLmEIxECHT, SRAPraozEssoRnNuNo 580 (29th ed. 1970).
As there is in continental law no "impeachment" of the defendant in the strict technical
sense, and as he is under no legal obligation to testify truthfully, see note 41 infra, the
use at common law of prior criminal record to impeach a witness' credibility has no
precise parallel in continental criminal evidentiary law.
1Sin order to understand this difference, the contrasting procedural contexts must
minority
marily to
tries and
the part
only one
begin the
ment is,
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trast, common law jurisdictions admit such evidence under certain circumstances. Thus, though continental law, unlike the common law,
contains no express prohibition against introduction of these sorts of
evidence, it may be that, as a practical matter, it is more restrictive
than the common law in this regard. The fact remains, however, that
the continental judge will always be familiar with the defendant's prior
criminal record in advance of the decision on guilt. It is not too farfetched to imagine that this knowledge may tip the scales against the
continental defendant in some close cases where the common law defendant would be acquitted, despite the proclamation of the continental
legal folklore that the prior record is logically irrelevant.
It thus appears that the two systems are not so far apart concerning this first type of admissibility rules. Counter-tendencies to basic
orientations narrow the gap on both sides. Yet there is no gainsaying
that a great deal of information, inadmissible under common law evidentiary rules, reaches the continental adjudicators. Consequently, the
prosecutor in the civil law system will often find it less difficult than
his common law counterpart to squeeze his informational sources into
the corset of technical rules of evidence.
For our purposes, perhaps the most important residual difference
is the relatively greater ease with which the continental prosecutor can
introduce evidence of out-of-court declarations of witnesses. In virtually
all jurisdictions testimony recorded at the pre-trial examination, and
often even prior to that, during the initial police inquiry, may be used
in court for substantive evidentiary purposes. 19 The continental prosebe borne in mind. In perhaps the majority of continental systems the prosecutor is
required by law to prosecute whenever there is sufficient evidence of crime. Moreover,
joinder of offenses is mandatory. Thus, the judge is actually telling the prosecutor, "If
you have credible evidence of related crimes committed by the defendant, go ahead and
bring charges." True, sometimes it becomes absolutely necessary in a criminal case to
prove a fact or set of facts falling partly under another category of crime (e.g., in order
to trace a murder weapon stolen from a store to the defendant). Then this fact or
set of facts, rather than the offense as such, will be subject to proof in court.
19
True, evidence which has not been brought out during trial may not be used
in arriving at the decision. Evidentiary material contained in the dossier technically
does not constitute evidence, although it does in fact influence the presiding judge
and, through him, other members of the adjudicating panel. But, even disregarding
actual practice, once evidence contained in the dossier has been brought out (by reading
out summaries of interrogation or in some other way), it may legally be used for
substantive purposes. See, e.g., WEsT GEParA CODE, supra note 5, §§ 251, 253 and
comments thereon in T. KLEiNKNECHT, supra note 17, at 624. Information on Italian
law may be found in A. DE MA. sico, Dmmrrro PROCESSAun PENAn 243 (1966); for
French law see 2 P. BOUZAT & J. PiNATEL, supra note 13, at 952. See also YuosrAv
CODE OF CRILUNAL PROCEDURE,

supra note 5, arts. 301, 305. The practice of liberally

using prior inconsistent statements for substantive purposes is sometimes criticized, but
mostly by academic lawyers. See, e.g., 2 E. ScnanT, supra note 15, commentary to
§ 253, at 723. Even if a witness has not been interrogated before the trial, the substance
of his testimony can, under some reservations, be introduced through the testimony of
hearsay witnesses, such as police officers.
Depositions of witnesses made during the preliminary examination can be used at
trial under the English variant of common law criminal procedures. To the extent to
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cutor is, therefore, capable of "freezing" a great deal of crucial incriminating evidence well in advance of the trial. The extent to which
this circumstance explains the difference in attitudes toward actual and
potential witnesses in the two systems is too apparent to belabor 2 °
An argument may be anticipated here that no matter what the
differences between the two systems on this score, they are irrelevant
for our purposes. Exclusionary rules of the type now under discussion
make it more difficult to prove factual propositions. These, however,
can be favorable as well as detrimental for the defense. Accordingly,
the argument continues, if exclusionary rules create special obstacles
to the prosecution, they also affect the defense in the same way. The
conclusion is that these difficulties cancel each other out and the difficulties in obtaining a conviction remain the same.
Whether the first type of exclusionary rules affect both parties in
the same way is not easy to say. The constitutional right of the American defendant to confront witnesses, for instance, could, if stretched to
its full potential, prevent the prosecution from using quite a number
of hearsay exceptions while still allowing the defense to use all of them.
This would then mean that admissibility rules hamper the prosecution
more than they do the defense. However, this potential of the confrontation rule, advocated by some, has not been realized. 21 Besides,
many cognoscenti suspect that hearsay exceptions display a prosecutorial bias to start with. The outcome of these and some other opposing
tendencies 22 is unclear, and the argument about the mutually cancelling
which this is permissible, testimony obtained in advance of the trial may be preserved
for later use. However, the conditions under which such depositions may be put in
evidence are much stricter in England than on the Continent. For example, it must
be proved that the defendant was present when witnesses gave evidence and that he
had the opportunity to cross-examine them. For elaboration see KNN'ys OuTLunms or
CRamqAL LAW 511 (18th ed. C. Turner 1962).
2
OFor example, the motivation to bribe or intimidate potential witnesses will be
diminished in that their testimony has in a sense been "canned" for use at trial. The
absence of "material witnesses" in the civil law is only one of many other less visible
consequences. But, surely, the implications of this "freezing" of testimony at an early
stage in the criminal process have a broader range. They affect, for instance, attitudes
toward full pre-trial disclosure of evidence. At least some opposition to full disclosure
comes from the fear that evidence will be tampered with.
2
lThe strong exclusionary effect of the confrontation rules has recently been
advocated by Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 76, 89 (1971). But see Griswold, The Due Process Revolution and Confrontation,
119 U. PA. L. Rv.711 (1971).
22Perhaps one of them deserves mention here. It revolves around the impact on
the law of evidence of the lack of appeals from an acquittal. This is the rule in most
common law jurisdictions, while the opposite is the case on the Continent. Some would
be prepared to argue that this circumstance must in the long run inject a pro-defense
bias into the law of evidence. In an effort to avoid reversals, the common law trial
judge might lean in the direction of excluding relevant evidence for the prosecution
whenever its admissibility is doubtful, while giving great latitude to the defense. See
G. Wr.TAS, THE PRoor op Gu'LT 327 (1963). Others would make an equally plausible
argument that the judges tend to rule in favor of the prosecution in close cases so as to
preserve reviewability of their rulings. Note in this connection that Williams considers
hearsay to be admissible evidence for the defense, id. 209-10.
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effect may perhaps be correct. But when we place the issue in the context of trial mechanics, a new dimension appears. The prosecutor at
common law is the first to produce evidence and, in order to reach the
trier of fact at all, he is the first to be stretched out on the Procrustean
bed of the exclusionary rules. Prior to trial, in contemplating whether
to bring charges formally against a defendant, he must ask himself
whether the logically revelant information he has gathered will successfully undergo the legal metamorphosis into technically competent evidence. This, I submit, is a problem which the continental prosecutor
does not face at all, or, if he does, not nearly in equal intensity 3 But
here I am getting ahead of my story. Before considering the problem
of the prosecutorial burden to establish a prima facie case, I must return to admissibility rules and discuss their second type.
2. Admissibility Rules Governed by Considerations
Extraneous to Truth-finding
The second type of admissibility rules, leading to exclusion of evidentiary material irrespective of its reliability, is not unknown to the
civil law systems. However, it would be erroneous to assume that both
systems exclude roughly the same amount of evidence by virtue of the
operation of these rules. Even if we confined our inquiry solely to comparing statutory proclamations and formal doctrine, it would soon become obvious that exclusionary rules are more numerous and surely
much more elaborate in America than they are in any civilian jurisdiction. True, in the field of testimonial privileges the scope of exclusionary rules will not differ significantly.2 4 But, as we take a closer look at
23

Imagine how difficult it would be in many cases for the common law prosecutor
to establish a prima fade case without taking advantage of the exception to the hearsay
rule in favor of admitting out-of-court confessions of the defendant. It is indeed easier
for the continental prosecutor to take a case to court without the confession than it is
for his common law colleague. See Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and

Structure of Evidence Rules under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System
of "Free Proof" in the German Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 Burr. L. RV. 122

(1966). Note also the empirical data on the use of confessions by West German courts
in Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEo. SrTuias 146
(1972).
2

4 See Pieck, Witness Privilege against Self-Incrimination in the Civil Law, 5 Vms.
L. REv. 375 (1960). It is true that testimonial privileges are quite restricted in a
number of European countries (e.g., France and the Soviet Union), but on the other
hand some jurisdictions go even beyond what is customary in the common law countries.
Consider, as an illustration, YuoosrAv CODE OF CRmn=AL PROCEDURE, supra note 5,

art. 213: "A witness is not under duty to answer particular questions if it is probable
that, in answering, he may expose himself or his close relatives to serious disgrace,
considerable financial loss or criminal prosecution." Id., art. 215 requires the judge to
instruct the witness of his privilege.
The actual exercise of the privilege is quite another matter. Pieck, supra, at 389,
is probably right in his observation that continental witnesses seem to claim the
privilege less often than American witnesses. Also, continental lawyers seldom counsel
witnesses to use the privilege. In general, their contacts with witnesses outside the
courtroom are less frequent than in common law jurisdictions, and are often even

frowned upon.
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exclusionary rules concerning defective interrogation of the defendant,
the impressions begin to change. 5 Many continental provisions regulating the interrogation of defendants are silent as to the admissibility
of testimony obtained in violation of proper interrogation procedures.
This is a significant silence indeed when compared with express exclusionary rules relative to the defective interrogation of persons other
than the defendant. Only a small number of continental countries have
adopted express legislative provisions rejecting illegally obtained testimony of the defendant.2 6
But the greatest contrasts by far exist in the law of search and
seizure. Exclusionary rules in this area are a rarity in continental law
and the "poisonous fruit" doctrine sounds almost fantastic to civil law
lawyers.2 7 This is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the
continental law of search and seizure is much less restrictive than that
of most common law jurisdictions. Thus, for instance, the police can
always conduct a warrantless search if there is "danger in delay. '28
25
The reader trained in the common law should not hastily assume that views as
to what is proper interrogation of the defendant are the same when we leave the
Anglo-American legal orbit. The privilege against self-incrimination is not construed in
the same way. See notes 39-40 infra & accompanying text. Let it suffice at this point to
offer only one illustration: although most continental procedures accord the defendant
the right to remain silent in the face of questioning, not all of them require that the
defendant
be advised of this right.
26
See, e.g., WEST GERmAx

CODE,

supra note 5, § 136a; Tim

FRENCH

CODE OF

CRxNAr PROcEDmuE arts. 114, 118, 170 (The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes,
No. 7, G. Kock transl. 1964) [hereinafter cited as FRENCH CODE]; YuoSLrAV CODE OF
CanmqAL PROCEDURE, supra note 5, art. 203. For a comparative discussion of jurisdictions

favoring admissibility of evidence obtained from the defendant through illegal questioning if that testimony is otherwise reliable, see Damaka, Comparative Reflections on
Reading the Amended Yugoslav Code: Interrogation of Defendants in Yugoslav Criminal
Procedure, 61 J. Camm. L.S. & P.S. 168, 179 n.68 (1970). See also Pieck, The Accused's
Privilege against Self-incrimination in the Civil Law, 11 Am. J. Com. L. 585 (1962).
Two more brief comments seem in order for those in need of background information. First, a survey of much of the continental writing on defective interrogation of
the defendant reveals that departures from the prescribed manner of interrogation are
typically considered dangerous to truthfinding. Abiding by the rules of proper interrogation thus seems to be mandated solely by the concern for factfinding precision. Second,
in those rare jurisdictions where illegally obtained testimony of the defendant must be
excluded irrespective of its credibility, few courts would go so far as to exclude all
evidence procured as a "fruit" of an illegally obtained confession. Isolated views to the
contrary are mostly voiced by academically rather than forensically oriented lawyers.
An example of such a radical view is that of the West German K. Peters. See Peters,
Beweisverbote in deutschen Strafverfahren, in VERHa NDLuGOEN DES SECHSUNDVnEREIGSTEN
DEOTSCHE Ju-IST=NTAOES 160 (1966).
2
7That is, the doctrine that evidence derived from illegally obtained evidence is

also inadmissible. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
28See, e.g., WEST GEmurmI CODE, supra note 5, § 105; TnE CODE OF CRIMNAL
PROCEDURE OF Tx RSFSR art. 168 (H. Berman & J. Spindler transl. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as RussAN CODE OF CaznNAL PROCEDURE]; FRENCH CODE, supra note 26, art. 56.
Regarding objects subject to seizure, it must be emphasized that continental law
never limited searches and seizures to "instrumentalities" as opposed to items possessing
"mere evidentiary value." After the rejection in 1967 of the mere evidence rule by the
Supreme Court, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), the two systems have drawn
closer together on this point. But even where, as in West German law, the list of objects
not subject to seizure is quite impressive, there still remain differences of practical
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More important than the black-letter law is, of course, the problem of its practical implementation. Are exclusionary rules more vigorously enforced in common law than in civil law jurisdictions? In the
absence of reliable comparative data it is difficult to answer this question. If one were to seek to determine the frequency and vigor with
which exclusionary rules are actually implemented on the basis of academic discussions or in the light of the case law emanating from the
highest courts, one would be led to believe that the concern over practical implementation, at least in America, greatly exceeds the concern
evident in civil law jurisdictions. The volume of American constitutional law on exclusionary rules is clearly without precedent anywhere.
Many will argue, however, that academic discussion and Supreme
Court decisions are poor indicators of what happens at the trial court
level.2 9 Let us assume, therefore, that the actual significance of exclusionary rules in America diminishes as we descend from the level of the
Supreme Court. Even making allowance for this, there is still ample
evidence to the effect that exclusionary rules have, at least in America,
a much greater practical significance than in any civil law country.
In America techniques have been developed to insulate the adjudicator of guilt from the impact of evidence adduced in litigating
admissibility. 0 There is concern that the adjudicator of guilt, having
heard strong evidence of guilt, will be incapable of ruling impartially
on the issue of exclusion, or that the adjudicator, having declared evidence inadmissible, will not be able or willing to disregard it. Consequently, for instance, preliminary hearings prior to trial on motions to
suppress illegally obtained evidence are quite common in American
jurisdictions, and are indicative of the practical impact of exclusionary
rules. Even those in America who deplore the frequency of cases in
which illegal evidence reaches the adjudicator of guilt will not dispute
statistics revealing numerous cases in which incriminating evidence
importance. Thus, for example, private mail can under certain circumstances be seized
and opened. See WSrT GEawAN CODE, supra note 5, § 99.
It must also be emphasized, however, that all continental systems provide for various
safeguards against police abuse in conducting searches (e.g., two attesting witnesses).
Also, certain objects seized by the police (e.g., letters) can be examined only by the
investigating judge. Searches for intangibles, such as electronic surveillance, are regulated
so differently in individual civil law countries that I can offer no capsule view, except to
note that in every civil law jurisdiction electronic eavesdropping without a court warrant
is permitted in both internal and external national security cases. On this point, again,
West German law seems to be more restrictive of government authority than most

jurisdictions. See E.
continental
29

KERN

& C. RoxN,

SnvRvEPAmm.NSRECHT

102 (1970).

In addition, one must not forget that where, as in the United States, most de-

fendants plead guilty, the constitutional law on exclusionary rules is of little avail to
the defendant. In keeping with limitations indicated at the outset of this essay, I shall,
however, not explore the broader perspectives suggested by this point. See notes 100-01
infra & accompanying text.
80See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Similar devices can be found also in
nonjury criminal cases. See Levin & Cohen, supra note 9, at 918-25.
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has been ruled inadmissible with the consequent dismissal of charges. 1
What happens on the Continent? Surely the structure of the continental tribunal, where lay and professional judges sit together, makes it
somewhat less natural to separate issues of admissibility from issues
pertaining to the merits of the case. Even so, just as in American nonjury cases, procedural devices could be developed.32 This, however, has
not been the general course of development in civil law jurisdictions.
Although there are no comparative statistics on this point, I believe that I can state with a great deal of confidence that motions to
exclude illegally obtained evidence are much less frequently made in
continental courts than they are in America. Even where such motions
are made on the Continent, the preliminary issue of whether illegalities
occurred is determined in a somewhat cavalier manner by American
standards." Small wonder, then, that cases in which exclusionary rules
lead to acquittals are much more rare on the Continent than they are
in America. Let us imagine for a moment that it were proposed in a
typical continental jurisdiction that a hearing before another judge on
the issue of admissibility be ordered whenever the latter issue arose.
Serious criticism of this suggestion would probably begin with arguments centering on administrative inconvenience and on the injection
into the criminal case of too many "collateral issues" which tend to
overshadow the adjudication of the merits. Also, the danger of having
the same person decide the question of admissibility and the ultimate
issue of guilt would seem less plausible. But I believe that, if pressed
far enough, continental lawyers would admit that their opposition to
consistent and vigorous enforcement of the second type of exclusionary
rules rested in the final analysis largely on their fears that "obviously"
guilty defendants may finally have to be acquitted. 4 This to them
would appear intolerable. This reaction is, of course, shared by many
81

See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH:r.

L. REv.
665, 743-46 (1970).
8

2Such devices might include hearings before another judge, disqualification, etc.
See generally Levin & Cohen, supra note 9.
83 1 submit that even those who are highly critical of American proceedings upon
motions to dismiss would have to agree with my observation, which is borne out by
the facts that the same trial judge or panel decides admissibility as well as guilt or
innocence, and that attempts to develop techniques to insulate the trial judge from
exposure to illegally obtained evidence during the pre-trial investigation are very rarely
encountered. For two such attempts see FREaicE CODE, supra note 26, art. 173; YuOosrAv
CODE OF CaRmNAL PROCEDURE, supra note 5, art. 81 (requiring that traces of illegally
obtained evidence be expunged from the dossier). Finally, special rules on the burden
of proof-for example, placing on the prosecution the burden of proving that a confession has not been coerced-would seem to continentals to involve too much refinement and injection of collateral technical problems into the criminal trial.
84By "consistent" and "vigorous" enforcement I mean exclusion which relates not
only to the illegally obtained evidence itself, but also to its fruits. Only under these
circumstances can an argument be made that the exclusionary rule may serve as a
deterrent to illegal practices,
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lawyers brought up in the Anglo-American legal orbit.e Even so, I believe that a pronounced attitudinal difference remains, and that it reflects a larger contrast regarding views of restraints placed on the pursuit of truth in the criminal process. 6
3. An Overview
At this point I should attempt to pull the threads together. How
does the operation of both types of exclusionary rules affect the prosecutor's chances to obtain a conviction? If my analysis of the two types
of these rules is correct, the common law of evidence presents much
more formidable obstacles to introducing incriminating evidence than
does the civil law governing the identical initial phase of adjudicative
factfinding.3 7 As with American television, which has fewer lines than
the European, the informational sources the common law prosecutor
can use are less numerous than those of his continental colleague. But,
to continue the metaphor, does the quality of the picture on the screen
depend solely on the mass of relevant information? Surely not. But
only the rejection of some sources of information by the common law
can be explained by a desire to improve factfinding reliability. The rejection of others is clearly a conscious sacrifice of factfinding accuracy
for the sake of other values.
B.

Presentationof Evidence

The comparison of evidentiary burdens at the next factfinding
phase is complicated by the striking contrast in the way evidence is
examined in the two procedural systems. In the common law adversary
procedure each party presents his case, calls his witnesses and examines
them. The civil law non-adversary trial is in the nature of an official
inquiry presided over by the judge: whatever evidence he decides to
examine becomes his-or, rather, the court's-evidence. Accordingly,
there is strictly speaking no "prosecutor's case" and there are no "witnesses for the prosecution." The bulk of questioning comes typically
from the bench and it is the presiding judge who begins the examination of witnesses."
35
For a quite striking recent example of such disenchantment, see the dissenting
opinion of Chief justice Burger in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971), and his appendix setting forth authorities in support of his position, id. at
424-27.
SO These will be traced in Part II of this essay.
8 As the careful reader must have noticed, I have excluded from the range of
my discussion a number of problems with a definite bearing on the difficulties in introducing evidence. Most of these center around the so-called preliminary findings of fact
(e.g., laying a foundation for the use of various evidentiary and procedural devices, proof
of the chain of custody, proof of corpus delicti, etc.).
8 An exception to this rule will be found in I)enmark and Sweden, but evon there
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The consequences of this basic difference in the proof-taking style
are legion, but I cannot delve here into all their ramifications. Only
one consequence will be singled out for detailed discussion as it most
directly relates to my theme; it is the absence in the structure of the
continental trial of the idea that some evidence must be produced by
the prosecution before the adjudicator can proceed to determine the
facts of the case. The implications of this difference between the two
systems will be traced in the procedural position of the defendant at
trial and in the existence vel non of corroboration rules. Next, the impact of common law presumptions of guilt and restraint on evidentiary
disclosure will be examined and put on the scales in weighing procedural burdens.
1. The Defendant as an Evidentiary Source at Trial
It is sometimes said that there is no privilege against self-incrimination in the continental system of criminal procedure.3 9 If, parochially
oriented, we expect to find in the civil law system exactly the same procedural arrangements which in the American variant of the common
law system are classified under this rubric, the above statement is obviously true. If, however, we assume that the minimum content of the
privilege reduces to the idea that no person should be compelled to
cause his own conviction by testifying, then the statement is generally
false. Differences between the two systems appear only if we go beyond
the minimum content and explore the technical implementation of the
privilege, its range, and its underlying policies.4 ° These differences are
the judge assumes a much more active role in the proof process than is customary in
common law courts. Probably following the admonition of very influential scholars,
see, e.g., 2 H. ZACeAaRTA, HAMBNUCH DES DEUTScCHE
STRA PROZESSES 203 (Gbttingen
1868), the draftsmen of the German Code of Criminal Procedure inserted in 1877 a
provision providing for party examination of evidence. Although the provision remains
in the Code to the present day, see WEST GErma
CODE, supra note 5, § 239, it has
never been used in practice. Cf. 2 E. S
Tr, supra note 15, at 643. Similarly, the door
to party presentation is opened by art. 304 of the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure.
See S. DANno, supra note 16, at 374. For interesting developments in Spain see G. TACxENBERG, KEUzvERnOR u
UNTERsucHuxGsGRUNDSATz Eat SPANISCHEN STRA ozEss
passim (1960). The codes of criminal procedure of four constituent republics of the
Soviet Union provide that the judge must examine the defendant last. See M. CHELTsoy, SovrsxYX UOorVNY PROTSESS [SovIEr CInMAk PROCEDURE] 383 (1962).
For the sake of simplicity, I am speaking here only of the interrogation of witnesses.
Continental systems distinguish, however, among defendants, expert witnesses and simple
witnesses for the purposes of formulating procedural and evidentiary rules concerning,
for example, the manner and formalities of interrogation, duty to take an oath, and
so forth. Another important difference neglected in the text concerns the continental
rule of permitting all persons examined to give a narrative account first, before being
subjected to questioning. This fact, coupled with the more general preference for using
"spontaneous" rather than "coached" witnesses, is of relevance here, and will briefly
be touched upon at the end of this study. See notes 219-20 infra.
39 Cf., e.g., Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 541,
548 (1956).
40 Perhaps a few salient differences deserve mention here. The range of the privilege,
at least in its American variant, exceeds to a somewhat uncertain degree mere testimonial
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important here only insofar as they apply to the defendant's position at
the trial stage.
In contrast to the common law concept of the privilege, the continental defendant is not free to decide whether to take the stand and
submit to the interrogation process. Questions can always be asked of
him. He only has the right to refuse to answer at all, or refuse to respond to particular questions.4 1 Although, as a matter of formal doctrine, the trier of fact is usually not permitted to draw unfavorable
inferences from his silence, the defendant's quite realistic concern that
such inferences will, consciously or unconsciously, in fact be drawn,
acts in a typical case as a psychological pressure to speak and respond
to questions. Thus, it should occasion no surprise that almost all continental defendants choose to testify. 42 The pressure to speak is, I believe, somewhat stronger than the parallel pressure in the common law
trial on the defendant to take the stand, as more immediate inferences
can be drawn from refusal to answer specific questions than from the
general refusal to submit to the questioning process.43 Responding to
evidence, while it is strictly limited to verbal utterances on the Continent. Thus, for
instance, in America the privilege is said to bar forced production of the defendant's
records, while in civil law jurisdictions such production has no connection whatsoever
with the privilege, and is in principle permissible. It is also possible that the "communicative" types of evidence, to which the principle applies in America, see, e.g., Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966), are more inclusive than those governed by
the continental privilege. A thornier question is whether continental jurisdictions would
go as far as American law in construing what shall be classified as "coerced" testimony.
Can, for example, depositions be used in a continental criminal case which were obtained
earlier, in the course of an independent investigation of police corruption, from a police
officer who was warned that his failure to answer may lead to removal from his position,
as was the case in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)? I believe that most
civil law jurisdictions would answer in the affirmative. See in this connection the interesting disciplinary case in which the Court of Justice of the European Communities
drew unfavorable inferences from the defendant's refusal to testify on a crucial point:
Alvis v. Conseil de la C.E.E., 9 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice des
Communaut~s Europ~ennes 99, 116 (1963). Finally, as noted before, the privilege as applied to witnesses is in some civil law jurisdictions construed very broadly. See note 24
supra. It covers not only "self-incrimination" but also incrimination of close relatives.
There is also no possibility on the Continent to remove the privilege of a witness by granting him immunity.
41
This right of silence is of a relatively recent vintage on the Continent. The
medieval inquisitorial procedure not only required that the defendant testify, but also
permitted enforcement of this duty through torture. After the use of torture was outlawed toward the end of the 18th century, most continental procedural systems still
provided that the defendant had the "duty to answer" and even threatened punishments
(poenae inobedientia) for failure to obey it. See, e.g., E. SCMIMT, EMPUMTNG IN DIE
GEsCEICTE DER DEUTSCHEN STEARECBTSP ILEGE 271 (3d ed. 1965). Surprisingly enough,
some vestiges of this view still survive in continental procedural law. See, e.g., H. PMNrnNGFR, Die Wahrheitspfticht des Beschuldigten im schweitzerischen Strafverfahren, in
PROBM DES scUwMrERscHm
STas~'rRozssaEcHTs 116-20 (K. Bader ed. 1966).
42
Refusals to answer any questions at all are mostly encountered in political trials
where such an attitude may be interpreted as defiance of the court and as a political
protest.
43
As indicated earlier, the overwhelming majority of continental defendants choose
to answer most questions. But even if they refuse to say anything, many systems would
still permit the judges to address specific questions to them. The view expressed in the
text seems to be shared by Glanville Williams. See G. WiLIAns, supra note 22, at 63.
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these pressures, the guilty defendant will often resort to lies in order
to escape conviction. Nevertheless, recognizing and tolerating this frequently instinctive desire of the guilty defendant to play the innocent,
modern continental systems generally refuse to put the defendant on
oath. Nor do any adverse legal consequences befall the defendant if
the falsity of his testimony is established at trial,44 though he will, of
course, hurt his credibility as an evidentiary source. It appears, then,
that the continental system is not concerned about exposing the trier
of fact to the defendant's unsworn testimony, although-considered
as a class-it is of dubious trustworthiness. It is believed that precious
information can be obtained even from false denials of guilt, detected
inconsistencies, and other verbal or non-verbal expressions emanating
from the defendant's person. All this information enters into the totality of data on the basis of which guilt-determination will eventually be
made.
So much for the preliminary juxtaposition of the "right not to be
questioned" and the "right not to answer questions" at trial. The
proper dimensions of the difference in the approach of the two systems
to the use of the defendant's testimony at trial can, however, not be
ascertained if one ignores the time sequence. In the common law trial,
of course, the defendant cannot take the stand, even if he wishes to
do so, before the prosecution has established a prima facie case. Before he is given a chance to submit to questioning, he has already heard
the witnesses for the prosecution. Consider the defendant's position in
the continental courtroom. As there is no requirement here that the
prosecution establish a credible case before the defense introduces its
evidence, there is no obstacle to beginning the proof-taking stage by
the interrogation of the defendant, and this in fact is the rule in con44
The fact that no adverse legal consequences befall the defendant even if the
falsity of his testimony is discovered has led some continental scholars to postulate that
the defendant has a "right to lie." This is, at the least, analytically fallacious. Cf. 1
G. Foscmm, SI TEMA D.L DnUTTo PROcUSSiAmE PENALE 437 (1965); H. PEENNINGER,
supra note 41, at 105; 2 E. ScaIT, supra note 15, commentary to § 136 nos. 11, 13, 15.
More importantly, the theoretical construct of the "right to lie" glosses over the
fact that, as a practical matter, detected inconsistencies or outright lies in the defendant's
testimony will be assessed against him by the factfinder. The defendant will diminish
his credibility as a source of information favorable to his case, and his denials will
lose their probative value.
Furthermore, the defendant's lies and "persistent" false denials usually affect the
sentence. In some European jurisdictions it is a common, although not universally
accepted, practice to consider detected lies as an aggravating circumstance. For example,

see the West German practice described in H. BauNs, STRmrzrassUse-SRE=T: A.LGEamanma Tmir 526 (1967). Compare also the prosecutor's closing argument in S. BED.oRD,

supra note 17, at 177. True, the doctrine in a number of civilian jurisdictions declares
that false denials should not be considered an aggravating circumstance, but the doctrine
is difficult to reconcile with the almost universally accepted practice of treating confessions of guilt as a mitigating factor. The more we proceed along this line of analysis,
the more the notion of a "right to lie" appears Pickwickian. It may more meaningfully
be said that the defendant's lies are tolerated by the criminal justice system.
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tinental systems 5 True, the continental legal folklore tells us that the
defendant's interrogation comes first because it is primarily a means
accorded him to contest the prosecutor's charges 6 But, whatever the
proclaimed rationale, the fact still remains that in all continental systems the defendant is used as an evidentiary source before any other
evidence has been examined at the trial 7 While the strategic value of
this arrangement for the defense is a matter of some dispute, there is
little doubt that it is advantageous to the prosecution. 4 At the begin45
The only system on the Continent under which there was no interrogation of the
defendant at trial before incriminating evidence raised the need for some kind of defense
was that of the Russian Tsarist Criminal Procedural Code, provided that the defendant
declared himself not guilty. The defendant was examined first only if at the beginning
of the trial he chose to confess. See Fonns y, Kurs UGOLOVNAGO SUDopRiozsTvA
[A CoUmSE in CanmqAL PROCEDuRE BnoRE Tm CoumTs] 361 (2d ed. 1899). On the
legislative history of this procedural arrangement see I. SCHCHEGLoviTov, UsTAV UGoLoVNAGo SUDOPROIZVODSTVA PO PRODOLZE nxtU [CODE OF CRTIINAL PROCEDURE] 528

(1913).
Distantly echoing this procedural arrangement, existing Soviet law is quite flexible in
its provisions regarding the order of examining defendants and witnesses. Although the
defendant's interrogation will usually precede the hearing of witnesses, judges may decide
to hear witnesses first, in order to show to the defendant "the pointlessness" of his
persistent denials. See M. CHELTSOV, supra note 38, at 382.
46
The folklore is reflected in legal semantics. The term "interrogation" is sometimes
replaced by expressions which connote that the judge passively listens to the defendant's
narrative. Another amusing example of downgrading the evidentiary aspects of the
defendant's interrogation is to regulate it outside of code provisions on the reception of
evidence. Thus, WEsT GERzr= CODE, supra note 5, art. 244(I) provides that "the reception of the evidence follows the examination of the defendant." For a realistic assessment
of the actual meaning of the defendant's interrogation, see Dominioni, Imputato, in 20
ENCICLOPEDIA DEL Dmmo 789, 813-15 (1970); Bayer, La Signification de L'Aveu de
L'Inculpi dans le Droit de Procddure Pbnale de Certains Astats Occidentaux Europlens,
2 (N.S.) RivIsTA ITALIANA Di DmiTro E PROCEDURA PmAnLE 724 (1959).
47 Someone might say at this point that a strong case has already been established
prior to trial, in the course of the preliminary investigation, and that there is consequently no need for the prosecution to establish a prima fade case at trial. However,
according to the continental legal folklore, the "veil of the dossier" must be lifted from
the trial in keeping with the principle of immediacy, and factfinding proceed afresh. See
note 15 supra. Accordingly, pursuant to the folklore's logic, evidence adduced before trial
is without weight, so that the defendant is indeed interrogated before any technical
evidence is in. In actual practice, the presiding judge will, in most jurisdictions, have
studied the dossier and familiarized himself with this continental variation on the theme
of prima fade proof. However, the fact still remains that the defendant is examined by
the judge before any other evidence has been heard directly by him, or in any way by
other members of the panel.
48
Glanville Williams suggests that the continental practice of examining the defendant first has a "distinct" advantage of giving him the chance to make the "first impression" on the factfinder. G. WLAss, supra note 22, at 81-82. He seems to have some
support among behavioral scientists. For instance, F. LuNo, EmToois or MmT 38-41
(1930), argued that there is a "law of primacy" in persuasion. A person exposed to adversary argumentation forms his opinion on the basis of the first argument and this
opinion cannot be easily dislodged. For an empirical study indicating that the party who
goes second in proceedings has the advantage, see Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, Order of
Presentationat Trial, 82 YALE L.J. 216 (1972). It is submitted, with deference, that the
defendant's alleged advantage pales to insignificance when assessed against the disadvantage of having to argue before knowing how the prosecution's case will develop.
Also, the first thesis, in a sense, is actually that of the prosecution, contained in the
indictment which in continental courtrooms is read out along with detailed supporting
grounds. If one adds to it the possibility that the defendant's argument may be poor and
unconvincing and that he may entangle himself in contradictions, one will probably be
led to the belief that the defendant's "advantage" is a kind of privilegium odiosum. For
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ning of the case the prosecutor may sit back and expect that leads or
evidence damaging to the defendant will come out of his interrogation.
Also, the prosecutor may hope that the concocted story of a guilty defendant will crumble in the light of testimony of subsequent witnesses.
In contrast, the prosecutor in the common law system must, before he
can hope to obtain incriminating evidence through the trial interrogation process of the defendant, come forward with substantive proof of
guilt by using items of evidence other than the defendant's statements
in court.4 9
2. Operation of Corroboration Rules
The operation of the so-called corroboration rules of evidence in
the common law system creates another possible barrier to conviction
which continental prosecutors have never encountered. Of course, the
term "corroboration" has many meanings and denotes various evidentiary devices. Some of these affect the admission of evidence, while
others bear on its final weighing.e° What concerns us here are only
those rules of corroboration which prevent the prosecution from even
reaching the factfinder on a given point unless the required additional
piece of corroborating evidence has been produced. Such rules are numerous and their impact of great practical importance in many cases.
For instance, the testimony of a rape victim will, in many American
jurisdictions, if not corroborated by other evidence, not even be given
to the trier of facts to evaluate. In other words, the prosecution will
fail to establish a prima facie case of rape.
Again, the contrast with the situation on the Continent is striking.
Not only is there no requirement for the prosecution to make out a
prima facie case, but there are also no evidentiary rules requiring that
a certain proposition of fact necessary for the ascertainment of guilt
be proved by more than one piece of evidence. Such rules would signify
a somewhat similar argument to that developed here see P. BOUZAT & J. PINA , supra
note 13, at 1072.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the defendant's disadvantage is
lessened to some extent by his familiarity with the dossier. However, because the dossier
contains only summaries of testimony, the defendant cannot fully anticipate the actual
impact the testimony of any witness may have at trial, and this compensating privilege
to examine the dossier is not as valuable as it might initially appear.
49 This does not mean, of course, that the common law prosecutor will always use
evidentiary material emanating exclusively from sources independent of the defendant's
verbal utterances. As noted before, admissibility rules and the prima facie hurdle will
make the use of out-of-court admissions and confessions frequently even more precious to
a common law prosecutor than they are to his continental counterpart. See note 23 supra.
This instance of repressed needs for efficiency in prosecuting which assert themselves in
less direct ways will be taken up later. See note 100 infra.
50 Some others amount to the judge telling the jury that they may convict on uncorroborated evidence only if convinced of its truth. Essentially, they reduce to permissible
negative comments of the judge on the weight of evidence. Cf. G. WmLmas, supra note
22, at 170-71.
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to continental lawyers a partial return to the system of legal proof
which has been a bite noire since the middle of the eighteenth cen51
tury.
3. Counterbalancing Factors
a. PrimaFacie Presumptionsof Guilt
Difficulties associated with the prosecutor's burden of establishing
a prima facie case should be borne in mind when assessing, within the
framework of a comparative study, the role of those guilt presumptions which affect solely the burden of producing evidence, leaving the
burden of persuasion on the prosecution. This is, I believe, the actual
effect only of those presumptions which "drop out of the case" after
some adverse evidence has been adduced by the defendant, so that the
case is submitted to the factfinder as if no presumption ever existed.5 2
What is the real effect of such guilt presumptions? They aid the
common law prosecutor in reaching the trier of fact on a factual issue,
and frequently put some pressure on the defendant to take the stand
and testify, although the prosecutor has presented relatively little evidence of guilt. Obviously, then, such presumptions counterbalance
prosecutorial difficulties which do not exist in the civil law system.
As there is on the Continent nothing comparable to be counteracted, it
should come as no surprise that presumptions have no real counterpart
in continental evidentiary law.53
51
Corroboration rules would be termed by continental scholars negative, as opposed
to positive, rules of legal proof. While the latter require conviction where certain kinds
of evidence are gathered, irrespective of the subjective evaluation of factflnders, see
note 10 supra, the former require the factfinders not to convict, irrespective of their
convictions, before certain kinds of evidence are gathered. While the negative rules of
legal proof leave somewhat more leeway to the subjective evaluation of evidence by the
factfinder, they still violate the revered continental principle of "free evaluation of
evidence."
Whether all vestiges of the negative rules of legal proof have disappeared from
continental law is, however, not altogether clear. It is, for instance, a hotly debated issue
whether a judgment of conviction can rest solely on the defendant's confession, although
the judge is thoroughly convinced of its verity. In practice, of course, at least a modicum
of corroboration is always found. Also unclear is the status of sporadic rules requiring the
judge to call in an expert irrespective of whether other evidence has persuaded the judge
concerning a specific proposition of fact.
52
These, to Thayer, were genuine presumptions. See J. THAYER, A PRimmnARY
TREATISE ox€ EVIDENCE AT TiE CoomoN LAw 337 (1898). Why my discussion is limited
for the moment to this narrow class of guilt-presumptions will be explained below. See
text accompanying notes 54-55 infra.
53
Probably the nearest continental analogue to prima facie presumptions is the
theoretical construct of "factual presumptions" (presumptiones hominis seu facti) or provisional (interim) facts. However, those who hold that these constructs are applicable
to criminal cases-and there is no unity on this issue-include only one such presumption
relating to the defendant's guilt: the presumption of the defendant's sanity. Let us
sketch in a few strokes how the working of this presumption is explained by continental
lawyers. The latter view the defendant's sanity as his mental capacity for blame and thus
a necessary prerequisite to a finding of guilt and criminal conviction. Strict logic would,
then, require an explicit finding of sanity before conviction in each and every criminal
case. In fact, sanity will not be subject to proof in every case, but only in cases where
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How does this difference affect the comparison of prosecutorial
evidentiary burdens? As I see it, such "prima facie" presumptions at
best decrease the burden of the common law prosecutor to a level
comparable to evidentiary burdens of his continental colleague. Only
where they operate can an argument be made that prosecutorial difficulties in presenting evidence are not significantly different under the
two procedural systems.
As the initiated know, many other so-called "prima facie" presumptions exert their influence beyond the level of allowing the prosecutor's case to reach the jury. Whenever the jury is instructed on such
guilt presumptions, even if told that the persuasive burden remains
on the prosecution, its effect spills over and influences the jury in their
evaluation of evidence. If told by the judge that the law considers the
finding of one fact strong, though only "prima facie," evidence of
another fact, the jury will in most instances probably be impressed
by such favorable comment on the inferential value of a fact they
have determined.5 It would be unrealistic to ignore this spillover
effect. However, comparative analysis of this additional effect of presumptions must temporarily be postponed. It is only on the next factfinding level, that of weighing and evaluating evidence, that I shall
return to guilt presumptions 5
doubts arise concerning the defendant's sanity. This leads the continental scholars to
speak of the presumption of sanity.
That sanity must be proven only if there is some indication contra, appears to some
scholars to be the result of the operation of a presumption of sanity. Put differently, the
natural course of events is said to warrant a provisional (or interim) finding of sanity.
What happens if there is some evidence tending to indicate insanity? The presumption
(or interim fact) "drops out of the case," in the sense that it does not affect ultimate
factfinding. If the proof of mental capacity is inconclusive, insanity rather than sanity will
be assumed in most civilian jurisdictions, even though the presumption of sanity was not
rebutted. But this is as close as this sole continental factual presumption relating to
guilt comes to Thayerian prima fade presumptions. What are the differences? The
continental defendant is not required to come forward with one iota of evidence to rebut
the presumption; it suffices that some doubt arise in the context of the case, say, from
a remark of a witness offered by the prosecution. Moreover, the purpose of the continental presumption of sanity, unlike Thayerian prima facie presumptions, is not to
help the prosecution to reach the trier of fact, simply because there is no problem in
reaching him at all. Finally, the issue of the defendant's mental capacity for guilt must,
when warranted, be explored by the court of its own motion. It is the court's official duty
to establish all guilt-prerequisites, so that the imposition of criminal sanctions may be
justified.
For another rough analogue, the German "Schutzbehauptungen," see E. D6muNo,
DiE ERpoRscnum; DEs SACHVERHALTS IM PROZFES 232 (1964).
In America, the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code refused to grant the judge
authority to raise the defense of insanity sua sponte on the ground that it would constitute "too great an interference with the conduct of the defense." MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.03, Comment at 194 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Even so, some American jurisdictions,
such as the District of Columbia, authorize the trial judge to raise the issue of insanity
motu proprio. See, e.g., Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
54 See the perceptive analysis in Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and
Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE LJ. 165, 199 (1969).
55
The following argument may be anticipated here. The common law defendant will
often be saddled with the burden of coming forward with some evidence when facts
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b. Disclosure of Evidence Compared
In weighing prosecutorial burdens at the level of producing evi-

dence, there is yet another aspect which deserves discussion. It is the
problem of whether evidence intended for use at the trial has to be
disclosed to the parties. As noted before, the continental trial is
preceded by an investigation whose purpose is not only to screen unfounded charges, but also to prepare evidentiary material for examination by the court. The extent to which the defendant is entitled during

this investigation to acquaint himself with evidentiary material (for
example, by studying the dossier or participating at proof-taking activ-

ities) is differently regulated from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. But,
even in those continental countries which are most restrictive in this
regard, the defendant and his counsel acquire, before the case comes
up for trial, an unlimited right to inspect the whole investigative
dossier. As the latter must contain summaries of all testimony and
records of all proof-taking activity, the defendant can familiarize himconstitutive of affirmative defenses are in issue. As will appear later, see note 93 infra &
accompanying text, the idea of affirmative defenses is alien to continental criminal law.
According to prevailing continental doctrine, the defendant has no burden of coming
forward with evidence when facts are in issue which would be classified by common law
lawyers as affirmative defenses. Thus, a large difference relevant to comparative prosecu,
torial burdens of establishing guilt seems to exist on this score.
I believe that the contrast looms large only if we remain on the level of studying
continental doctrine rather than actual practice. In most instances the continental defendant will, for strategic reasons, willingly assume the burden (Darlegungslast) of what
the Germans call "Schutzbehauptungen." See E. DmuING, supra note 53, at 232. He will,
in other words, not remain passive, but testify to facts coterminous with facts constitutive
of affirmative defenses. Considering the fact that the common law defendant's burden
is usually sustained by the defendant taking the stand to testify on "affirmative defenses,"
the practical impact of the doctrinal difference is not hard to assess. In a typical case,
whatever burden is placed on the common law defendant to come forward with some
evidence on a defensive issue is only a part of the burden placed on the continental
defendant earlier, in a system where the trial begins with his interrogation on all issues.
There is, however, the possibility of a residual difference here. A case may arise where
evidence in support of facts classified in the common law system as elements of a defense
enters the case independent of the defendant's testimony, for example, by way of a
remark of a witness offered by the prosecution. Even if the defendant remains totally
passive in such a case-which would be rare indeed-the continental court will have to
explore the "defensive issue" as part of its official duties.
My view that practical differences are not very significant on this score is shared by
Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with American Law,
56 VA. L. Rzv. 239, 247 (1970).
56 A caveat seems appropriate here. The realistic assessment of the practical impact
of some very liberal continental provisions always requires that we explore whether or
not the bulk of investigative activities has shifted from the formal judicial or prosecutorial investigative stage to the often informal administrative police inquiry. If this
transition has in fact taken place, and decisive incriminating evidence gathered, broad
procedural safeguards during the formal investigation, such as inquiring whether the
defendant desires counsel, may well be of little practical value to him. They are, to
borrow a phrase from Chairman Mao, like a comb given to us only after we have become
bald. Perhaps the best known example of such a shift in emphasis from a very formal
investigation with liberal safeguards to a rather informal, low-visibility inquiry is the
shift from the former French instruction priparatoireto the enquite officieuse. See R.
Vouri & J. LiAuit, IROr P&AL ET PROCADURE PENA, 255-56 (3d ed. 1969); 2 G.
STnrsm & G. LvAssEm, suPra note 5, at 215.
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self in this fashion with all evidence previously collected. The prosecutor's charge sheet, framed on the basis of the investigation, must
indicate in considerable detail what the prosecution's legal theories are
and what evidence will be offered to the court. True, both parties may
introduce additional evidence at trial, but whenever there is surprise
and one party is unprepared to counter new evidence, the court will as
a rule grant a continuance.57 The practice of trying to spring a surprise
by the late introduction of evidence will be frowned upon by the judges
for a variety of reasons I cannot even begin to enumerate here. However, although the continental judge may reject proof offers by the
parties, he cannot "punish" a party by refusing to hear a surprise
witness. Such a ruling would be thought to violate the judge's duty to
ascertain the truth. In sum, there is full advance disclosure of issues
and evidence, and, in general, neither party can expect to score points
by the unexpected introduction of new evidence."
Some common law jurisdictions have of late adopted a type of
preliminary hearing which leads to a great deal of evidentiary disclosure. 9 The contrast between this system and the continental one is
not negligible but cannot be traced here. Instead, let me focus the
discussion on the contrast between American and continental attitudes
toward disclosure, for it is here that we find important differences for
the purpose of studying evidentiary burdens. The so-called "discovery"
rules differ to a great extent in American jurisdictions, but even under
the most liberal ones the defendant is not entitled to learn the substance
0 Moreover,
of what the witnesses for the prosecution have to say.6
often he will be left guessing as to who will appear in court as a witness
for the prosecution.
How does this difference affect our comparative analysis of
prosecutorial difficulties in obtaining a conviction? It is not difficult
to conclude that restraints placed on disclosure make it harder for the
American defendant to rebut the prosecutor's evidence, thus indirectly
decreasing prosecutorial evidentiary burdens. True, this conclusion
may be countered by claiming that surprise may upset the prosecution
too, and that both parties are equally affected by lack of disclosure.
It seems, however, that the prosecutor is more favored than the defendant by lack of full discovery, and that the "balance of advantages"
57

See, e.g., WEsT GEa AN_CoDE, supra note 5, § 246(11).
58 Of course, there will always be room for some surprise at trial. The impact of
testimony in response to a new question, deviations from prior testimony, as well as
many other factors may not be predicted through familiarity with the dossier.
59 See Norton, Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 11, 12-17
(1970).
60
Compare the comparative discussion of discovery rules in American and continental
civil proceedings in R. ScnEsmmGaE,
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is tipped on this score in the direction of the prosecution. 6 ' It must,
therefore, be conceded that American discovery rules create the second
counter tendency which reduces the comparatively greater burden the
American prosecutor sustains in producing evidence. Is this countertendency so strong as to reduce to insignificance whatever differential
burden the two styles of producing evidence place on prosecutors?
Here one must bear in mind that there is, from the American
perspective, a price the continental defendant pays for full familiarity
with incriminating evidence in advance of his trial. In discussing the
different concepts of the privilege against self-incrimination, I remarked that the continental defendant is more readily subjected to
the interrogation process than his common law counterpart, and more
easily available as an evidentiary source. In a typical case the pre-trial
dossier will "discover" to the prosecutor much of what the defendant
will later testify at trial. It is very unusual indeed for the defendant
to hold back information at the investigative stage and surprise the
prosecution by testifying at the trial. It would be less atypical if the
defendant revealed less at trial than in the course of the investigative
stage. In addition, the defendant's documents, including such items as
private letters and possibly even diaries,6 2 will be forcibly produced
and included in the file of the case. As a result, the dossier will disclose
all the incriminating evidence and exculpating evidence, much beyond
the limits dictated by American views on the privilege against selfincrimination. Thus, continental disclosure is more of a two-way street
than it can be, consistent with constitutional requirements, in America.
Nor is this all. As noted before,6 3 evidence contained in the dossier is
in a sense "canned" for subsequent use at trial, and the argument common in America that discovery may lead to opportunities for tampering
with evidence is just not given credence in the context of continental
procedure.
The price the continental defendant pays for full disclosure"
obviously reduces the demands which the proof-taking phase of the
61
See Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149, 1180-92 (1960); Norton, supra note 59, at 13-14.
62See note 28 supra. In the case of diaries, only a very limited number of civilian
jurisdictions place restrictions on their use as evidence. For example, see the famous
West German "diary case," 19 BGHSt 325. For an excellent discussion of this case see
E. KEm & C. RO.xN, supra note 28, at 102. Compare the continental approach to that
expressed in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), which still seems to be good
authority.
63
See note 19 supra.
64Perhaps I should indicate here that the problem of disclosure does not present
itself to continental lawyers as one of balancing advantages. Full advance disclosure is
simply viewed as one of the postulates of rational factfinding. The relationship of discovery to broader problems of procedural models will be touched on briefly in the

second part of this Article.
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trial places on the continental prosecutor. If, then, the advantages the
American prosecutor gains through lack of full disclosure are considered against the background of the total discrepancies which exist

between the burdens of continental and common law prosecutors, it
seems fair to conclude that, despite the offsetting effect of these advantages, some disparity of burdens still remains. The continental
prosecutor seems to me to have less difficulty in connection with production of evidence, although not nearly as much less as might appear

in light of the fact that he does not have to make a prima facie case
at trial.
C.

Weighing of Evidence

I now turn to the final phase of the proof process, in which factfinders weigh evidence and arrive at the decision, the common law
jury in the privacy of their jury room, and the continental mixed
panel " in the secrecy of the judge's chamber. I cannot explore here
many fascinating problems involved in contrasting the functioning of

these two different decisionmaking bodies."6 What is immediately
material here is the question whether the prosecutor will find one of

these two bodies harder to persuade of the defendant's guilt.
1. Different Rules Governing Voting
The common law verdict of guilty was traditionally required to

be unanimous. Of late this rule seems to be in eclipse, but is, despite
some quite recent ominous signs, still retained in the majority of
65 1 am limiting my discussion in the text to the mixed panel because it is the most
representative continental adjudicator. The jury trial has been retained only in a small
number of countries, modified and restricted to the trial of a narrow class of criminal
offenses. See note 4 supra. Where cases are tried to professional judges only-and this
is the case in most continental countries for less serious offenses and in the Netherlands
for all offenses-my arguments in the text will apply a fortiori. Perhaps the reader should
also be reminded that the continental mixed panel decides in a single deliberative session
both on the issue of guilt and on the sentence. The continental trial is not bifurcated into
the guilt-determinative and sentencing stage, as is the case in America.
66
One aper u related to my theme deserves mention here. In both evidentiary
systems, each constituent element of the crime must be proven. Of course, in both
systems evidence will be produced concerning only some elements, and the factfinders will
be expected to draw inferences therefrom of other facts. Yet a difference seems to me to
exist here, based on the impact of jury instructions on the one hand and continental
"free evaluation of evidence" on the other. Continental factfinders place, I believe, more
emphasis on the "Gestalt" of the proof offered and even matters not formally urged as
proof. The common law jury seems more inclined to "Balkanize" the factfinding process.
More individual consideration seems to be given to each element of evidence per se,
following suggestions derived from the judge's instructions regarding presumptions, his
appeals to disregard substantive use of evidence such as prior conflicting statement!, and
so forth. While it is true that instructions to the jury to ignore certain evidentiary
sources, or not to use them for certain purposes, are for the most part more honored in
breach than observance, it would be hasty in comparative analysis to dismiss their effect
altogether. Although formal continental doctrine sometimes requires that factfinders disregard certain cognitive data (e.g., inferences from refusal to answer certain questions,
or the impact of illegally obtained evidence), it should be recalled that no formal instructions to lay members of the mixed panel are required by law.
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American jurisdictions. 67 Continental systems never viewed the unanimity rule with favor. Even the French revolutionaries, who in 1791
were so enchanted by English institutions that they attempted a wholesale transplantation of English criminal procedure, never went so far
as to require unanimous guilty verdicts from their juries.68 Continental
adjudicators decide by a majority vote, often a bare majority. 9 Rare
indeed are voices claiming that the continental analogue of the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt presupposes a voting
regime whereby the prosecutor must overcome "reasonable doubts" of
all adjudicators.7 °
The implications of these different approaches to decisionmaking
are obvious. The prosecutor will surely find it more difficult to obtain
a conviction under the regime of unanimity than that of majority. For
if only one juror refuses to convict, say, because of sympathy for the
defendant, or because of very stringent views on sufficiency of the
evidence presented, there will be no conviction. Consequently, where in
the Anglo-American orbit the unanimity rule still prevails, the prose71
cutor can expect a less favorable "conviction-acquittal ratio."1
67 For centuries Scotland has required only a bare majority, and in addition permits
the "not proven" verdict. See I. WILLOCE, THE ORoINs AND DvnoPm= or THE JUar
IN ScoTLAN (1966). England abolished the unanimity rule in 1967, allowing the jury to
convict by a 10-2 majority. Criminal Justice Act 1967, § 13. The "ominous signs" referred to in the text are two recent United States Supreme Court decisions in which jury
unanimity was held not to be constitutionally mandated: Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
404 (1972), and Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972). It is quite possible that
these decisions may turn out to have been the requiem for the unanimity rule in America,
as many states could well move .to discard it.
68
See Statute of Sept. 16, 1791, pt. II, tit. VII, art. XXVII, 4 Lois et Actes du
Gouvernement [LA.G.] 267 (1808) (three dissenting votes block conviction). See also
Constitution of Sept. 3, 1791, ch. V, art. IX, 4 L.A.G. 222 (1808) (juries must have at
least twelve members).
6
A special majority is required, for example, in West Germany, WasT GmEMAN
CODE, supra note 5, § 263 (two thirds), and in France, FREcH CODE, supra note 26, arts.

296, 359 (eight of nine jurors). The requirement of a bare majority seems to prevail in
Eastern Europe. Of interest is the Swedish system, which places considerable weight on
the vote of the professional judge: the opinion of the lay assessors will not prevail over
the contrary view of the professional judge unless all (or, in some cases, nearly all) lay
assessors agree. See THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE ch. 29, § 3 (The American
Series of Foreign Penal Codes, No. 15, A. Bruzelius & R. Ginsburg transl. 1968) [hereinafter cited as SWEDIsH CODE].
7oFor an isolated doctrinal view in this sense, see L63sIuN & SE=, OETsEIM 1cHiscHas SnzAFPRozEssRacHT 99 (1952). Although, historically, the requirement of unanimity had nothing to do with the reasonable doubt standard, common law lawyers
frequently link the two. See, e.g., Hall, The Rights of the Accused in Criminal Cases, in
TAIxs oN AmisRIct= LAw 55, 64 (H. Berman ed. 1961). See also the dissent of Justice
Marshall in Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 399 (1972), and the more cautious
dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, id. at 381.
71 Cf. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 381 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
It is interesting to note in passing that comparative research lends some support to
the contention of the dissenters in Johnson and Apodaca that the rejection of the
unanimity rule will drastically shorten deliberation. The deliberation of a continental
mixed panel is relatively short, and few disagreements of a lone dissenter are maintained
to the final vote. For empirical data on trials in West Germany, see Casper & Zeisel,
supra note 23, at 151.
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2. Professional and Lay Propensities to Convict
Since the common law unanimity rule seems to be diminishing
in significance, another contrast between the two systems assumes
greater importance. In a jury trial the determination of guilt is made
solely by lay people, whereas in the continental mixed tribunal professional judges play an active role. If lay people tend to be on average
more lenient in criminal adjudication than professional adjudicators,
the jury will be more reluctant to convict than the mixed tribunal, and
the prosecutor trying to persuade the jury of the defendant's guilt will
have a somewhat harder task before him.
That lay adjudicators are, on the whole, more lenient, seems to be
an impression so widely shared that it has almost become a truism.
There is empirical evidence in support of these impressions, although
perhaps not enough to remove the issue entirely from the realm of
speculation. Disagreements between lay and professional judges have
been studied, both in America and in Europe, and the results seem to
indicate that in these disagreements lay judges seem on the average to
favor the defendant. 2 Moreover-and this is of particular importance
to our subsequent discussion-there is some indication in these empirical studies that those disagreements may not be entirely accounted for
by such reasons as sympathy for the defendant's plight, but also, to
an extent, by "higher thresholds of reasonable doubt" on the part of
laymen. 78 Lay people seem often to require more evidence to convict
than professional adjudicators, particularly in those cases where the
decision turns on mere circumstantial evidence.
Why should lay adjudicators tend on average to be more lenient?
I believe that we are presented here with only an instance of a larger
phenomenon observable in other areas. Max Weber has analyzed it in
talking about bureaucratization; sometimes it is discussed in connec2

Kalven and Zeisel have studied disagreements between the American judge and
jury on the issue of guilt and found the jury to be more lenient. H. KA vEN & H. ZEISEL,
Ti AnRxc:eA
JuRY 58 (1966). Recently Casper and Zeisel have suggested the same
tendency, although with a relatively small sample and much less pronounced, in disagreements between West German professional judges and lay assessors sitting together on a
mixed panel. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 23, at 154-60, 175. In drawing conclusions from
the work of Casper and Zeisel one must not lose sight of a subtle factor on which it is
easy to speculate but hard to acquire empirical data. Since the continental judge is a
towering figure, see note 77 infra, it is quite possible that the small number of instances
in which judges noted initial disagreement with their lay colleagues (6%) reflects the
reluctance of the latter to oppose the professional judge in the first instance. For additional information on diverging lay and professional attitudes toward conviction in civil
law jurisdictions see H. KAnvEx & H. ZEISEL, supra, 516-20, and Mannheim, supra note
4, at 103, 404.
7
3 See H. KALvEN & H. ZEasEL, supra note 72, at 182-90. Criticism of this admirable
study has perhaps detracted from the strength of some of its findings, but does not question its conclusion that judge and jury apply somewhat different standards of reasonable
doubt. See, e.g., Walsh, Book Review, 79 YALE LJ. 153 (1969).
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tion with professionalization, but it is also an aspect of any routinization of activity.74 In all these processes what is acquired is an ever
increasing measure of self-confidence, coupled with rational detachment
and matter-of-factness. So, just as in other human activities, prolonged
exposure to criminal litigation will result in a degree of case-hardening.
Experienced professional judges will tell us about the agony they went
through before convicting their first defendant on circumstantial evidence; cognoscenti might perhaps tell us that even jurors find it easier
to convict toward the end of their term. The longer one is involved in
the business of adjudicating criminal cases, the more these cases become depersonalized, mere representatives of general classes. Gradually
the morning freshness of perceiving each case as a unique human
drama is gone, and one becomes adjusted to the efficient performance
of a routine task. This, perhaps, is the unfortunate "d faut de qualitg"
of any professionalization.
Assume that there is truth in these widely shared observations.
It can then be demonstrated that the civil law system exhibits counterpressures to neutralize, when necessary, the differential lay predispositions in the adjudication of guilt.
Whatever influence the common law judge has on the jury is
limited mostly to instructions. The jury sits alone and decides independently. What evidentiary evaluation leads to a verdict remains
unknown because the jurors are not required to justify factual findings.
In addition, the absence of appeals from acquittals in the overwhelming
majority of common law jurisdictions removes another means of professional supervision of the jury.75 By contrast, the lay element on
the continental panel is much more effectively controlled by professionals. The professional judge or judges retire with the lay judges,
participate in the deliberation process and preside over the debate.
True, the lay assessors on the bench are more often than not in the
majority. Further, in most jurisdictions lay judges do play an active
role and are not members of the panel for mere cosmetic purposes.
Yet, few would deny that the professional judge is a towering and
influential figure in the eyes of his lay colleagues 7 There is typically
74
M. WEBER, FRom MAx WEBER: EssAYs n SocioLoGy 50, 54, 216-21 (H. Gerth &
C. Mills transL 1958).
75It is true that the absence of rational supervision goes in some instances against
the defendant, such as in verdicts influenced by bias or racial prejudice; but, on balance,
sympathy rather than antipathy toward the defendant seems to be the more frequent
operating force.
70This has recently been substantiated by empirical research. Casper and Zeisel
studied the rate at which initial disagreement on the issue of guilt between lay and
professional judges on the West German mixed panel is overcome, and discovered that
in about 70% of all cases lay judges surrender their initial dissenting position. Casper &
Zeisel, supra note 23, at 186. Cf. Zawadzki & Kubicki, L'elgment populaire et ke juge pro-
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also an appeal from factual findings, and the court must state in the
judgment why it gave credence to one item of evidence rather than
another. 77 The prosecutor thus knows that even if he fails to obtain a
conviction on strong evidence from the original adjudicator, he will
have another chance with the appellate court.
Further reflection reveals that the two procedural systems face
disparate problems in trying to attune lay factfinders to actual evidentiary standards in the practical activity of deciding criminal cases.
As the continental judges sit together, there is no need for the professionals to instruct their lay colleagues about the quantum of proof in
advance of actual deliberations. Nor is advance information needed on
how to handle possible factual doubts. If such doubts arise, the professional judge will advise the lay judges in the debate over specific
facts, during in camera deliberations. It is, then, not surprising that
very few continental systems require formal instructions on proof
sufficiency for conviction. The situation on the common law side of our
comparison is quite different. There is no informal exchange of views
and advice between the judge and the jurors at deliberations. Instead
-anticipating that some doubts concerning evidence introduced are
very likely to arise-the law requires the judge to instruct jurors on
the necessary quantum of proof before they retire. The instruction is
in the form of a rigid and abstract formula.
At this point, before discussing the implications of this difference
in approach, a preliminary matter needs clarification: is the quantum
of proof in the two systems basically the same? Somewhat reluctantly,
then, I must venture onto the very treacherous ground of comparing
the formal doctrines and actual standards governing proof-sufficiency
in the two systems.
That factual doubts in criminal cases should be resolved in favor
of the defendant is a principle espoused by modern legal systems,
irrespective of whether they belong to the common or civil law tradi
fessionel dans la procddure p#nale en Pologne, 50 REvuE DE DROir PftAL Er DE CR.uaNoLoGiE 919, 929 (1970). It is likely that some lay judges do not even bother to register
their initial disagreement in view of the dominant position of the professional judiciary.
This is particularly likely where the mixed panel is composed of an equal number of lay
and professional judges. In this connection see the interesting Swedish provision on the
weight of the vote cast by the professional judge, SwEDIs CODE, supra note 69, ch. 29
§ 3. For a more general discussion of the relationship between continental lay and professional judges see M. WEBER, RECHTssoZioLOGiE 288 (1960).
77
In some continental jurisdictions which have retained a modified form of jury
trial there will be, just as in the Anglo-American orbit, no appeal from factual findings.
The practical importance of the requirement to justify factual findings is sometimes
overemphasized. While the requirement no doubt introduces an additional degree of
rationality into the trial process and presents an obstacle against arbitrariness, many
judges develop standard explanatory phrases in their written opinions which often obscure
the reality of their conscious concerns. There is also the problem of attempting to explain
other people's thought processes in formulating a decision.
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tion. Labels do change: continentals speak of the maxim in dubio pro
reo, while common law lawyers talk of requiring proof "beyond a
reasonable doubt."'7 Moreover, the implications of the rule are differently perceived, especially as we focus more on details.7" Yet the
core of the rule, the idea that the defendant should be accorded the
benefit of factual doubt, seems an axiom of criminal justice shared by
nearly all contemporary jurisdictions.8 " Disturbing problems arise,
78 Both maxims seem to be of relatively recent vintage. Although it is usually stated
that the phrase "in dubio pro reo" was first employed in 1811 by the German lawyer
Stiibel, recent research has shown that it reached the German courts only as late as the
first decade of this century. Sax, Zur Anwendbarkeit des Satzes ,,in dubio pro reo" itn
strafprozessualen Bereich, in FxsTsCEzunR Fr ULaICH STOCK 143, 158 (1966). The
reasonable doubt formula is said to have appeared in the last years of the 18th century.
McCop.mcK's HANDBoox oF = LAw OF EVIDENCE § 341, at 799 (2d ed. 1972). Of
course, the idea that the defendant should benefit from the adjudicator's factual doubts is
much older: Some trace it back to Roman and even old Hebrew law. Those who
designed the medieval inquisitorial proceedings provided for special types of verdicts in
case of factfinders' doubts (absolutio ab instantia, plus ampetnent informi) and, thus,
by refusing to acquit the defendant outright, repudiated the idea that he should benefit
from the uncertainties of the factfinder. But it may be noted as a curiosity that even
the inquisitorial system of legal proof, within the syntax of its values, showed tendencies
to favor the defendant: for example, less evidence was needed to establish facts benefiting
the defendant than those detrimental to him. See B. CARwzov, PRAcTCcA NOVA IPERu As
Sixowica IERvmt Cax=NAL=r0a, Pars III, questio 115, nos. 74-75 (Lipsiae (Leipzig)
1739).
The relationship between maxims on factual doubts and the presumption of innocence
is subject to dispute, both in continental and in Anglo-American writing. Some believe that
the two are synonymous. Others believe that the presumption of innocence has a broader
meaning. It has also, they claim, an admonitory function, warning the factfinder to
make his decision solely on evidence adduced in court, rather than on inferences from
the indictment or even the arrest. Or, under another view, older on the Continent than
in America, the presumption of innocence protects the defendant from onerous restraints
during the criminal process. See Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the
World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 404 (1970). Without lingering in these
almost seraphic doctrinal spheres, let me make only a brief remark on this score. Even
if the admonitory function of the presumption of innocence is disregarded and it is conceived of solely as expressing technical rules on the burden of proof, I fail to see how the
two could be conceptually viewed as coterminous. The idea of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt has, at least potentially, a wider reach than the presumption of innocence. The
latter relates only to those facts which concern the defendant's guilt, while the former is
related to many additional facts outside the guilt-innocence alternative (e.g., mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, procedural facts, etc.).
70 For instance, various positions are taken on implications of doubts regarding facts
unrelated to the defendant's criminal guilt (e.g., statute of limitations), or even some
grounds for exemption (defensive issues) obviously related to guilt. There is also some
controversy whether the maxim requires outright acquittals or is compatible with equivocal decisions expressing the fact that some doubts as to possible guilt remain (e.g., the
Scotch "not proven" verdict, or the Italian "assoluzione per insuffldenza di prove"). See
A. DE UAnsICO, supra note 19, at 254. What on the level of generalities looks like common ground thus, in fact, covers much disputed territory.
80 The maxim is also espoused by East European socialist countries. See 1 M. STRoGOvsca, Kuns SovETsxoGo U~oLoVNOGo PROTSESSA [A COURSE IN SoviET CRnNnA, PROCEDURE] 358 (1968). Moreover, some Soviet writers go so far as to claim that the ideas
embedded in the presumption of innocence are actually observed only in socialist as opposed to bourgeois criminal procedures. Cf. T. DOBROVOScAnM, PRaNTSIPY SovxrsKooo
UO0LOVXOGo PROTSESSA [PRINCIPLES oF SovIEr C wAL PROCEDURE] 117 (1971). That
there should be only declared harmony (and that arpeggio) in accepting the principle, and
that it should even be used as a weapon in waging ideological wars should come as no surprise. As with many other vague legal maxims, it is high-sounding but commits us to little
in actual practice. Only China seems to strike a dissonant note, openly rejecting the presumption of innocence. See SiHAo CHruAN LENo, JUSTICE IN COMMXUNIST CHNA 63 (1967).
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however, if one turns to the study of the actual meaning and precise
character of "doubts" which must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Such questions are usually below the horizon of attention of
academic civilian lawyers, but they also seem to be seldom subjected
to candid and piercing analysis by more pragmatic common lawyers.8 1

The question, however, is of crucial importance to all novice adjudicators who need guidance on what doubts, if any, are compatible with a
finding of guilt. The superficial though authoritative answer to this
question is virtually unisonous in contemporary criminal justice sys-

tems: the factfinder must attain the subjective state of full certainty
of the existence of guilt before voting for conviction.

Is the law's proclamation in harmony with actual adjudicative
standards? Perhaps only those who never deviate into practicality

and owe little allegiance to reality would actually believe that the
answer is in the affirmative. If all imaginable hypotheses of innocence
which the factfinder surveys in his mind before deciding the issue of
guilt were in fact incompatible with a conviction, the practical activity
of administering criminal justice would come to a standstill. Even
where, as in criminal trials of all civil and common law nations, the
tolerable margin of error is small and proof standards very high, the

attainment of full certainty is an impossibly stringent requirement.
Besides, it seems psychologically naive to assume that sufficiency of
proof requirements do not change in the process of decisionmaking.
They depend on a number of sometimes imponderable factors, such as
magnitude of punishment, prior inquiries into guilt, dichotomy between
physical facts and "inner" facts relating to mental state, and so forth.82
But although some would admit that decisionmakers occasionally re81For a frank and perceptive analysis in the Scandinavian literature see Waaben,
Criminal Responsibility and the Quantum of Proof, 9 SCA"DINAViAN STUDIES IN LAW 243,
274-79 (1965). In England, Glanville Williams has reflected on the line beyond which
risks to the innocent become justifiable in the public interest. See G. WnzmAs, supra
note 22, at 190. In American writing Tribe has recently made some perceptive passing
comments on this problem. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in
the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. RIv. 1329, 1373-74 (1971).
82That the risk of error in capital cases is least acceptable and causes the most
stringent proof requirements is perhaps too plain to belabor. In the days of the "legal
proof" system this was openly recognized. But even much later, in some instances well
into the 20th century, a number of evidentiary systems retained the prohibition against
conviction in capital cases on mere circumstantial evidence. The implicit premise was the
idea that direct evidence is more reliable. Cf. 2 V. BAYER, JuuosLAvENsxo Kjrm6o
PRocESNo PRAvo [YuGosLAv LAw oF CMNrAL PROCEDURE] 36 (1972).
Regarding the impact of the distinction between physical and mental facts see
Waaben, supra note 81, at 277. Thus, for instance, very demanding proof requirements
will in actual practice be set concerning the question whether the defendant has fired a shot
at the decedent. Much less proof will be required to become "convinced" of the intent to
injure or to kill, although there is no legal presumption of intent stemming from the act
of shooting. Such intent will in a sense be expected because practical experience tells us
it is typically present. People seem to be unwilling to accept unusual situations, even
where these are much more proximate than mere theoretical possibilities.

19731

EVIDENTIARY BARRIERS TO CONVICTION

quire less proof, for example, with respect to very exceptional facts
such as those constituting duress or necessity, few would go a step
further and openly acknowledge that degrees of tolerable doubt change
too, so that tolerable doubt appears more as a sliding point along a
continuum than a fixed entity. For my part I believe, korresco referens,
that only the latter view corresponds to the psychological realities of
adjudicative factfinding, and can only hope that at least novice adjudicators will privately bear me out.
But if my brief remarks may perhaps appear plausible to behavioral scientists, why is it that they fly in the face of the modern legal
dogmatism and the proclamations of those who officiate before its
altars? It is exceedingly difficult, perhaps even impossible, to articulate
clearly actual proof standards applied in practice by experienced factfinders and the corresponding degrees of tolerable doubt in ascertaining
facts. It also seems reasonable to fear that making explicit qualifications and reservations on the probably unattainable standard of absolute certainty might lead to the lowering of proof requirements for a
*finding of guilt. The complex curvature and fine shades of actual
standards are absorbed in an imprecisely articulated form and gradually understood by the initiated. Their articulation and analytic dissection is thought to be harmful when disclosed to the uninitiated.
Thus, the issue is relegated, perhaps with wisdom, to those sensitive
areas in the penetralia of criminal justice where it is still thought
advisable to distinguish between exoteric and esoteric knowledge. In
short, the proclaimed views on the quantum of proof belong to the
arsenal of useful legal myths, and the requirement of absolute certainty,
in its form ad usum Deiphini,plays a useful, though imprecise, exhortative role, psychologically conditioning the adjudicator to use the utmost
care in guilt-determinations.
Assuming that the articulated standards on proof-sufficiency for
guilt-determination are essentially the same in both systems and that
actual standards in both systems are probably less demanding, what,
then, is the consequence of the fact that the common law jurors must
be instructed a priori on proof-sufficiency, while there is no such
requirement for lay members of the continental mixed panel?
Imagine a professional judge presiding over the deliberations of
the continental mixed tribunal who strongly disapproves of what he
believes, in the light of evidence, is an unjustified tendency on the
part of the lay members to acquit. Will he exacerbate his disagreement
with lay adjudicators by admonishing them on the "in dubio pro reo"
principle? It seems reasonable to assume that, in a typical case, the
answer is in the negative. Consider now the corresponding situation
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after the common law jury trial. Here the anticipation that some doubt
will always be a corollary of factfinding has led to the qualification,
unparalleled on the Continent, that not all doubts have to be resolved
in favor of the defendant, but only "reasonable" ones. I do not believe
that this qualification plays a significant role in terms of its actual as
opposed to "rationalized" impact on the jurors. But consider a case in
which the common law judge would convict while some jurors tend to
lean slightly in favor of the defendant, out of sympathy or some other
motive independent of the evidence presented. True, the trial judge
may, by the manner in which he delivers instructions, and, in a few
jurisdictions, through his power to comment on the weight of the evidence, attempt to influence the jurors. Still, inexperienced and awed
by their responsibility to decide on the destiny of a human being, will
they not tend to grasp for an opportunity to avoid conviction by
classifying their subjective state of mind as affected by a measure of
Creasonable doubt"?
To conclude. The absence in the continental system of the requirement that lay judges be formally instructed on proof-sufficiency
for conviction tends to reduce the difference between professional and
lay adjudicators in their attitudes toward conviction. In contrast, the
a priori, formal instruction on proof-sufficiency given to the common
law jury by the judge may subtly increase these dissonant attitudes.
3. Trial Structure and Evidentiary Needs
In talking about disparate difficulties faced by prosecutors in
persuading the factfinder of the defendant's guilt, a number of additional factors must be considered. They are independent of the layprofessional dichotomy, but are intimately linked to the different structures of the continental and common law type of trial. On several
occasions I have mentioned that the continental trial is typically conducted in such a manner that the presiding judge is required to study
the file of the case in advance of the trial.8 The extent to which this
practice creates a danger of bias varies from country to country. It is
less pronounced in those continental jurisdictions where pre-trial investigations are less thorough, and the investigating officer is not
required to voice his opinion on whether the case deserves to be
transferred to the court for trial. But whether from a comparative
perspective the trial amounts to a verification of the record prepared
by the investigator or is genuinely "creative," the impact of the dossier
on guilt deliberations of the mixed panel cannot in candor be denied.
While it is open to conjecture whether or not lay judges will be less
8

3

See note 16 supra.
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open-minded than jurors as a result of the knowledge that the case
has been "objectively" investigated before trial, the fact remains that
the professional judge will not approach the case as a tabula rasa. He
will have an additional edge over lay assessors at deliberations as well:
he will know more about the case than his lay colleagues.",
Another factor, seldom discussed, is relevant here. It is well known
to experimental psychologists that different people have disparate
cognitive needs; they often require different information, or ways of
presenting it, in order to be persuaded of, or simply to comprehend
a point. The continental trial is in a sense more attuned to this psychological phenomenon. All continental decisionmakers, lay and professional, are entitled to address questions to witnesses and take an active
part during the presentation of evidence.8 5 On the other hand, common
law jurors are passive observers of the examination of evidence, although, somewhat paradoxically, it is they who will have to decide the
case. Their immediate cognitive needs are often unpredictable to the
parties presenting evidence. It is, of course, possible that their general
predispositions and needs may be elicited through voir dire or anticipated through the familiarity attorneys sometimes acquire with a small
and relatively stable venire. But, on balance, more uncertainties and
doubts are likely to arise, ceteris paribus, among jurors than among
members of the mixed panel.
One can only surmise that the adversary method of presenting
evidence is somewhat more conducive to uncertainties and doubts than
the more organized and detached continental method. It is a truism
that the more points of view we take into consideration, the harder it
is for us to make a decision. When we view reality "through eyes other
than our own"8 and are presented each side of the story in the most
favorable light, it will become somewhat harder for us to become
absolutely certain that only one side to an argument is in the right.
Thus, it is possible to argue that the prosecutor will have somewhat
84 Although the professional judge is not supposed to inform the lay assessors of
evidence not actually adduced before them, it is not inconceivable that he may on occasion be tempted to do so. Quite apart from this, his superior preparation and familiarity
with the dossier will allow him to proceed with a speed and authority that cannot fail
to impress his lay colleagues.
85 Lay assessors do in practice exercise this right, although not as frequently as one
might expect. See Casper & Zeisel, supra note 23, at 149-50.
S6 This, in Fuller's opinion, is the primary virtue and indeed the justification of the
adversary system of presentation of evidence. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALxs
oi" A.mEP cx LAw 30, 43 (H. Berman ed. 1961). Spiro has stated, in discussing the
adversary trial and its implications, that the adversary style "contributes to lowering any
conviction that only one side to an argument is in possession of all the truth." H. SPmo,
GovENxMr BY CONSTrTUnO 230 (1959). A few passing comments on the complicated
question of which manner of presenting evidence is a better means of discovering the
truth will be made at the end of this study. See notes 218-20 infra & accompanying text.
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more difficulty in sustaining the burden of persuasion under the adversary than under the continental style of presenting evidence.
4. The Mechanics of the Persuasive Burden
So far I have dwelt on those features of the two procedural systems which, as I see it, make the jury more reluctant to convict than
the continental mixed panel seems to be. But even here offsetting
tendencies are at work. Happily, only one of these is usually considered
to be of major significance. In the common law system the burden of
persuading the factfinder passes occasionally to the defendant, through
the operation of some guilt presumptions and a number of so-called
affirmative defenses. On the other hand, continental criminal law is
said to have abandoned guilt presumptions in the course of the last
century. Devices resembling affirmative defenses were also discarded
in the belief that they were better suited to the private rather than
public law style of litigation. As these differences between the two
systems clearly affect the prosecutor's burden of proving guilt, it is
tempting to assume that presumptive devices and affirmative defenses
on the common law side counteract any greater burdens initially placed
on prosecutors in the Anglo-American legal system. Let me consider
guilt presumptions first and then turn to affirmative defenses.
a. Guilt Presumptions Affecting the Burden of Persuasion
That continental criminal law has discarded guilt-presumptive
devices while common law courts frequently operate with them is by
now a clich of comparative law. Yet it frequently misleads casual
observers for two reasons. In the first place, there are terminological
pitfalls: "presumptions of guilt" do not mean the same thing to continental and common lawyers. In the second place, it is very easy to fall
into the trap of comparing stale doctrine on one side with statements
accurately describing current practice on the other.
Continental lawyers are traditionally very careful literalists. When
they speak of genuine presumptions (presumptiones legis) they use the
term in a narrow sense: they refer to devices which always shift the
burden of persuasion,8 7 and are always mandatory in the sense that
87 In considering my references to the burden of proof in continental law the reader
must note that burden of proof problems assume a special meaning in the context of
nonadversary proceedings. Inasmuch as the continental court is under a duty to take an
active part in discovering the truth, the burden on a party to establish a fact always
"co-exists" with the duty of the court to ascertain the facts of the case. Small wonder,
then, that continental evidentiary burdens seem strange to lawyers trained in the common law, and that some perceptive continental scholars claim that in a non-adversary
procedural situation there is no allocation of proof burdens at all See E. Scrmi,
D urscers SaTAP'RozxssR.cr 60 (1967).

While it is possible that the burden of proof rhetoric in the continental system of
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they require certain inferences from the proven fact. Unfortunately,
the term "presumption" in the common law systems has "suffered badly
from rough and careless handling" 88 and this practice has left its
imprint on guilt presumptions as well. Even so, it does not require
much study to realize that most so-called guilt presumptions in common law criminal law reduce to permissive inferences; they merely
allow the factfinder to make a finding of the presumed fact after he
has established the basic fact. They do not require such a finding. For
all practical purposes they amount to favorable comments on the
inferential value of certain facts for a possible finding of guilt. Having
thus translated the bulk of common law guilt presumptions as continental permissive inferences, both the continental law and continental
adjudicative practices have to be scanned for functional counterparts.
Of course, it would be futile to look for precise analogues: in the absence of a genuine jury trial, there is no need for the continental
professional judges to instruct formally the lay factfinders on evidentiary matters. But, once again, let me attempt to lift the veil of
secrecy surrounding the deliberations of the continental mixed tribunal.
Experienced judges will admit that cases arise where they have to
argue with lay assessors to correct their "misunderstanding" of evidence, mostly of the circumstantial type.8 9 Is it too daring to assume
that in the course of such arguments they will often favorably comment on the inferential value of certain facts considered as proven by
their lay colleagues? I am quite certain that well-devised empirical
studies would reveal various interesting techniques developed by professional judges in dealing with psychological and epistemological
problems lay assessors experience in decisionmaking. 90 The actual
impact of some of these techniques is, I believe, equal to, or perhaps
stronger than, the impact on the jury of instructions relating to permissive inferences of guilt.
But even if most common law guilt presumptions (permissive
criminal evidence is an unnecessary borrowing from civil procedure, the fact remains that
conventional doctrine uses the term. The Thayerian distinction between the burden of
persuasion and the burden of going forward is traditionally not made in continental
criminal as opposed to civil procedure. However, in continental legal scholarship there
are some devices that express an essentially similar distinction. But this is no place to
consider this very complex problem, connected as it is with the great scaffolding of continental (mostly German) generalization in the area.
88 J. MAGnm, EVIDENCE, CommON SENsE AND COmmON LAW 183 (1947).
89 See the remarks of the Danish judge in H. KALvEN & H. ZESEL, supra note 72, at
519.
90 It is sobering to note that continental judges will quite often experience difficulties
in persuading lay assessors of the damaging character of evidence in many of those situations where a permissive inference (read "guilt presumption") appears in the instructions
of the common law judge. A classic example is the problem of proving that the holder of
stolen goods knew of their stolen character. See id. (observations of the Danish judge).
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inferences) do have functional counterparts in the civil law system,
there remain a number of those which would be classified as stronger
than permissive inferences, even within the continental classificatory
scheme. As noted, continental doctrine rejects such devices unanimously as contrary to both the presumption of innocence and the
in dubio pro reo principle91 It will be difficult indeed to find them in
continental criminal statutes. But the existing cleavage must not be
exaggerated. Meticulous study of continental court practice might
reveal an occasional genuine presumption, such as, for example,
mandatory inferences of drunkenness from certain levels of alcohol
in the blood."
In sum, what appeared at the outset as a momentous difference
seems, on closer analysis, to be only a minor discrepancy.
b. Affirmative Defenses and the Burden of Proof
The Anglo-American law on affirmative defenses is obscure and
somewhat confusing. Analytically distinct issues are indiscriminately
termed "affirmative defenses"; their relationship to criminal guilt and
thus to the proclaimed presumption of innocence has not been sufficiently explored.9" Clearly, then, trying to relate affirmative defenses
91
The modem animosity toward presumptions is delightfully illustrated by Freud in
his story about the man who was prosecuted for burglary. Proof that he had a jimmy
in his possession was considered sufficient evidence of guilt. When asked whether he had
anything to say, he begged to be convicted of adultery too, since he was carrying the tool
necessary for that offense on him as well. 21 S.FRzuD, STANDARD EDznoig or Co~mrr
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS or Si0oMUND FREuD 252 (1957).
Recently, presumptions of guilt in American law have been questioned on constitutional grounds. Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 425 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 54, at 176.
92
See, e.g., A. ScHr5NxE &H. SCHRODER, STRA"EsETzBucR, commentary to § 315c, at
1564-65 (15th ed. 1970).
It is also terra incognita how many evidentiary problems, openly soluble by means of
presumptive devices, are covertly "buried" in the substantive criminal law of both systems.
This burial may take place in two main ways. First, in order to circumvent proof difficulties in proving an element of a crime, that element may simply be deleted from the
definition of the crime. Second, if an exemption from criminal liability is difficult to litigate, it may be omitted from the corpus of criminal law. The continental vigor in
preserving the presumption of innocence logically intact and the continental abhorrence
of guilt-presumptions make it appear quite likely that a number of evidentiary problems
are buried in continental substantive criminal law.
Due to the operation of such covert devices there is a degree of amusing confusion
in comparative law discourse. I have heard lawyers from jurisdictions which refuse to
accept mistake of law as an excuse at all criticize the A.L.I. Model Penal Code provision
shifting the burden of proof with respect to mistake of law onto the defendant. The tenor
of criticism was that such a solution violates the presumption of innocence and some
related procedural ideas. Leaving aside the question whether or not there are better ways
to handle mistake of law, such criticisms verge on the ridiculous. At least from the defendant's perspective it is better to have a claim he has to prove than none at all.
93
Suffice it to offer only a few illustrations. Proceeding from what may be viewed
as their pristine meaning, one would expect that affirmative defenses imply admission of
the prosecution's case and introduction of new matter (i.e., "confession and avoidance").
While this is the case with some defenses, it is not so with alibis and many other contentions amounting to outright denials of guilt rather than its admission. Further, one
might be led to believe that affirmative defenses require at a minimum that the defen-

EVIDENTIARY BARRIERS TO CONVICTION

to their nearest analogues in continental law is presently a quite diffi-

cult problem which, for our purposes, need not be explored at great
length here. Let it suffice to juxtapose continental guilt-exemption
grounds94 with those common law defenses that are admittedly intrinsic
in guilt (or at least related to it) and which shift the burden of persuasion onto the defendant. Perhaps duress may be as good an illustration
as any of the same issue, differently classified by the two systems.
The continental guilt-exemption grounds must be established by

the continental court as part of its official duties. Moreover, in most
civilian jurisdictions the burden of persuasion is not shifted onto the
defendant and the quantum of proof is said to remain unaltered. 9 5 If
we look at the same issues conceived as affirmative defenses in the
Anglo-American orbit, the contrast is striking. Its implications for

the comparison of prosecutorial burdens seem, once again, to be very
considerable. If, however, we disregard the conventional continental
doctrine and focus on the continental law in operation, the gap between
the two systems begins to narrow. Consider a typical continental jurisdiction where the burden of proving a guilt-exemption is not shifted
to the defendant. Although the issue here is, to use a common law term,
part of the continental prosecutor's case, it seems hasty to assume that,
in actual practice, the same very demanding standard of proof-sufficiency required for most facts falling within the definition of the crime
will be required for the guilt-exemption. As I suggested before, the
required quantum of proof is variable in practice: adjudicators are
reluctant to believe in the existence of unusual situations and are more
dant put the matter in issue. But even this is not always the case. Consider the "affirmative defenses" which the judge may raise sua sponte, such as insanity and self-defense in
many American jurisdictions. Finally, while some affirmative defenses merely shift the
burden of going forward, others shift the burden of persuasion onto the defendant.
Here some semantic clarity has been injected recently by those who insist on the distinction between mere defenses and affirmative defenses. See, e.g., U'ITED STATES NATIONAL
CoanISioN ON REFoa oF FEmA. CRanNAL LAws, STUDY DAFr oF A NEW FEDEAL
CammAr. CODE § 103 (1970).
More serious to me is the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between criminal
guilt and affirmative defenses. This uncertainty is the compound result of the relatively
amorphous concept of guilt in common law jurisdictions and the confusing categorization
of "affirmative defense." The problem is far from academic. If, for example, entrapment
is considered a defense unrelated to actual guilt, shifting the persuasive burden with
respect to this issue onto the defendant may somehow be reconciled with the dictates of
the presumption of innocence. But, if a defensive claim, such as duress, negates criminal
guilt, then shifting the burden of persuasion with respect to it onto the defendant
simply means he has to prove his innocence rather than the prosecutor his guilt. One
cannot then honestly maintain that guilt must be proved by the prosecution and guiltexemptions grounds by the defendant. One is only the obverse of the other.
94 By "guilt-exemption" grounds I mean issues which would, in the doctrinal frame
of reference of most continental countries, negate either "illegality" (Rechtswidrigkeit) or
guilt (Schuld). For details see H. SIvinG, CowsT nu-Er ELEMENTs oF CWnr 381-89
(1967).
95This is not the case in all civil law countries. Thus, there is good authority in
France for the opposite view. See G. STETANI & G. LEvAsSEuR, supra note 5, at 21, 459.
Consider also the account of Danish law in Waaben, supra note 81, at 246-47, 253-55, 267.
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readily "convinced" of what happens in the usual course of events."6
Now it is easy to see that most guilt-exempting grounds are outside the
realm of the typical; if this were not so, continentals would probably
incorporate them into the definition of the crime. Accordingly, continental legal folklore notwithstanding, the prosecutorial burden with
respect to proving guilt-exemption grounds is somewhat relaxed.
Let there be no misunderstanding. Both presumptions of guilt
and affirmative defenses exert an offsetting influence in the common law
system and decrease the prosecutorial burden of proving the defendant's guilt. But I believe that their cumulative influence is not strong
enough to nullify my conclusion that the common law prosecutor
experiences more difficulties in persuading the jury of the defendant's
guilt than his continental counterpart does in persuading the mixed
panel.
D.

Summary and Perspective

What final picture emerges from my discussion? Now that the
judicial factfinding process has been examined in search of factors
affecting evidentiary barriers, we are in position to note in a general
way that each phase of factfinding activity appears to be a bundle of
offsetting tendencies. Clearly, then, it is not easy to make conclusory
pronouncements with great assurance. Yet I believe there is enough
basis for stating that the common law prosecutor encounters more
obstacles than his continental colleagues in all phases of factfinding
activity. First, he finds it harder to surmount the admissibility hurdle,
where his informational sources undergo the metamorphosis into technically competent evidence. He will also find that many more demands
are made of him at the level of presenting evidence. Finally, as I have
just attempted to show, the jury seems to be a factfinder more reluctant
to convict than the continental mixed tribunal. In sum, the initial thesis
about unequal evidentiary burdens appears to be correct.
Before I take up the problem of whether these disparate evidentiary difficulties are related to the nature of adversary and nonadversary proceedings, I would like to offer a number of brief observations. Some of these will try to place the problem of evidentiary
burdens in a larger context. Others will go to possible implications of
unequal evidentiary burdens, dealing not so much with more practical
issues but rather with those of a more "perspectivistic" nature.
1. The Interrelationship of Factfinding Styles
It will be remembered that, in exploring prosecutorial evidentiary
difficulties, I have contrasted only the most elaborate factfinding
96Note 82 siupra & accompanying text.
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processes in the two systems. As there are more than one in each system
of criminal justice, we must now turn to the problem of their mutual
relationship.
The range of differences among available factfinding styles is
very narrow in the continental system of criminal justice. Whereas,
as I have shown, the most elaborate mode is less refined and demanding than its counterpart in the common law system, the most summary
one is not significantly different from the most demanding. Factfinding must always be judicial and only a few evidentiary rules of minor
significance are relaxed. 97 Also, and this is very important for our
purposes, the continental defendant has virtually no influence on the
question of which mode of factfinding will be used in his case.9 8 Rather,
objective criteria are applicable: the more serious the offense, the more
demanding the rules of evidence for its processing.
By contrast, in most common law systems of criminal justice, the
range of differences of alternative factfinding modes is enormous. In
marked contrast to the very elaborate and highly technical evidentiary
style used in jury trials, there stands the very informal "administrafive" factfinding preceding entry of a guilty plea. Furthermore, it
is the common law defendant who decides which evidentiary mode will
be used: he can plead guilty, thus obviating the need for any adjudicative factfinding at all; he may waive his right to a jury trial; or he
may insist that his case be tried to a jury.
Now, it is probably true that the machinery of criminal justice in
most common law countries would come under great strain, and perhaps even be paralyzed, if the great majority of defendants insisted on
being tried under the full panoply of evidentiary rules. It is, accordingly, not surprising that various inducements developed in actual
practice for defendants to plead guilty and thus limit the factfinding
activity to more informal police or prosecutorial inquiries. While it
would be transparently naive to argue that only evidentiary problems
are operative here (for there are other, more pressing ones9 9 ) it would
be erroneous to deny their significance. Even if such factors as the
97

In principle there is always the need for trial with formal proof-taking (Beweiszwang). Only in the area of minor crime, some but by no means all civil law countries
have devised mechanisms obviating the need for trial. This, for instance, is the case with

the West German "Strafbefehisverfahren." See WFst Gmausar

CODE,

supra note 5, §§ 407-

12. Administrative factfinding suffices, of course, in the case of mere administrative viola-

tions. See note 5 supra.
98 The limited degree to which the defendant can simplify proof-taking is illustrated
by YuoosLAv CODE OF C nmqAL PRocEDuRE, supra note 5, art. 208, patterned upon the
Austrian model. For an example in Japanese law see S. DAe~o, supra note 16, at 372-73,
377-79. The Russian criminal procedure code of 1923, R.S.F.S.R. 1923 UGOL. PROT. KOD.
art. 286, attributed a great importance to the defendant's confession, giving the judge
the power to dispense with taking further proof if the defendant admitted his guilt. This
provision was, however, always disputed, and was discarded in 1960.
99 These reasons are discussed in A. BLUMERG, CRMArMAL JUMSCE 28-31 (1967).
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desire to avoid expense are assumed absent, there still remain compelling reasons to encourage guilty pleas solely on the ground of
avoiding the demanding proof-taking of the adversary trial. There is
probably in the factfinding area a point of diminishing returns in
trying to make proof-taking an "obstacle course" for those who administer the criminal justice process. What the latter will rightly or
wrongly feel as too severe a repression of a need for "efficiency" or as
too high a barrier will be subtly circumvented or satisfied by following a quite different route.100 Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque
recurret.1°1
But we need not pursue these conjectures further. Whatever the
reasons, the fact remains that in America, at least, the intricate judicial
style of factfinding is used in a small minority of cases; the great bulk
of offenders are processed through the negotiated guilty plea mechanism.102 And if we consider prosecutorial burdens in the total volume
of cases, what I have said regarding common law jury trials and fullfledged continental proceedings is no longer true. An opinion might
even be hazarded that, on this broader plane, continental evidentiary
standards for proving guilt are more demanding. This perhaps not too
paradoxical phenomenon raises troubling questions of policy. Assuming that we are not bound by preexisting legal donn~es, is it better
to have a very elaborate evidentiary style which, in an age of ever
increasing crime rates, we can afford to use only in a miniscule fraction
of cases, or to devise factfinding systems which, while less demanding,
might then be applied universally? It is almost like asking a lady
whether she prefers an orchid once a year or a modest bouquet every
day.
2. Some Consequences of Unequal Prosecutorial Burdens
Although, as I have just noted, the common law system places a
heavier evidentiary burden on the prosecutor only in a very small
number of cases, it would be erroneous to believe that the impact of
this fact is consequently also negligible. Let me present a few illustrations from the field of criminal procedure first. Many possible consequences of unequal difficulties in proving guilt may pass unnoticed if
1 0 Enlarging upon Fuller's metaphor of the health and sickness of a legal system,
L. FuLLER, ANATOmy OF THE LAW 6 (1968), and using Freudian terminology, the "due
process" requirements may be termed the superego of the machinery of criminal justice
and the needs of its administrators the id. If the latter are repressed too severely by the
superego, the whole system will display neurotic symptoms. Repressed needs will manifest
themselves in unusual and unexpected ways.
101 HoRATrUs FLAccus, EPISTOLARUm LinER Prtus, Epist. 10, 24 (Orellius ed. 1844).
1 2
0 See PRESIDENT'S CommBssION ON LAW ENFORCEmNT AND ADmINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE oF CRImE INA FREE SocnETY 134 (1967).
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we remain engrossed in the domestic perspective. But if we are faced
with the need to explain some characteristics of the criminal justice
system to foreigners, new aspects of things once thought familiar immediately spring into sight. Reflect for a moment on the reasons for
the surprise of most visitors from civil law countries when they learn
that the American news media carry from time to time detailed reports
on the activities of notorious criminal figures, while the latter remain
at large and perhaps do not even have a record of arrest. To explain
this strange phenomenon to foreigners, I believe we must begin by
describing the greater divorcement between prosecutorial information
and admissible evidence, on the near impossibility of "freezing" evidence before trial, 0 3 and similar evidentiary peculiarities of the common law criminal process. Or, since I have mentioned the arrest record,
let me note the fact that continental visitors will be astonished at
the significance attached in America to such records. In their countries,
very little, if any, significance is attached to records of arrest. Whence
this difference? Part of it pertains, perhaps, to differential uses of
arrest: perhaps the authorities are more prone to use arrest per se as a
punishment in the United States. But, once again, unequal problems in
following up arrest with a conviction remain part of the explanation.
More subtle implications come to the fore if we analyze some sources
of confusion in comparative legal discourse about problems of criminal
justice. Thus, to offer only one illustration, words like "conviction"
and "acquittal" do not refer to exactly the same underlying experiences
in the two systems. The opposition between conviction and other modes
of adjudicative disposition is more closely related on the Continent to
the opposition between guilt and innocence than it is in America. This,
in turn, helps explain disparate views about who is to bear costs of
proceedings not resulting in conviction, as well as a host of related
problems. 104
If one turns to substantive criminal law in the common law jurisdictions, it is not hard to see the significant influence of the everpresent
possibility of having to try a case to a jury, with all the concomitant
evidentiary problems. It is, for example, entirely possible that the still
10 3

See notes 19-20 supra.

104 If, for example, the failure to convict a defendant is indicative of his innocence

to a high degree, the argument that the state should bear the costs the defendant incurred becomes very compelling. Small wonder, then, that provisions to this effect will be
found in some civilian jurisdictions. .See, e.g., Russi x CODE OF CRIM nAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 28, art. 107; WEST GmimA CODE, supra note 5, art. 467; YUGosLAv CODE OF
CmRiAL PROCEDmURE, supra note 5, art. 92. (Italy and France, however, take a contrary

view.) If, on the other hand, failure to prosecute successfully has little relationship to
innocence, the demand for compensation of costs incurred by the defendant loses much
of its vigor, although his costs may be very high-as is surely the case in America, where
counsel's fees are comparatively very high and the defendant may spend money on private

investigations, expert witnesses, and the like.
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markedly greater reliance on external or objective standards in the
criminal law of common law jurisdictions is due in part to the much
greater difficulty in litigating the actor's subjective state of mind.10 5
The more notorious and less controversial example is the conspiracy
doctrine, so severely criticized by civilian lawyers and so frequently
used in the practice of common law courts. Is not this frequent use related to the relaxation of evidentiary rules in conspiracy trials?"0 8
With these brief remarks I conclude the discussion of evidentiary
difficulties experienced by the common law and civil law prosecutors.
Clearly, beneath many other distinctive features of both legal systems
there sounds the leitmotif of concern for the evidentiary difficulties encountered by prosecutors. Though there are many avenues open to explore them, tracing the often tangled relationships between prosecutorial evidentiary problems and other features of each criminal justice
system would require an independent study. It suffices for my purposes to have suggested that fruitful hypotheses can be put forward
once unequal factfinding problems are recognized.

II. BAuIERS

TO CONVICTION AND

Two RIrvAL PROCEDURAL MODELS

Part I sought to show that the common law jury trial presents the
prosecutor with more evidentiary obstacles than does the continental
criminal trial. Here my aim is to explore the common feeling that there
is a link between unequal obstacles to conviction and the dichotomy
between adversary and non-adversary proceedings. Unfortunately, before embarking on this large enterprilse, some preparatory work must
first be undertaken. In both continental and American scholarship the
expressions "adversary" (or "accusatorial") and "non-adversary" (or
"inquisitorial") are used in a variety of senses, and the meaning of the
opposition between procedural systems changes accordingly. Moreover,
even within a single and more or less stable dichotomy, a degree of
confusion remains. It is not at all clear which sets of features are determinative of the "adversary" as opposed to the "non-adversary" system. Each label seems to cover characteristics in shifting combinations,
105 This, of course, is not the historical explanation. But present opposition to more
refined subjective standards is, I believe, linked to evidentiary problems continentals
do not have to cope with. A case in point is the rejection by the draftsmen of the Model
Penal Code of an analogue of what civil law lawyers would call "actio libera in causa"
doctrine. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08, Comment 3, at 7-9 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
On the doctrine of actiones liberae in cause see H. JEscHnEc, LmBUCH: DES STRA sECHTS:
ALGEuraRa TEml 293-94 (1969) and the comparative literature mentioned therein.
106 Perhaps the locus classicus on evidentiary benefits reaped by the prosecution in
conspiracy cases is the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 452-57 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Continental criticism of
conspiracy doctrine is succinctly presented in H. Srvmo, suara note 94, at 161-63.
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not infrequently at war with one another. Finally, it is entirely possible
that the opposition of procedural models most suitable for the purposes
of this study is hidden behind the juxtaposition of a number of new
models which, at least semantically, depart from traditional dichotomizing in talking about procedural types. Thus, a somewhat lengthy
digression cannot be avoided: the meanings of both traditional and
freshly coined labels designating procedural systems must be analyzed
and an attempt made to explore their mutual relationship. As I proceed, the opposition between procedural types will acquire greater precision and, before quitting the digression, it will become possible to
determine the conceptual tools most appropriate for my task.
A. Essential Characteristicsof Adversary
and Non-adversary Systems
1. Continental Scholarship
a. The HistoricalApproach
A quick glance at a conventional continental textbook on criminal
procedure reveals that one of the first pontes asinorum continental law
students have to cross is the mastering of distinctions among the accusatorial, the inquisitorial and the mixed (or reformed) 10 7 criminal procedures. This traditional classification is historically grounded: it was
created to summarize the development of procedural patterns as viewed
from the continental perspective and within the usual continental parameters of interest. Both the taxonomical purpose and the circumstance that three procedural subcategories are involved imply that this
classification does not afford a suitable conceptual framework within
which to study the contrasts between modern continental and AngloAmerican criminal processes. Even so, a cursory sketch of the three
procedural types under this classification must be attempted here.108 It
will facilitate an understanding of the use of the term "inquisitorial
procedure" on the Continent, and will illustrate the way in which continental lawyers classify their present criminal procedures.
Not much need be said here about the accusatorial type as defined
under the historical approach. It was constructed with a dual purpose.
The primary one was to offer a succinct description of procedures pre107 German lawyers prefer to speak of "reformed" rather than "mixed" procedures.
Inasmuch as their label implies that the third procedural type is not a via media between
the accusatorial and inquisitorial extremes but rather a variant of the inquisitorial type,
their nomenclature seems preferable. Cf. notes 121-22 infra & accompanying text.
108 For a more detailed presentation of the historical approach see F. GARRAUr,
E r DE PROC MURE PiAM,
TRArri TioSETIQUE Er PRATIQiE D'INSTRUCTION CIMN
excerpted in A. EsmEm, A HISTORY or CONTIENTAL CRENuAL PROCEDURE 3-12 (U.

Simpson transl. 1913).
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vailing in Europe from the fall of the Roman Empire, throughout the
Dark Ages, and until the beginning of the thirteenth century. An ancillary aim was to provide a classificatory niche wherein to place the modem English criminal trial. 109 This duality of purpose has led to an uneasy marriage-in the data-pool from which the type was constructed
-of modem procedural ideas and primitive, even irrational"0 procedural forms. It also accounts for certain unresolved ambiguities of the
adversary type under the historical approach."' In addition to procedural features familiar to common law lawyers, essential characteristics
of the accusatorial type include elements such as "popular accusation,"" 2 trial by jury, and possibly even the absence of appellate procedure.
More attention must be devoted to the inquisitorial type as conceived by the proponents of the historical approach. In essence, the
inquisitorial type is but a generalized description of criminal proceedings which prevailed in continental European countries from the thirteenth until the first half of the nineteenth century. The rough outline
of this system is as follows. The criminal process was instituted by the
investigator acting of his own motion in the form of a secret preliminary investigation." 3 In its first phase the investigator's task was to de109 When the historical approach was in its heyday very little was known in Europe
about the American criminal process. Another serious limitation of the data-pool from
which the types were constructed was the absence of sufficient information about the
criminal process preceding the judicial stages-for example, lack of awareness of the
actual operation of pre-trial interrogation that might be conducted by justices of the
peace. The significance of this limitation for the validity of the classification will be
touched on later.
110 By irrational I mean procedural devices, such as trial by ordeal, which rest on
religious imaginings, especially the belief that the deity can be summoned to intervene
in the screening of the guilty from the innocent. On this ancient mode of trial in England
see T. PLucNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ComaoN LAw 113-18 (5th ed. 1956).

" I cannot discuss here the difficulties arising from attempts to reconcile, within a
single procedural type, features essential to factfinding in the Dark Ages and in modem
times. Can contemporary systems be declared "impure"? Is it at allfeasible to construct
a "pure" type under the historical approach? Would such an attempt, by neglecting
accidental historical accretions, inexorably lead from a historical to an analytical approach toward procedural systems?
112 Under popular accusation, the charges can be pressed by any citizen, irrespective
of whether he has been victimized by the offense. It will be recalled that this system
was used at the trial of Socrates, see PrATo, Apology 24, in TEE COLLECTED DIALOGUES
or PrATO 10 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairns eds. 1961); R. BoNNEm, LAwYRs AND LITIGANTS
nm ANCIENT ATHmms 44 (1927), and in the Roman Republic, see, e.g., A. JoNms, THE
CuNAL CouRS oF nm RomAN REPUBLIC Am PmNuCcPAT 46 (Oxford 1972). This is
still the theory of the British system, see R. ARGuIE, CRUIAL PROCEDURE 20 (1969);

KErY'S OUT
oF C iuAL LAw 561 (18th ed. J. Turner 1962).
118It must be emphasized, however, that in most continental jurisdictions, throughout the period indicated in the text, inquisitorial procedure coexisted with a type of
proceeding which required an accusation (formal charge) as a prerequisite to any procedural activity. This latter type was considered by legal theorists of the epoch to be
technically superior to criminal proceedings initiated by the investigating judge sua sponte.
They referred to it as forma processus ordinaria (i.e., ordinary mode of proceedings). On
the relationship between these two ways of handling criminal matters in medieval
Italy and 17th century Saxony see B. CARwzov, supra note 78, Pars III, questio 106. See
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termine whether the crime had in fact been committed and the identity
of the primary suspect. When the latter was found, the second phase
of the investigation would begin, directed against a specific person.
Typically, the defendant was incarcerated at this point and held incommunicado. Both he and the witnesses were examined ex parte and required to answer questions under oath; responses to all questions were
put in writing. 1 4 Until the investigation reached its final stages, the
defendant was rather vaguely informed about the precise nature of the
crime being investigated and the incriminating evidence. It will be recalled at this juncture that the law of evidence prescribed the kind and
the quantum of proof required for conviction.l 1e In all offenses of some
gravity mere circumstantial evidence was not enough to support a conviction: the only "legal proof" attainable was often the defendant's
confession. Thus, in cases involving serious crime, if the defendant did
not voluntarily confess, and the evidence gathered against him raised
a strong probability of guilt, the investigator was long permitted to put
the defendant to torture in order to extract a confession from him. n
When the investigator completed all investigatory activities he would
send the file (dossier) of the case to a court for decision. The court
would proceed on the basis of documents contained in the file, and in
many countries would never see the defendant. In fact, there was no
trial, but rather a closed session of the court' 7 Public prosecutors,
even where they existed, were not necessary for the proceedings to
commence, develop, or terminate. Furthermore, in many countries the
defendant had no right to assistance of counsel. 118
This rough sketch of inquisitorial procedure should in itself suffice
to explain the aura of dread and mistrust surrounding the adjective
also 1. QuANr, Dnc FoLTER 168 (Aalen 1970) (photocopy of the 1900 Dresden edition).
In practice there were numerous disincentives to bringing a formal accusation, notably in
cases of serious offenses. Thus, victims, rather than file a formal "accusation," would prefer
to report a crime informally to the investigating judge, who would treat such reports as
just another informational source upon which to base his sua sponte activity. As a result,
the so-called "ordinary mode of proceeding" became practically obsolete, except in the

area of minor crime.

114 The answers were taken down verbatim. See, e.g., B. CARwzov, supra note 78, Pars
I, questio 113. A special protocol ("Gebdrdeprotokol") would contain descriptions of
the demeanor of persons under interrogation. Cf. R. QuAkrr-R, supra note 113, at 83.
115
11

See note 10 supra.

6See note 215 infra. After the abolition of torture, inquisitorial proceedings

adopted other coercive measures to enforce the defendant's duty to testify. Cf. note 41
supra; note 215 infra.
11
7In this respect the French variant was more favorable to the defendant than
the German. Under the French variant the defendant was at least permitted to see the
adjudicators and communicate with them. In German-speaking countries the decision was
for a long time rendered by law professors at what we would think of today as "faculty
meetings" to which the defendant was never admitted.
118"Learned and honest" (docti et probi) counsel were, however, admitted in
inquisitorial proceedings of the German-speaking countries. See B. CAlwzov, Supra note
78, Pars IH, questlo 115, no. 93.
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"inquisitorial." I believe, however, that most of this aura is actually
due to factors having little to do with inquisitorial proceedings per se.
Partly, it results from confusing ordinary secular proceedings described
here with those of the Holy Inquisition.19 Partly, it is a reflection of
the harshness and cruelty of the substantive criminal law of the times.
But, most of all, the pejorative note stems from the mistaken belief
that the institution of torture was essential to the inquisitorial type. °
The mixed type was developed by European scholars to offer a
generalized description of modern continental criminal procedures
which replaced the inquisitorial process just described in the first half
of the nineteenth century. It was then, in the wake of the French Revolution, that many features of the old procedural style became incompatible with the changed political and social climate' 21 It is by no
means easy to present the outline of this last procedural type under the
historical approach. After ali, it was designed to represent an eclectic
mixture, and its flavor naturally changes as we go from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. Yet any presentation would probably reveal the following
main characteristics.
The initial investigatory phase of the continental criminal process
is correctly thought of as inquisitorial in its basic design. Howeverand continental lawyers set great store by this feature-the investigation can be instituted only at the instance of an "accuser," usually the
public prosecutor. In the course of the investigation, the investigating
judge, or some other purportedly impartial official, 2' is charged with
19 The Inquisition was a special ecclesiastical court for the suppression of certain
offenses against the Church, notably heresy. Its proceedings contained many departures
from ordinary secular proceedings. Moreover, offenses falling within its jurisdiction were
either imaginary, as for example the crimen magiae (witchcraft), or those of beliefs and
attitudes
more than specific acts.
2 0
3
In fact, inquisitorial proceedings-for example, early ecclesiastical procedure in
criminal matters, see, e.g., DacRaurm GRATmiA, Causa XV, questio 6, in S. VoN DooRNicK, Dim SuI nrA -"BER DAS DEcanrUv
GRATiaxI 221 (J. Schulte ed. 196)-are
known in which torture was not permitted. It should also be recalled that inquisitorial
proceedings persisted in many European countries long after torture was outlawed. The
mistaken link between torture and the essence of the inquisitorial system is only one
instance of the many pitfalls inherent in the historical approach to types of procedure.
Characteristics of inquisitorial proceedings of a given epoch, or a given country, are often
proclaimed characteristics of the inquisitorial type. On the other hand, as I indicated,
supra note 111, if an effort is made to isolate the minimum of common features, one is
moving away from the historical approach in the direction of building "pure" models.
121Descriptions of mixed procedures are often based on the example of the Napoleonic Code of Criminal Investigation, Code d'Instruction Criminelle (1808), 9 BuzLETIN DES Los DE L'EBimE FRAxArs 4th, No. 214 bis (1809), which was enacted following the rejection in France of the transplanted English criminal procedure. Although
it is true that this code served as a prototype to many legislators in the civil law system,
it would be mistaken to believe that it represented the first "mixture" of "accusatorial"
and "inquisitorial" ideas. Criminal proceedings before the Star Chamber, for instance,
were1 clearly
such a hybrid.
22
As a distant echo of the inquisitorial distinction between the general and special
investigation, some modem continental jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, distinguish between two types of preliminary investigation. One of them (enquite or
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the collection of evidence. But, in contrast to the inquisitorial style, at
least some proof-taking activity is carried out in the presence of the
parties. The rejection of the medievalist system of legal proof decreased the importance of the defendant's confession. The defendant
may be questioned, but is no longer required to answer. At the close of
the investigation, if not before, the defendant and his counsel acquire
an unlimited right to inspect the file of the case. As a result there is
full evidentiary disclosure before trial.
The procedural stages following the investigation are said to be
predominantly accusatorial in inspiration. The dossier is transmitted
to the public prosecutor, who must decide whether to bring the case to
trial or not. There is no arraignment with formal pleadings before the
trial judge. The trial itself is open: both parties are present and must
be accorded opportunity for argument and debate. In principle, all evidence taken during the investigatory stage must be examined anew.
Proof-taking is presided over by the professional judge. He is not only
very active in questioning witnesses, but is also both authorized and
required to raise all issues revelant to the charge. If necessary, he must
even hear evidence not formally put forward by the parties. A final important point: trial proceedings are not bifurcated into guilt-determinative and sentencing phases.
If, at this juncture, we compare the central features of the mixed
with those of the inquisitorial type, there is no question that the former
contains many "accusatorial" ideas. If viewed against the background
of continental legal history, we might even be tempted to place this
third procedural type approximately midway between the extremes presented by the inquisitorial and accusatorial systems. From the common
law perspective, however, it is possible that both inquisitorial and
mixed procedures appear as two branches of a common parent stem,
that of non-adversary proceedings. Even so, it would seem inappropriate to refer to this common stem as "inquisitorial." In view of the aura
surrounding that term, reminiscent as it is of such odious features as
unspecified charges, secret proceedings, and torture, all abandoned
long ago, it seems unfair to continentals to attach it to their contemporary criminal proceedings.
Not much more than this lesson for comparative discourse 23 can
Ermittlung) is usually carried out by the police, and the other (instruction priparatoire
or Untersuchung) is entrusted to the judge. Under the Russian system, where the office

of investigating judge does not exist, the latter, more elaborate type of preliminary
investigation is carried out by officials of the Public Prosecutor's Office. See RussLA.

AL PROcEDURE, supra note 28, arts. 117, 125.
1323While it is true that common law lawyers sometimes shock their civil law
brethren in comparative dialogue by calling their procedure "inquisitorial," the latter
have been known to reciprocate. Sometimes the Anglo-American procedural style is said

CODE Or Cpa
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be derived for my purposes from the standard classification of continental procedural types. It has many weaknesses, one of the most
serious of which is the relative neglect of the highly important though
poorly visible police stage of the criminal process.124But, quite apart
from these weaknesses, the historic orientation of the classificatory
scheme coupled with the fact that contemporary continental criminal
procedures are somewhat in the middle of the range between the two
extremes makes that scheme unsuitable for the purpose of studying the
contrast between modern continental and common law systems. The
most striking differences between the two are not significantly related
to the differences between "mixed" and "accusatorial" proceedings under the historic approach.
b. Two Narrow Technical Views
In discussing alternative ways of structuring criminal procedure,
continental scholars sometimes oppose solely the accusatorial and the
inquisitorial styles, using these two expressions in a narrow sense. Let
me consider here two main instances of this narrow usage. The first one
reduces to the conceptualization based upon only one of many reforms
which led to the advent of the "mixed" procedures. It will be recalled
that the inquisitorial investigator proceeded of his own accord: there
was no mechanism either to spur him on or to set limits to his inquiries.
In a sense, he acted both as factfinder and as prosecutor. This merger
of procedural roles was severely criticized long before inquisitorial proceedings were rejected on the Continent. 25 Of course, advocates of reform, steeped in the non-adversary tradition, did not go so far as to
require that the adjudicative role be divested of so many responsibilities that it resemble that of an umpire. Only some of those responsibilities considered incompatible with the role of the adjudicator under a
rigorous adversary approach were thought to endanger objectivity in
factfinding, and were thus eliminated. The ensuing reforms in the nineto be embedded in "primitive concepts" of the judicial role, or to be contrary to the
"ontology" of criminal procedure. See 1 G. Foscmir, supra note 44, at 227-28; S. DANmo,
16, at 83-84, 175.
supra2note
1 4 This phenomenon is in the civil law system mostly the result of insufficient
familiarity with the police stage of the Anglo-American criminal process. But, as I see
it, this is not the whole explanation, inasmuch as a sizable group of continental jurisdictions is involved. The continental legal folklore generally tends to attribute more rigidity
to the division among branches of the legal system than those trained in the common law
can imagine. Since, in some systems, the initial police activity is not governed by the code
of criminal procedure but is considered to belong within the domain of administrative
law, it is simply not studied by procedural scholars. See note 191 infra. See also W.

ScHuE, supra note 56.
125 In German-speaking countries, where inquisitorial proceedings prevailed long

after the abolition of torture, this was indeed considered as the single most important
defect of inquisitorial procedure. This view is still shared by some eminent German
CODE, supra note 5, at 2.
scholars. See Schmidt, Introduction to WEST GEanRi
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teenth century broke up the much-criticized "personal union" of prosecuting and ascertaining facts, and entrusted the "severed" activity of
prosecuting to a new procedural protagonist-the prosecutor. Since
that time the adjective "accusatorial" is often used by continental lawyers to denote proceedings in which the prosecutor's charge is both a
prerequisite for investigatory activities and the limit on the scope of inquiries. The term "inquisitorial" is applied to proceedings where there
are no such restrictions on factfinding activity. 2 "
To define the meaning of this dichotomy is to demonstrate that it
is totally unsuitable as a conceptual tool for comparative purposes. For
the "accusatorial" style, in this narrow sense, shares common ground
with both the continental and the Anglo-American legal systems.
The second narrow use of the expressions "accusatorial" and "inquisitorial" involves juxtaposing the following two opposed procedural
arrangements. Under the first ("accusatorial"), the defendant has the
right to be present when procedural activities are underway and is entitled to offer counterproof and counterarguments. Under the second
("inquisitorial"), proceedings may be conducted ex parte and the defendant can be restricted in his defense.12 7 The first procedural arrangement, however, is still attuned to the continental ideal of the parameters of procedural choice. Accordingly, it does not contemplate
that there will be partisan presentation of evidence and partisan zeal
even though the defendant is present and active in court. Rather, it assumes a detached non-partisan examination of evidence in which the
judge will play a dominant role. Thus, once again, many striking contrasts between the continental and common law styles remain outside
the reach of these procedural polarizations.

c. ProceduralModels and the Analytic Approach
If we remain within the mainstream of continental writing on
criminal procedure, it is difficult indeed to find two rival procedural
types expressive of the most important differences between the structures of the criminal process in continental and common law countries.
The simple explanation is that the proper range of contrasts exceeds
what to conventional continental thought appear to be the inherent
12 6
For a typical example see E. KE=u, STRArSvEAmmNSRECHT 47-50 (8th ed.
1967). To explain better the reaction against medieval proceedings, perhaps I should
note here that in minor offenses the medieval inquisitorial "investigator" was at the same
time 127
the adjudicator, and was not required to transmit a dossier to the court.
The first procedural arrangement is better known in Latin countries under the
label of "procddure contradictoire" ("il contraddittorio"). At times the Latin maxim
audiatur et altera pars denotes the same idea. See 2 G. LEONE, TRATTATo DI DnTrro
PRoE ssuALE PEsNArz 332 (1961). See also G. S=Amr & G. LEvAss-uR, supra note 5, at
27-29.
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boundaries of criminal procedure. For instance, that the parties should
be permitted to shape the subject matter of proceedings, through pleadings, stipulations, monopoly in raising issues, and in many other ways,
seems to continental lawyers to be almost "ontologically" characteristic
of civil rather than criminal procedure.12 8 However, as soon as we cross
these "inherent" boundaries and move into the area of civil litigation
continental style, procedural rules, devices, and operative concepts can
easily be found to express the full range of differences between the two
alternate styles of structuring criminal proceedings.
Recently, deeper understanding of proceedings in the common law
orbit, including its American variants, has contributed to the receding
of continental horizons of thought about the spectrum of differences in
contemporary procedural systems. Perceptive continental scholars have
become aware that, when viewed from the Anglo-American perspective,
contrasts between current Eastern and Western European procedures
begin to pale, and that even differences between "mixed" and "inquisitorial" systems lose their significance in many important respects.'29
Thus a movement seems afoot to cut loose from the traditional, historically grounded triadism in categorizing procedural systems. But it
must not be overlooked that the rejection of the historical orientation
in approaching the problem of procedural types has an important consequence. Proceeding from striking contrasts between modern procedural systems, continental scholars try to identify underlying problems
to which these contrasts are alternate solutions. What emerges from the
juxtaposition of the two sets of procedural arrangements thus polarized
is surely not a shorthand description of real-life procedures. Rather,
two diametrically opposed ideal-types in the Weberian sense emerge,
whose greatest value is heuristic.'8 Using a more fashionable term, I
shall call them models, and, in order to avoid the cluster of confusing
associations surrounding the labels "inquisitorial" and "accusatorial,"
I shall refer to them as the adversary and the non-adversary models.
At this point an important distinction must be made. Most of these
128 0n what to continental lawyers are inherent boundaries between criminal and
civil litigation, see K. P'TmEs, STRAPRozFss 80 (1952) See also S. DA No, supra note 16,
at 83-84; E. Scnarm T, STRAPPRoZFss UND RE HTsSTAAT 206 (1970). Particularly confusing
to conventional continental thought is a private law litigation style in a system which, like
the American, rejected the idea of popular accusation. See note 112 supra.
129 Thus, such an eminent authority as Eberhard Schmidt has said that, inasmuch
as the German court, rather than the prosecution and defense, shapes criminal proceedings, criminal procedure as practiced in West Germany is in essence inquisitorial. See
Schmidt, supra note 125, at 10, 18. Obviously, the expression "inquisitorial" is used in a
new sense here. It denotes the opposite extreme of "Parteiprozess" (party-controlled
proceeding) and is closely related to the analytical model of which I shall shortly speak
in the text.
13oAs will appear later, it may lead to confusion if models are regarded as repro,
ductions of reality rather than methodological constructs of largely heuristic value.
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recent efforts toward constructing models remain, quite consistent with
the continental legal style, on the technical plane of developing polar
alternatives defined in terms of procedural rules and principles. There
appears to be much less concern to articulate rival ideological preconceptions which might help explain the choice of radically different technical alternatives in structuring the criminal process. Even so, interesting developments occur on both planes and should be briefly surveyed
here.
In first considering the technical legalistic plane, let me quickly
outline the sequence of procedural ideas inherent in the adversary
model. The fundamental matrix is based upon the view that proceedings should be structured as a dispute between two sides in a position
of theoretical equality before a court which must decide on the outcome
of the contest. The procedural aim is to settle the conflict stemming
from the allegation of commission of crime. Since the proceeding is
essentially a contest, devices such as pleadings and stipulations are not
only acceptable but, indeed, essential because they establish the existence of a contest and delineate its borders.' 31 The protagonists of the
model have definite, independent, and conflicting functions: the prosecutor's role is to obtain a conviction; the defendant's role is to block
this effort. In his charge the prosecutor determines which factual propositions he will attempt to prove and must marshal evidence in support
of his factual contentions. Not only does he have the burden of persuasion with respect to the latter, but also the burden of presenting evidence in court. In doing so he is expected to be partisan. The defendant
decides which facts favorable to his theses he will attempt to prove,
and must adduce evidence in support of all his factual contentions. He
cannot be examined by the court, for reasons which will appear shortly,
nor can he be questioned by the prosecution. For if only one side to a
contest were to use the other as an evidentiary source, such practice
would destroy the balance of advantages and the position of theoretical
equality between the contestants.13 2 Furthermore, such practice would
fly in the face of the idea of rival use of informational sources: the informational source and its partisan user would merge in the person of
the defendant. The role of the adjudicator becomes that of an umpire
who sees to it that the parties abide by the rules regulating their contest. Even here his basic attitude is one of passivity: he is to rule on the
181 Clearly, there cannot be a dispute if one side refuses to oppose the other. This
is not, of course, the historical explanation of formal pleadings in criminal procedure.
18 2 This, also, is not the historical explanation. Historians tell us that the common
law defendant was for centuries not allowed to testify because he was considered an
interested witness. However, traces of the analytic incompatibility noted in the text
occassionally surface in American writing. See ALI MOD.EL CODE OF PRE-ARmGwNm=r
PNocEpmrm § 5.01, commentary at 169 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1966).
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propriety of conduct only upon the objection of the side adversely affected. When the contest is over the adjudicator must, of course, decide
on the outcome. 133 An important outgrowth of the fundamental matrix
is a great number of technical rules regarding proper conduct of the
protagonists. Proceedings tend to become "over-lawyered."
Many features of actual criminal procedures in common law countries are not essential characteristics of this model. Judgment by one's
peers, ambushes as a result of lack of discovery, publicity, emphasis
on oral testimony-these and many other features are not indispensable
to the adversary model. Yet, as we shall see, the ideological assumptions underlying the model make many of these non-essential features
a matter of natural choice. Borrowing a scholastic term, they are naturalia rather than essentialiaof the adversary style.
Non-adversary proceedings emerge from the following central
structural idea. Rather than being conceived of as a dispute, they are
considered an official and thorough inquiry, triggered by the initial
probability that a crime has been committed. The procedural aim is to
establish whether this is in fact the case, and whether the imposition of
criminal sanctions is justified. Of course, the matrix of an official investigation is incompatible with formal pleadings and stipulations: the
court-controlled pursuit of facts cannot be limited by mutual consent of
the participants. 3 4 "Parties" in the sense of independent actors are not
needed, and proceedings may, for instance, be a mere "affaire a deux."
Factfinding is "unilateral" and detached. All reliable sources of information may in principle be used, and the defendant may be subjected
to interrogation. Obviously, then, this much simpler structure of protechnicalities. The non-adversary model is, thus,
ceedings leads to fewer
5
"under-lawyered."'1
Many historically-determined features of continental procedures
are not essential to the model. It is, moreover, theoretically possible
that the presentation of evidence could outwardly proceed in an adversary fashion, as long as the adjudicators were at least subsidiarily authorized to raise new issues, examine proof sua sponte, and hear evidence themselves whenever necessary to advance the official inquiry.
But, once again, the ideological assumptions behind the model make
53

The adjudicator's passivity explains why it is that under the "pure" model the
judge cannot interrogate the defendant. In locating actual American practices on the
spectrum between the present model and its rival, the passivity of the jury in factfinding
should not be overlooked.
134 Thus, even if the defendant declares that he is guilty, the inquiry must proceed
in the ordinary fashion.
1a5Not only is the technical scaffolding of procedure simpler; as indicated, legal
counsel are not indispensable for the model to function. If they do appear, however, the
more active the court, the less important their role.
'
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many features of real-life continental proceedings a matter of natural
choice.
So much for the two analytical models devoid of ideological underpinnings.136 Turning now to the opposition of the two ideologies underlying the rival procedural models, we find little more in Western European writing than passing remarks and sporadic embryonic ideas in
need of elaboration. Little effort seems to have been spent on the study
of how broad ideological orientations determine the choice of procedural arrangements. 137 However, where the issue of rival ideologies has
squarely been faced, collectivistic values and benevolent paternalism
were isolated as preconceptions of the non-adversary model, while
traditional Lockean liberal values, with distrust of the state and freedom from its restraint, were found to be in the ideological matrix of the
adversary model. 8' More frequently than in the West, ideologically
colored analyses of procedural systems will be found in the Eastern
European writing. This leads me to a brief discussion of Marxist attitudes toward types of criminal proceedings.
d. ProceduralTypes in Marxist Literature
According to Marxist teachings, each socio-economic system, from
the slave-owning to the socialist, generates its own distinctive type of
law. The most important characteristics of that law emanate from the
basic purpose of the legal order, which is to protect and further the
values and interests of dominant social forces. Following this philosophic vision, students of criminal procedure in socialist countries
thought it imperative to classify all existing criminal processes according to the socioeconomic system of the state which adopted them.
Leaving aside problems of legal history, the most important task of the
new taxonomers was to isolate distinguishing features of socialist as opposed to bourgeois (capitalist) criminal procedures.
1i6A "third model can be derived from this analytical point of view only as a
synthesis of the two extremes. It is, however, seldom constructed. For an example of
such a third model see G. Fosc=,; supra note 44, at 230.
137 This is not to say that there is not a great deal of writing on political, social,
epistemological, and even psychological problems in criminal procedure. Most of this
writing is devoted, however, to problems independent of the opposition between adversary and non-adversary criminal processes. See, e.g., the brief yet excellent discussion
in K. P8 nTas, supra note 128, at 66-71. See also E. ScenrT, supra note 128, passim.
13 For a rare example of this approach see G. FoscHI=, supra note 44, at 226-30
(linking adversary proceedings with "individualism," and inquisitorial proceedings with
paternalistic attitudes and socialism). On the phenomenon of judicial paternalism
(paternalismo giudiziario) see the bibliography collected in G. Foscmnr, supra note 44,
at 232. A few stimulating insights can be found in G. RADBRucir, GMr DES ENGLISCBaM
RECHTS 15 (4th ed. 1958).
Viewed historically, primitive adversary proceedings are usually explained in terms
of weak state authority and little awareness of social danger emanating from criminal
conduct.
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The difficulties encountered turned out to be formidable. All Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, belong to the continental legal tradition. The force of tradition being what it is, it seems
quite natural that whenever the existing civil law rules, modes of
thought, and institutions were not found to conflict with the new socialist order and its values, they were retained and built upon. This is precisely what happened in the domain of the criminal process: the criminal procedure systems of all Eastern European countries exhibit the
unmistakable imprint of continental "mixed" proceedings. Thus, if one
were to abide by the traditional criteria of continental systematization,
he would be forced to admit that "bourgeois" proceedings in Western
European countries are much closer to "socialist" procedure than is the
adversary structure of Anglo-American proceedings. Most differences
seem to lie outside any natural Marxist contours. Much as Max
Weber had to admit that modern capitalism is equally well served
by common and civil law techniques, so the Marxist students of
procedure were forced to declare that bourgeois procedure can be
either adversary or not.139 What resulted was the downplaying of the
importance of this opposition by characterizing it as a mere form hiding the same bourgeoisified substance.1 0 But if the difference between
socialist and capitalist criminal procedure does not reside in broad procedural design and in the rules of procedure and evidence, where is it
to be found? Inevitably the emphasis shifted to attempts to describe the
contrast both in terms of the actual operation of criminal justice systems, and in terms of the supporting economic, social, and political assumptions. This two-pronged Marxian approach need neither be merely
a weapon in ideological wars nor a plaything of those who dwell in
ivory towers.' 41 Unfortunately very little serious scholarship and no
139M. WEBER, supra note 76, at 284. The examples Weber chooses to illustrate his
point are more striking than the ones available in the law of criminal procedure. The
latter is, relatively speaking, more neutral regarding socio-economic systems or factors,
and perhaps more responsive to changes in the organization of political power. Obviously
laws regulating ownership of property, for example, are much more intimately linked to
social and economic structures. And yet, as Weber indicates, capitalist systems manage to
operate in this area with vastly different conceptual tools, such as those connected with
the Romanic "ownership" and those stemming from Anglo-American titles and estates.
For a fascinating discussion of the reverse phenomenon, i.e., the use of similar technical
concepts by widely different socio-economic structures, see Merryman, Toward a ComparativeStudy of the Sale of Land, in 2 Ius PRVAT- m GENTIUM 737, 742 (1969).
140 Cf. UGOLOVNyI PROTSESS [cpfAL PROCEDURE] 440 (M. Cheltzov ed. 1969).
This does not mean that the importance of the traditional dichotomy is neglected altogether. See note 150 infra. Nor does it mean that some special characteristics of legal
rules on criminal procedure cannot be isolated in socialist countries. This, however, is a
rather difficult task in view of differences existing-on the level of rules-among individual East European states. Even so, it may be said that the influence of the Soviet
example is very pronounced in all Eastern European countries save Yugoslavia. On
Yugoslav departures from the Soviet model see Dama~ka, Foreword, in YuGosLAv CODE

or CpmnAr PROCEDURE, supra note 5, at 4-15.

14lInteresting inferences have been drawn, especially in the study of procedural
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empirical research has been done along these lines so far. This will become obvious to anybody prepared to wade through the rather drab
prose on this subject, which is characterized by a mixture of mere
verbiage, ideological rancor, and occasional stimulating hypotheses for
future research.'4
But I need not spur the reader on to this tortuous and tedious
journey. The important question for my purposes lies outside the existig writing on the contrast between bourgeois and socialist procedures,
no matter how these are defined. 143 Notwithstanding the fact that the
adversary and non-adversary models are not intended to depict the opposition of socialist and bourgeois criminal procedures, it is by no
means impossible that one of the two models is better attuned to the
ideological preconceptions and perhaps even to the structure of one of
the two rival socioeconomic systems. The key to this analysis lies in
the underlying assumptions and some salient characteristics of socialist
procedure.
Surely one of the basic socialist values is an openly acknowledged
and quite strong emphasis on collectivism, as opposed to the primacy of
the individual. The all-important relationship between the state and the
defendant in the criminal process will not be viewed as one of irreconciliable conflict.' 44 Perhaps, on a philosophical level, the very existence
of a conflict between the individual and socialist society will be questioned.146 As the state power is said to be in the hands of the toilerssystems in feudal societies where the social bias was openly expressed in procedural rules.
For example, the use of torture was restricted in case of defendants belonging to the
dominant social class. See note 214 infra. Even with respect to modem criminal processes,
few would deny the interest of studies exploring the realities behind solemn proclamations
that justice is administered on the basis of equality, studies concentrating on the influence
of disparate social, economic, and political circumstance. Perhaps a whole new and more
meaningful classification of modem criminal procedures could result.
142See, e.g., M. CHmLTZOV, supra note 140, at 440-56 (on bourgeois procedure),
SA-A, supra note 80, at 117-18.
425-40 (on socialist procedure); T. DOBR0VOv
The prerequisite of serious scholarship in this area that is lacking in most Eastern
European countries is a well-developed, empirically oriented sociology of law. Perhaps
more important, it appears exceedingly difficult to avoid the temptation to compare
proclamations on one hand with unearthed sociological facts on the other, and score
facile points in the ideological war. Inter arma silent sdentiael
143 1 do not regard the definitions advanced so far as definitive.
144Although, for example, rules can be found in Soviet procedure amounting to a
conscious sacrifice of precision in truthfinding for the sake of other values, one cannot
find passages to this effect in doctrinal writing as they would run counter to the prevailing legal folklore. Procedural safeguards are conceived of as mandated solely by concern
for the reliability of the factfinding process. There also seems to be little recognition of
the possible contradiction between the state's desire to ascertain the truth and the guilty
defendant's desire to conceal it. Strogovich, for example, does not consider this possibility.
S6e M.

STROGOVICH, KURS

SOVLXSXOGo

UGOLOVxoO

PROTSESSA

[A CoURSE 3N

Sovmar

CpamNAL PRoCEDuRE] 52, 58, 60 (1968).
145 See, e.g., Szabo, Le Droit Socialiste, in B. BrAcoyjmw, W. CzAc ORsir, T.
IoN Asco, V. KNAPP, M. KRouroGOLov, I. SzAao & V. TouArAawov, IN'RoDucnoe Aux
DROiTS Socruasrms 9, 73 (Budapest 1971); Rakhunov, Dokazatelstvennoe Znachenie
Priznanila Obviniaemogo po Sovetskomu Ugolovnomu Protsessu [Evidentiary Signifi-
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the overwhelming majority of the people-distrust of those who administer the criminal process would seem misplaced. 46 While safeguards
against possible abuse must be developed, basic faith in public officials
is thought justified, and the possibility of misuse of powers is not a primary consideration in devising procedural arrangements. Socialist conceptions of the purposes of the criminal process are changing. The role
of criminal proceedings is conceived as much broader than merely applying substantive criminal law and punishing. 47 Particular significance is attached to the educational function of proceedings, not only
with respect to the defendant and other participants in the courtroom
drama, but also with respect to the citizenry at large. 48 The pervasive
atmosphere is not one of scepticism regarding the possibility of establishing the real truth, and the meaning and morality of punishment; on
the contrary, there is full confidence in the propriety of conceptions
of crime and criminality as well as in the reliability of factfinding. 14 9
I could continue this rough sketch of values underlying socialist
proceedings, but the torso that has already emerged is sufficient for
my limited purposes. Are these rhapsodic ideals more consonant with
the procedural model of an official inquiry or with the model of a
"battle" between the state and the individual before a purportedly
neutral arbiter? Although I believe there is little doubt where the
answer lies, I will suspend giving any answers at this juncture.8 0 The
cance of the Defendant's Confession in Soviet Criminal Procedure], 1956

SovSTsxoE

GOSUDARSTVO z PRAVO [Sov=r STATE AND LAw] no. 8, at 34, 36.
146 State agencies are no longer agents of an oppressive minority

"fired by a desire to
pervert." Whatever supervision against abuse is needed can be exercised by the Party
and the citizenry participating in the administration of justice. See M. CHELTZOV, supra
note 142, at 428-29.
147 Note that for a long time after the revolution "punishments" were considered
by the Russian Commissariat of Justice as measures of social protection rather than
punishment stricto sensu. This Ferrian idea was, then, incorporated in the Russian
criminal code of 1922, R.S.F.S.R. 1922 UGoL. KoD. art. 26. Currently the interplay
between agencies of criminal procedure and "social agencies" such as the "comradely
courts" is particularly important here. There is, in general, great willingness to go easy on
those who repent, and "rugged individualism" is not considered a virtue.
148 Hence many procedural provisions appear bizarre when viewed from the Western
perspective. Examples include the possibility of holding court in the locale linked to the
crime involved, so-called "social accusers and defenders," assignment of cases to the
comradely court, the "special [or "private"] decision" accompanying the regular judgment continental style and so forth.
149 Soviet views on this score revolve around the concept of "objective truth." See
T. DoBRovoLsSKAA, supra note 80, at 121-35; M. C LTzOV, supra note 140, at 88-97.
Skepticism concerning the possibility of finding the real truth is declared typically
bourgeois.
0
15
Cheltzov states explicitly that bourgeois procedure is "based" on the principle of
adversary contest of the state and the individual before the adjudicator who is only
said to be independent of the state. The concept of a "contest" is thus considered a mere
ideological facade. Id. 440. That the adversary idea is uniquely characteristic of bourgeois
justice was also the view expressed by the brilliant early Soviet scholar E.B. Pashukanis.
See E. PAsHuYANxs, LA

TmEoRiE

GLtRAL, nU DROIT

ET LE

M

RXzsM

169 (Paris 1970).

Strogovich, however, takes the view that Soviet criminal procedure, at least at the
trial stage, is adversary in the sense that the role of the judge is separated from that of
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problem will be taken up in the next section, dealing with some procedural models framed by American lawyers.
2. American Opinions and Scholarly Writing
a. The Manichaean Dichotomy
In America, too, the expressions "accusatorial" and "inquisitorial"
tend to be used somewhat indiscriminately at times. Various procedural
patterns are loosely included under these labels, and the meaning of
the opposition of the two systems remains somewhat obscure. It would
seem to me, however, that the dichotomy often purports to represent
the distance between the old continental inquisitorial procedure at its
historic worst, and a variable selection of somewhat idealized features
of modern American criminal proceedings. Thus, for instance, a system which leads to the use of coercive measures to extract the defendant's testimony is opposed to a system which relies on evidence
"independently secured through skillfull investigations.' 151 Or, a system predicated on the presumption of guilt is contrasted with its
counter-ideal founded on the presumption of innocence. 15 2 As I see it,
the problem with this polarization is that it is Manichaean. It seems
to suggest that the only alternative to some lofty conceptions of Due
Process is a lapse into the horrors of a procedural system where charges
are not specific, the accused is not accorded the benefit of doubt, his
confession is coerced, his detention before trial is unlimited, he has
no right to counsel, and is not advised of his constitutional rights. 3
Whatever the merits of this dichotomy as a weapon in the war between
-in the late Herbert Packer's terms-the Due Process and Crime
Control factions, surely the differences between modern continental
the prosecutor and in the sense that the defendant is accorded certain rights in order
to defend himself. This is a reflection of conceptions of socialist democracy. See M.
STRaoovc,
IzvSTA VYssHErX Uc:EBNY H ZAVEDENI: PRAvovEDENiE [REPORTS OF
HIoHm EouCAToNAL INsTiruoNs: LAw] (transl. no. 2 1962). Of course, his opponents
can always reply, in Marx's phrase, that the Soviet criminal procedure is here "mit einer
buergerlichen Schranke behaftet," i.e., that it (temporarily) encompasses bourgeois elements.
151 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Watts v. Indiana, 338
U.S. 49, 54 (1949).
152 This line of analysis has been criticized as inaccurate in Ploscowe, The Developopment of Present-Day Criminal Procedures in Europe and America, 48 HARv. L. REv.
433, 436 (1935).
153 These are all aspects of inquisitorial procedures cataloged by justice Frankfurter
in Watts v. Indiana 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949).
I have shown that there were many inquisitorial procedures (e.g., in German-speaking countries) in which the defendant had a right to counsel, see note 118 supra, while
at the same point in history the English adversary trial did not admit counsel in felony
cases. Or, take modem systems. Whether or not continental or common law charging
papers are more specific is not at all certain and would deserve a separate study. That
the defendant should be advised of his "constitutional rights" is obviously a very parochially conceived feature of adversary proceedings, unknown, for example, in the United
Kingdom.
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and Anglo-American criminal procedures cannot meaningfully be
studied within this Manichaean framework.
b. A Narrow View
The continental concept of the "mixed" type of criminal procedure, while not unknown, has never gained currency in common law
countries. 1 A narrow continental way of conceiving the contrast between the accusatorial and the inquisitorial style, seems, however, to
have a rough analogue. Fuller has said, for instance, that "[t]he
essence of the adversary system is that each side is accorded a participation in the decision that is reached, a participation that takes the
form of presenting proofs and arguments." 15 5 Lack of opportunity to
present proof and arguments would, then, presumably be the essence
of the inquisitorial system.
It would appear at first blush that, if the core of the adversary
style is conceived in this fashion, there is no difference between modern
continental and common law systems. It will be recalled that the
continental defendant is accorded "participation" in the above sense,
at least at the trial stage, and frequently even during the preliminary
investigation. Closer examination reveals, however, that important differences remain. It is perfectly clear, for instance, that the active
role of the continental judge appears from the common law perspective
as too gross an interference with the conduct of both the defense and
the prosecution, even in the eyes of those who, like Fuller, do not
consider judicial passivity as essential to the adversary style. Moreover, continental parties do not present their evidence and arguments
in a manner that would be considered partisan or active enough to
common law lawyers. More important, if our purpose is to find the
proper parameters within which to study the contrasts between modern
continental and Anglo-American procedural patterns, then the narrow
view is unacceptable. Many other significant considerations should be
taken into account over and above the contrasting manner in which
arguments are made and evidence examined by the adjudicator.
c. Rival Models of Procedure

The adversary system and its antipode are at times constructed
more broadly by common law lawyers. Here the core of the opposition
seems to lie in alternative ways of conceiving the adjudicator's role:
judicial passivity (the umpire) is juxtaposed with judicial activity (a
154 But cf. H. BER

,,

JusTicE N TnE U.S.S.R. 304 (1963).

165 Fuller, supra note 86, at 30, 41. Compare Fuller's views with those of E. KERN,
supra note 126.
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researcher pursuing the actual facts). I cannot here meticulously trace
the implications of these two contrasting premises, but I believe they
come very close to the two continental analytical models I have suggested earlier. There is, however, one significant difference. The question whether the parties can shape proceedings or not is not as central
in common law as it is in continental thinking.'56
But rather than canvassing the fine shades of difference in this
basically similar approach, I shall dwell for a while on attempts by
American scholars to articulate two diametrically opposed sets of
assumptions said to underlie the choice of procedural patterns. The
relationship of these rival ideologies to the contrast between adversary
and non-adversary procedures must be established.
More than two decades ago, with his penetrating sense and remarkable breadth, Karl Llewellyn contrasted the "parental" and the
"arm's length" systems of criminal justice. 17 The keynote of the first
is attitudinal: it resides in a feeling of togetherness, or "We-ness," in
Llewellyn's idiom, between the miscreant and the group-government.
The defendant is viewed as an integral part of the community, a member of a going team.' 58 There is no distrust of officials, who harbor
parental emotions, even feelings of love. 59 The goal of any activity
directed toward the miscreant is to reintegrate him into the community,
through repentance and open confession. Thus, punishment, when
imposed, is not thought of as merely a deterrent or simple vengeance;
it becomes an educational tool. Official action finds broad popular
support and procedures are simple.
The "arm's length" system of criminal justice is the antipode of
the "parental" type just described. The defendant is not viewed as a
member of a team here, but rather as a "person quite outside," whom
the officials are to take hold of only if they can pin upon him some
specific act. One of the basic characteristics of the system dictating
policy choices is distrust of officials. In keeping with the fundamental
"detached" tone, the goal of the official activity towards miscreants
is a narrow one: if it were to go beyond punishment, too momentous
an invasion of the culprit's personality would occur.
156 As an example of this broad view contrasting judicial activity and passivity see
Ploscowe, supra note 152, at 433-37.
15 7 See his article on the anthropology of criminal guilt, reprinted in K. ILEwELLYN,
JUUSPRUDENCE 439, 444-50 (1962). His description of the "parental" system is based on

anthropological studies of primitive tribes, but his discussion shows that he detects the
same system behind procedural, correctional and even attitudinal characteristics of modem criminal justice systems. Those bent on tracing the history of this procedural model
in Anglo-American writing should perhaps begin with Bentham's "domestic" or "natural"
model See J. BETHar, A T5EATISE oN JuDiC L EvmEcE 7 (M. Dumont transl., London
1825).
158 YL .nwmyw, supra note 157, at 448.
159 Cf. id. 449.
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Implications flowing from these two "ideologies" were only outlined by Llewellyn, but no doubt remains that, in the procedural
domain, opposing policy choices result in two technical-legal models
strikingly resembling the opposition between non-adversary and adversary proceedings. 6 10 As between these two poles, Llewellyn expresses
a preference for the former "when it works well." 161 He also believes
that the former is better suited to a cure-and-prevention approach
towards the criminal sanction.1 62 However, Llewellyn is aware of the
lessons of history, which teach us how easily the parental ideology
can be abused and the problems involved in controlling crime simplified. Thus, as a final choice, he favors an admixture combining the
best features of the parental and arm's length systems. 1
More recently, John Griffiths has constructed two diametrically
opposed ideological models of the criminal process along almost identical lines. 64 One he calls the "family" model, the other the "battle"
model. While the latter is predicated on the idea that there is in the
domain of the criminal process an irreconciliable conflict between the
individual and the state, the former is based on the proposition of
reconciliable interests, even a state of love.1 65 While the family model
implies a basic trust in public officials, the battle model is characterized
by a lack of faith in them. The family approach prevents fractionalization and a narrow view of the functions to be fulfilled by the criminal
process; its antipode leads to "conceptual compartmentalization" and
the blacking out of possible educational purposes of the trial besides
the "meting out of deterrence." 1 66 Unlike Llewellyn, Griffiths tells us
very little about the procedural arrangements which would be likely
to flow from the adoption of these two rival ideological roots. There
are even passages in his essay which suggest that he does not feel that
the "family" ideology would require radical departures from the adversary style' 67 Thus, I have no way of knowing his personal views
16

0 Id. 444-45.
Id. 448.
162 Grafting "a cure-and-prevention line of treatment" to the adversary procedure
seems to Llewellyn as "a sort of institutional semi-schizophrenia." Id. 46.
163
1d. 447-49.
164 Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal
Process,
79 YALE LJ. 359 (1970).
65
1 Id. 371. At id. 416 n,189, Griffiths speaks of the "possibility of forgiveness."
166 Id. 376-78, 388-91.
6
1 7 See id. 383, where Griffiths doubts that the Family Model "would involve less
reliance on counsel, since there are good reasons for an adversary process which have
nothing to do with irreconcilability of interest." Although he does not specify what these
good reasons are, one that comes to mind is the belief that adversary presentation of
evidence is a better factfinding tool.
Yet it is easy to think of examples in which the adoption of "family" ideology has
led to the rejection of adversary features in judicial proceedings. Consider only the
16 1
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on the dictates of his ideological models in the choice of available
procedural design. But, if it were necessary, I could easily show in
detail that, much as with Llewellyn's two models, at least Griffiths'
"parental" ideology leads to a procedure with a distinctive nonadversary flavor.
The attentive reader must have noted long ago the striking
similarity between Llewellyn's "parental" and Griffiths' "family"
model on the one hand and some ideological assumptions behind
socialist criminal procedure on the other."" Lawyers in socialist countries would probably dislike the epithet "parental" when applied to
their system. 16' 9 They would, perhaps, consider the family and parental
models as mere caricatures of their own assumptions. But, if the
semantic hurdle be surmounted and the exaggeration inherent in all
models recognized, I believe that scholars in socialist countries would
concur in the opinion that the "family" ideology is indeed much closer
to their own ideological tenets than is the "battle" concept. They would
also be prepared to subscribe to the view that, as a result of their basic
policy orientations, the technical procedural rules of an adversary
model are totally alien to them. In sum, what Llewellyn and Griffiths
seem to have done is to present two possible ideological justifications
for the rival adversary and non-adversary models of the criminal
process.
extent to which, in America, the parens patriae ideology has affected juvenile proceedings.
What finally prompted the Supreme Court to require adversary elements in juvenile proceedings was surely not a belief that such elements flow from the parens patriae approach.
Rather it was the realization of the wide gulf existing between "parental" proclamations
and actual practice. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-17, 27 (1967). Of course, it would be
rash to suggest that the parental ideology necessarily leads to intolerable procedural laxness or unfairness. Non-adversary proceedings to contain safeguards, such as adequate
notice,0 records of hearings, and right to appeal.
1 8See text accompanying notes 144-50 supra; cf. text accompanying notes 137-38
supra (on "ideological" models in Western Europe).
109 They would particularly resent the implication that defendants are treated as
less than adults.
Let me note in passing that, until 1958, the Soviet system of criminal justice resembled Llewellyn's "parental" model on one more point: there was absent the "technical requirement" that crimes be defined by law prior to their commission. If, in fact, the
essence of crime is "social dangerousness," crime can-to borrow Llewellyn's phrase-be
expected to be foreknown as such in that it clearly runs counter to the tone and purpose
of going institutions. Comradely courts are even closer to the "family" style of treating
miscreants, but cannot be treated within the purview of this Article.
170 An objection may be anticipated here. How can the Family Model be the basis
of such typically non-adversary proceedings as the medieval inquisitorial type? To pick
an extreme example, can torture and extraction of confessions be consistent with the desire to reconcile the offender with the community? Not only is this theoretically possible,
but torture was actually frequently rationalized along these lines. Moreover, it would be
erroneous, I think, to oppose love in one model to hatred in the other. Hatred and love
are extreme forms of emotional involvement with the defendant, and it is true perhaps
that les extrenes se touchent here. The more appropriate polar opposites of love toward
the miscreant are coolness and emotional distance. Quaere: Is not parsimony in emotional commitment an "arm's length" attitude, perhaps essentially "bourgeois?" See G.
Sm-nmR, The Pythagorean Genre: A Conjecture in Honor of Ernst Bloch, in LANGUAGE
AND SILENCE 78 (1967).
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Perhaps better known than the preceding are the Due Process
and Crime Control models of the criminal process developed by
Herbert Packer. 7 1 These two models must be presented in a nutshell
and their meaning carefully scrutinized in order to establish their relationship to the opposition between adversary and non-adversary procedures. The distinguishing characteristic of the Crime Control model
is its heavy stress on the need to repress criminal conduct, which leads
to the demand that the criminal process be efficient in screening the
guilty from the innocent. Thus, speed and finality are placed very high
in the hierarchy of values underlying this model. 2 Quite naturally,
then, administrative processing is preferred over judicial. Indeed, in
its purest form, the Crime Control model favors exclusive non-judicial
factfinding "leading (1) to exoneration of the suspect or (2) to the
73
1
entry of a plea of guilty."

The Due Process model is complex. Its ideology is said to have
two main strands. The first is embedded, as with the Crime Control
model, in the area of concern for factfinding reliability. But, in contrast
with its rival, the Due Process model favors judicial processing because it reduces the possibility of error. 4 A further distinction, again
based on precision in factfinding, is that the Due Process model is
75
prepared to sacrifice efficiency in the interest of minimizing error.
It is, however, the second strand of Due Process ideology which accounts for the most important difference between the two models. If
stripped to its barest essentials, it consists of the belief that individual
values are paramount and that official power must be limited. 7 6 In
sum, if the Crime Control model in its pure form leads to an "assembly
line" process, its polar opposite requires that the process be structured
as an "obstacle course."' 177
On the surface it might appear that Crime Control values must be
associated with "inquisitorial" thinking, whereas the values of its
171 See H. PACKER, TBm LmTS oz THE CNAL

SANcTioN

149-73 (1968). The

essay originally appeared as Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
Rxv. 1 (1964).
172 H. PACKER, supra note 171, at 158-59.

173Id. 162-63. With exclusive non-judicial factfinding nothing remains, however, of
the common grounds between the two rival models, especially those Packer noted at 157.
'74 Id. 163-64.
175Id. 164-65. A pure Due Process Model, says Packer, has a very low demand for
finality. As long as there is an allegation of factual error, there must be an opportunity
for an adjudicative hearing. Id. 164. At this point, and in anticipation of further analysis,
the following question arises. Is this review available only from findings of guilt, or also
from findings of innocence?
For a discussion of the Due Process Model's relative concern with false findings of
guilt and
false findings of innocence, see note 184 infra & accompanying text.
176 H. PACKER, supra note 171, at 165.
177Id. 163.
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antipode coincide with "accusatorial" assumptions. Packer makes it
perfectly clear, however, that his "polarization" is limited to clashing
7
assumptions animating the modern American adversary system.
Specifically rejected also is the possibility that Packer is contrasting
the divorce between actual practice and the law on the books 1 9
What, then, is the meaning of his opposition of two models? Here we
must tread carefully. For, although admirably written-or, perhaps,
precisely because of occasional flights of language-Packer's argumentation concerning the two models is not always tightly woven.
Notwithstanding sporadic passages which seem to suggest the
contrary, 8 0 closer reading reveals that he does not purport to contrast
two rival ideal-types in designing the criminal process. True enough,
his Crime Control Model may be conceptualized as such. It has a positive content, and efficiency in screening suspects may, standing alone, be
imagined as an "animating assumption" in shaping criminal procedure.
But "the Due Process Model is basically a negative model,"'1 81 and it
is conceptually impossible to imagine a criminal process whose dominant
concern is a desire to protect the individual from public officials. In
its pure form it would lead not to an obstacle course, but rather to
mere obstacles and no course on which to place the former. Now, this
problem seems to be solved by the introduction of the other "strand,"
rooted in the concern for factfinding precision. Posito sed non concesso
that this additional strand provides the minimum positive content.
Even so, the resulting hybrid is not a pure model. Indeed an internal
conflict is possible between the desire for reliable factfinding and the
concern for individual rights.' Also, the very nature of polarization
is somewhat fanciful in view of the fact that, admittedly,8 3 the Due
Process Model is not the converse of the Crime Control Model.
What, then, is involved in the confrontation? Before I venture
my own interpretation, I must take the liberty of rethinking the Due
Process ideology along the lines suggested by its author, and of changing its content slightly. What are the actual reasons for the preference
in the Due Process Model of judicial over administrative factfinding?
Is it really the desire to increase the factfinding precision? I believe
that the answer is in the negative. Factfinding in any criminal pro178

Id. 154-58, 172 in fine.

179 Id. 153.
180 Here I mean his reference to "pure" Due Process and Crime Control models, e.g.,
id. 164, 172.
181 Id.173.
1 82
For example, exclusionary rules of evidence extrinsic to the desire to establish
the truth may be objectionable to advocates of the reliability strand, while quite acceptable to the proponents of the individual primacy strand.
183 H. PAcE, supra note 171, at 163.
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cedur6 has a dual purpose: we want to convict the guilty and acquit
the innocent. Unfortunately, there is a conflict between these two
desires: the more we want to prevent errors in the direction of convicting the innocent, the more we run the risk of acquitting the guilty.184
In other words, there is a "cognitive dissonance" between the desire to
minimize false positives and the desire to minimize false negatives.
With this dilemma in mind, let me return to the reasons for the preference for judicial factfinding in the Due Process ideology. As I see it,
the reason is not a desire to eliminate mistakes irrespective of the
distinction between false positives and false negatives. The prospect
of convicting an innocent is viewed with so much more horror in the
Due Process ideology that it is even prepared to sacrifice factfinding
precision in the totality of cases. If my analysis is correct, then there
are not two strands in Due Process thinking-the dominant concern
for individual rights and the ancillary concern for factfinding reliability-but solely the former. The preference for adjudicative factfinding
emanates from the cluster of ideas revolving around the primacy of
the individual, rather than from the concern to be more precise in
establishing facts.
Now if one juxtaposes the thus "purified" Due Process Model and
its antipode, the meaning of the confrontation becomes obvious.
Labels are beguiling; what Packer is in fact offering us are not two
models of the criminal process. Rather he is presenting, within the
framework of the American criminal process, a stimulating depiction,
rich in implications, of two clashing inner tendencies: the tendency
toward efficiency and the tendency toward protecting the rights of
the defendant. But-and this I want to underscore-this inner tension is part and parcel of the dialectics of any criminal process. Any
design of criminal procedure, even the extreme inquisitorial one, 185
must establish a balance between these two (and some other) inner
tendencies.' 86 This is not to say, however, that the manner in which
84
1 See J. HAIL, STUDIES IN JUJRISPRUDENCE AND CRINAL THEORY 220 (1958);
Tribe, supra note 81, at 1386.
1
85 As only the Crime Control tendency or one of the various supporting ideologies
behind it can be conceived of as a model, it might appear at first blush that at least the
ideology of efficiency can be equated with the ideology of such an extreme as the medieval
inquisitorial procedure. However, that procedure was a response to the legal syntax of
those days, which contained elements opposed to efficiency-for example, emphasis on
judicial factfinding, and an exacting system of legal proof. Consider also the debate between abolitionists and retentionists of torture as an example of a clash, within inquisitorial procedure, between "output" and "quality" concerns, or "crime control" and "due
process" people.
186 William Seagle has concerned himself with the conflict between impartiality and
efficiency, and has criticized procedure as an "obstacle race" from the efficiency viewpoint. W. SEA;LE, LAW: Tm SCIENcE OF INEYcIENCY 62 (1952). For examples of other
clashing tendencies set forth in continental and Anglo-American writing see K. PmEs,
supra note 128, at 66-71; R. PouND, C-rMAL JUsTIcE IN AmRCA 59-61 (1945).
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this dilemma is being resolved is independent of the contrast between
adversary and non-adversary procedures. It would seem to me that the
pure adversary model tends to resolve the conflict in a synthesis
coming closer to the Due Process ideology than does the non-adversary
model. The reasons for this will appear in the following pages where
I shall explore the relationship between evidentiary barriers to conviction and the contrast between adversary and non-adversary criminal
procedure.
3. Choice of the Proper Dichotomy
Various meanings attributed to the expressions "accusatorial"
and "inquisitorial" have been surveyed. Some other conceptual constructs of possible use in studying the contrast between adversary
and non-adversary procedures have also been canvassed. Hopefully,
this long digression has led to enough clarifications to offer, in Robert
Frost's phrase, "a momentary stay against confusion." Before returning to the problem of evidentiary barriers, what remains to be done
is to choose an opposition of adversary and non-adversary procedural
structures that is most suitable for my purposes.
I believe that the opposition most revealing in its ramifications is the one contrasting the internal logic of the procedural
design of an official inquiry with that of party contest. s7 It is true
that the contrast has been criticized.'8 8 For the most part its
descriptive value has been questioned. The two rival procedural
designs are said to be mere caricatures of real-life processes. No existing system, the critics say, coincides with implications flowing from
the two opposing designs. The basic theme either of inquiry or contest
is orchestrated in real life with heavy borrowings from the other camp,
so that, as a result, all criminal processes appear mixed l 9 To indulge
in this kind of criticism is to voice disapproval of the use of models
in general. For all models are by definition suggestive caricatures
and simplifications departing from reality. I believe it is to Weber
that we owe the paradoxical dictum to the effect that in order to
grasp the real context we have to construct an unreal one. Thus, even
if the descriptive utility of the two procedural models is denied-and
I believe it cannot fairly be-there remains the heuristic value. 190
187 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 128-38 supra.
188 Cf. Fuller, supra note 86, at 40-41. See also Kunert, supra note 23.
189For example, the American judge is not totally passive, especially in criminal
cases. Further, he need not accept a guilty plea in certain circumstances.
190 The descriptive value of the two models is, of course, limited. By liberating us
from the tyranny of details like.those described in the preceding note,.the models enable
us to perceive the grand contours of real-life contrast. The heuristic value inheres in the
conceptual framework provided by the two models for the comparative analysis of such
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Sometimes the thrust of the criticism goes to the fact that the
dichotomy concentrates on the judicial stages of the criminal process,
neglecting the all-important initial phases. I find this criticism justified.' 1 Surely a comprehensive comparison of modern criminal processes requires the framing of new models. 92 But my discussion is
focused mainly on the judicial stages so that-in this limited areathe two models are satisfactory. With this reservation in mind let me
return to my main theme.
B.

Rival ProceduralSystems and Commitment to the
Discovery of Truth

In approaching the problem whether there is a link between the
difference in evidentiary barriers to conviction and the contrast between adversary and non-adversary procedures, a good starting point
seems to be the following question: Why are evidentiary barriers
against conviction erected at all?
It is analytically possible to imagine a few of them as stemming
from concerns shared by all evenhanded searchers for the truth,
irrespective of their areas of endeavor. The aim of such barriers is
to prevent the decrease in the precision of screening the guilty from
the innocent. In a sense, they are value-neutral: acquittal of the
guilty is viewed with the same disapproval as conviction of the innocent. More often than not, evidentiary rules serving this purpose
will not even be perceived as "barriers" by those who administer
the criminal process. 3 The pursuit of truth in the criminal process is
not an untrammelled exercise in cognition. Modern procedures in particular view with much more horror the prospect of convicting an innocent person than they do the prospect of acquitting the guilty. 94
diverse issues as the relative importance of counsel and procedural form, and, as we shall
see, the
commitment to the pursuit of truth in the criminal process.
91
'
The data-pool used in constructing both the historic and analytic procedural
types does not include the low-visibility police inquiry. Comparison of police procedures
is quite complicated: in many continental jurisdictions, the judicial stages cover a larger
segment of the total process than is the case in Anglo-American jurisdictions. Furthermore, although the police phase can hardly be imagined as "adversary" in any country,
it will derive part of its specific flavor from the circumstance of whether the police anticipate an immediate adversary judicial phase or an intermediate judicial investigation.
192 This is another practically unexplored area in comparative criminal law analysis.
193 Consider, for example, the use of uncorroborated confessions. Such confessions
are inherently unreliable as tools for the screening of the guilty from the innocent, and a
rational system must prohibit their use. This prohibition will be perceived as a barrier
only in pathological cases in which the administrators of the criminal process use a criminal conviction as a means of punishing a person irrespective of whether they were
persuaded of the defendant's guilt with respect to the offense charged.
19 Even the old inquisitorial proceedings reflected, in at least one respect, a greater
concern over unjustified convictions than inaccurate acquittals; they required less evidence for facts favorable to the defendant than for those detrimental to him. See note
78 supra.
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Accordingly, many evidentiary rules presenting obstacles to conviction are inspired by the desire to minimize the chances of convicting
an innocent even at the price of increasing the chances that a guilty
person may escape punishment.19 5 Although these rules display a bias,
in the sense of favoring prevention of false positives even if it implies
reducing the number of accurate results in the totality of processed
cases, it would be mistaken to deny that they too are grounded in
considerations of factfinding reliability. But there are many evidentiary
barriers against conviction totally independent of the epistemology of
normal procedure, limiting the search for truth and deliberately reducing factfinding precision for the sake of other values. Some testimonial privileges, rules excluding reliable evidence illegally procured,
and many facets of appellate procedure belong in this group.196
Imagine that in one procedural system considerations of finding
out the truth are more important than in another. What are the likely
consequences? How will the two systems resolve the conflict between
efficient pursuit of the truth and protection of values such as human
dignity and privacy and the preservation of a general atmosphere of
freedom? The one placing a very high premium on these other values
will often remain committed to them even at the expense of truth discovery; in this sense it will be less "truth oriented" than the system
for which values unrelated to truth discovery are less weighty. The
more "truth oriented" system will be less willing to erect those evidentiary barriers that are independent of the concern for factfinding
reliability. But, even among barriers related to factfinding precision,
there will probably be an important difference. Maximizing the number
of correct verdicts may run counter to the desire to minimize the number of false convictions. The stronger the commitment of a system to
truth discovery, the lesser the number of guilty defendants the system
will be prepared to see acquitted for the sake of preventing the conviction of an innocent person. This attitude will, in turn, cause the
195 The most obvious example is, of course, the widely-accepted requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Many problems are, however, quite controversial.
Thus, the unlimited discovery allowed the continental counsel is classified by some as a
postulate of even-handed factfinding. Others of a more authoritarian bent claim that
these rules reflect a bias in favor of preventing false positives (false convictions), and
against preventing false negatives (false acquittals).
196 While this all will be considered almost banal by many American readers, it is
quite controversial in many foreign jurisdictions. For example, it is often claimed that
evidentiary privileges are based on a desire to avoid evidence of dubious value. Also,
the exclusion of some illegally obtained evidence is said to increase factfinding reliability
in the long run.
I often wonder whether this exclusive emphasis on truthfinding considerations emanates from seriously held beliefs, or amounts simply to an attempt to psychologically
condition the adminitrators of the criminal process. They are more hospitable to arguments concerning prevention of factual error than they are to arguments extolling the
primacy of the individual, human dignity, and similar values.
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more truth-oriented system to be less tolerant of those evidentiary
barriers which act primarily to minimize the chances that an innocent
person will be convicted.
But can it be said that one of the systems places a relatively
higher premium on truth discovery? Many believe that there is no
difference on this score: the objective of both systems is the same
search for the truth. 97 Here I must disagree. Indeed, I contend that
the continental non-adversary system of procedure is more committed

to the search for truth than is the Anglo-American adversary system.
Plunging headlong into a much- debated issue, I shall now attempt to
marshal support for this contention on three planes: in the contrasting structure of criminal proceedings, in conflicting ideologies support-

ing it, and in historic considerations.
1. Pursuit of Truth and Procedural Structure

Broad pronouncements by judges and scholars in the two rival
systems on the purposes of the criminal process may be dismissed by
some as mere ritual incantations. It is possible, however, that they
are symptomatic of deeply rooted beliefs and that a fleeting glimpse

may be caught in them of the relative weight attached to the search
197 For a recent example of this view, voiced by a noted comparatist, see Jescheck,
supra note 55, at 240-41.
Truth is, so the argument goes, equally important to both systems. They differ only
in assessing the weight of other values which may and often do compete or conflict with
the desire to find out the truth in the criminal process. Assuming, thus, the value of truth
discovery to be a constant in the equation, these scholars would rather speak of differences between the two procedural systems in terms of weight placed on values other than
that of ascertaining the truth. This mode of analysis has, no doubt, a certain attraction of
which I will talk in a moment. But I do believe that it is based on a misconception of
the way in which conflicting values work in the area of criminal procedure. These clashing values operate as Dworkin's principles and policies. See Dworkin, The Model of
Rules in LAW, RpASON, AND JUSTIC 3, 19, 30 (G. Hughes ed. 1969). We cannot determine their absolute but can only sense their relative weight. What is involved here is a
process of balancing, of establishing the resultant of forces pointing in differing directions.
Thus, even assuming that the value of discovering the truth can be determined to be
equal in the two systems, if one of them considers values opposed to it to be less weighty,
it ipso facto places greater relative weight on the value of discovering the truth.
Even so, many prefer to discuss the problem in terms of relative commitment to
privacy, individual dignity and similar values, rather than in terms of different commitment to the pursuit of the truth. As I indicated before, note 196 supra, I find this preference to be anchored in procedural pedagogy. In discussing procedural problems-even in
academic contexts-many scholars are concerned about the impact of their thoughts on
those who administer procedural systems. The latter are believed to be more sensitive to
fact-finding considerations than to values competing with them. It is feared that telling
these people that one system is more oriented toward truth discovery than the other will
be interpreted by them to imply praise for that system and a veiled invitation to redress
the balance in the other system in favor of an unrestrained pursuit of truth. These fears
may perhaps be realistic. Even so, I prefer to cast my discussion in terms of varying
commitment to the discovery of truth, because I believe that this approach is more
accurate and possesses greater explanatory force. Those who dislike my conclusion that
the adversary system is less committed to discovery of the truth may rephrase it so that
the system is said to be more attuned to other important values.
Note in this connection that continental civil procedure has fewer and less potent
devices for ascertaining the truth than does the common law, especially in its American
variant. See, e.g., M. CAPLnrrTTr, J. 1i R.RA.AN & J. Pamo, supra note 10, at 138.
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for truth. It is openly stated by some common law lawyers that the
aim of criminal procedure is not so much the ascertainment of the
real truth as the just settlement of a dispute. 98 Even allowing that this
may be an exaggeration, the statement still sounds iconoclastic to continental ears. In talking about ends of the criminal process continental
lawyers place a primary emphasis on the discovery of the truth as a
prerequisite to a just decision. Considerations impinging upon the
search for the truth are characterized as merely limitative, restricting
somewhat the primary objective of truth discovery. The latter, however,,,remains
the dominant aim to be achieved in a "socially acceptable
99

way.W

Let us see whether this legal rhetoric can be traced to our polarization of the two rival procedural models. Consider the "contest"
model first. Almost imperceptibly, the emphasis shifts here from problems of cognition to the concern that parties abide by the rules
regulating their "battle." In the conceptual realm of the party contest,
it seems perfectly acceptable that a party, perhaps in the right on
the merits, "lose" on a technicality-if he violated the rules regulating the contest. The judgment itself is not so much in the nature of
a pronouncement on the true facts of the case; it is, rather, a decision
198 See, e.g., J. CouTTs, Mem AccusE: A CoaARATIV STDuy 14 (1966); fl. Spino,
GOVERMENT BY CONSmTrIoN 227 (1959); Goldstein, ,supranote 61, at 1149; Hammelmann, supra note 9, at 78. See generally T. ARwuoLD, THE SR'mB0x or GovEsmma 183.
85 (1935); K. LLEwELLvN, supra note 157, at 445-46.
199
The revered continental concept of substantive truth (Materielle Wakrheit) originated in the Germanic tradition of amplitude and thoroughness in philosophic inquiry.
Sometimes considered as merely exhortative and addressed to those who administer the
criminal process, it is at times also conceived of as an invocation to the legislator, urging
him to discard procedural rules hampering the objective of truthfnding, no matter how
much these seem warranted for other purposes, For a stimulating analysis of this question see 1 V. BAYER, JUGOSLAVENSKO Knrsi-o PROCESNO PRAVO [YUGOSLAV LAW oF

CRnmqrL PRocEDu ] 173-86 (1969).
Discussion of this "procedural principle" vanished almost completely from newer
German writing, but is still widespread in other continental countries, with the exception of France and jurisdictions under its strong influence. Particular importance is attached to this principle, renamed the "principle of objective truth" among scholars in
socialist countries. Here we also find lengthy discourses about the "nature of the truth,"
linking cognitive skepticism to bourgeois values. See, e.g., T. DoBnRvosxVA, supra note
80, at 41.
Even those continental students of procedure who would go very far in restricting
truth discovery hold that it is an essential objective of the criminal process inasmuch as
it is a precondition to a just decision, the true ultimate aim. See, e.g., K. PErms, supra

note 80, at 68. For his views on limits to the pursuit of truth see Peters, Beweisverbote
im deutschen Strafverfahren, in VMVMLV.GEN DES SECHsuDVamZIGSra DZUTSaCmN
JURismNTAGEs 91, 160 (1966).
A relatively recent West German study has deviated from the conventional continental view regarding the achievement of justice through truth discovery as the ultimate
end of criminal procedure. The real vdtimum, according to its author, is the reduction of
disruption of the community caused by the probability that a crime has been committed.

See Schmidthiauser, Zur Frage nach dem Ziel des Strafprozesses, in Fxsrscmzrr 1rf
Ei3nnARuD Sc~aXmDT 511, 523-24 (1961). Schmidthl.user's arguments bring him closer to

common law thinking on ends of criminal procedure, and offer ample food for thought,

far beyond my subject.
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between the parties.2 01 If, however, proceedings are structured as an
official inquiry, the concern for ascertaining the facts of the case is
2 01

much more central.

Lest it be objected that the problems are discussed only grosso
modo, let us descend to more specific issues. An example obviously
in point is the impact of the adoption or rejection of formal pleadings
and stipulations in criminal procedure. If proceedings are patterned
upon the model of an official determination of the facts of the case,
both formal pleadings and stipulations are objectionable. The defendant, although in fact innocent, may plead guilty, or may stipulate
damaging matters, for a variety of reasons.202 An official inquiry must,
therefore, disregard possible interparty arrangements, and pursue the
search for the real truth; confessions do not relieve the continental
judge of his duty to conduct the trial in the usual manner. On the
other hand, if proceedings are essentially a contest, and the judgment
a decision between the contestants, the logic of this procedural design
2 03
naturally tends toward accepting formal pleadings and stipulations
See G. Fosc~xn, supra note 44, at 227-28.
Although attacked by many as an exaggeration, there is, I believe, something to the
analogy between the "battle" model and the sporting event. In the latter, an athlete can
be disqualified for a technical breach; considerations of fairness assume great weight. In
her fascinating and colorful traveller's report, Sybille Bedford comments on the "unfairness" of the continental system. She does not question the accuracy of continental factual findings. Her point, rather, is that in Britain the prosecutor would seldom be able
to present "so complete a case" as the German prosecutor, and that British defendants
would have "a rather better chance of getting away with it." She is concerned about the
"unlimited probing" in continental procedure. "The sporting spirit, the notion of the law
as a game of skill with handicaps to give each side a chance, is entirely absent on the
Continent." S. BEDForD,supra note 17, at 163. See also R PouND, supra note 186, at 163;
G. RADBRcH, GEIST DES ENGLiSCmE RECHIS 15 (4th ed. 1958).
201 See G. Foscne, supra note 44, at 229.
202
He may want to undergo punishment for pathological reasons, or to protect the
real culprit, as well as for a variety of tactical reasons in the dynamics of the criminal
process (e.g., to establish a false alibi). But-and this is important in continental thought
-he may not even know whether he is actually guilty. Guilt is not a factual but rather
a legal problem, to be explored at trial. A word of caution here. Continentals do not
distinguish factual and legal guilt along the lines suggested in H. PACER, supra note 171,
at 166. Indeed, they would be very critical of Packer's inclusion, in the concept of legal
guilt, of issues such as venue, jurisdiction, or even the statute of limitations.
Some empirical data on West German trials with and without the defendant's confession can be found in Casper & Zeisel, supra note 23, at 146-51. In 42% of the cases
studied the trial was held notwithstanding the existence of a full confession at some stage
of the proceedings. Of these about 80% were first given to the police and the remaining
20% to the judge. True, cases in which the court had a full confession required less time
for disposition at trial, but the differences were not as significant as Americans would exdeliberation time differed hardly at all. Id. 150-51.
pect.2 The
03
In America the judge must, in principle, look into the factual basis of a guilty
plea. Although this is analytically a departure from the pure adversary model, the heavy
emphasis in America on the defendant's own strategic interests in deciding whether to
plead guilty would still be viewed with unmitigated horror by adherents of the non-adversary model. For a good example of the contrast between the two systems see the discussion of pleading problems in Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the
Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DuxE LJ. 927, 931. Their arguments on whether
the guilty plea may be accepted even though the defendant maintains that he did not
commit the crime in question, appear to a typical continental lawyer to be broadcast on
a quite different wavelength of values.
200
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Or consider the problem of pre-trial disclosure of evidence." 4 It
will be remembered that, even under the analytic approach, lack of
discovery is not of the essence of adversary proceedings. It can hardly
be gainsaid, however, that a "battle" model is more hospitable to the
idea of "procedural ambush" and surprise, while the "inquiry" model
will have nothing but scorn for this "perverted" way of searching for
the truth. I could go on with examples of procedural patterns more
or less acceptable to either of the two models in the light of their
differing commitment to the discovery of truth. But in doing so I
would probably belabor the obvious. Let me, therefore, pass briefly
to the impact of the two rival ideologies.
2. The Search for Truth and Ideological Preconceptions
Ideologies supporting the choice of procedural systems are both
vague and controversial. Various beliefs and concepts constituting
these ideologies can easily be used at times to justify almost diametrically opposed procedural solutions. 5 Yet there is, I believe, at least
one strand of "adversary" ideology with a quite definite thrust in the
direction relevant for my purposes. As I have suggested before, the
adversary system in its modern variant is inspired to a great extent
by an attitude of distrust of public officials and its complementary
demand for safeguards against abuse. Accordingly, the adversary system is quite tolerant of evidentiary barriers limiting the search for
the truth for fear of abuse of governmental power. Moreover, it does
not view as unnatural the use of the criminal process itself "as the
appropriate forum for correcting its own abuses,"2 ° thus making possible the reversal of "substantively" just decisions on "technicalprocedural" grounds. It stands to reason that as a result of greater
hospitality toward such ideas, the factfinding potential of the system
must somehow be decreased. Concern to establish the "real truth"
has serious competitors in "collateral" considerations under the adversary system; guilt and innocence are not paramount.
By contrast, the ideology supporting modern non-adversary procedure, be it in the "family" or some other variant, while not ignoring
204
Justice Brennan voiced the thought that discovery "is the most effective device
yet fashioned for the reduction of the aspect of the adversary element to a minimum."

Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest

for Truth?, 1963 WASH.

UL.Q. 279, 291. Goldstein says, however, that discovery "has as its object the harnessing of the full creative potential of the adversary process." Goldstein, supra note 61, at
1180.

205 In the preceding pages only some ideological models were outlined; others could
easily be constructed. Further, recall the uncertainty of the implication of the family
model. See note 167 supra & accompanying text. I believe that the family model leads
inexorably to non-adversary procedure, though others, no doubt, will vehemently disagree with me.
2 00
See H. PAcxER, supra note 171, at 167 in fine.
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the potential danger of abuse, exhibits much less distrust of police,
prosecutors, judges, and public officials in general. Accordingly, many
procedural safeguards and technical rules, acceptable to the ideology
of adversary procedure, are dismissed as unjustified loopholes, "unnecessary obstacles of pedant legal etiquette,"12 0 or impermissible
injections of collateral issues into the search for guilt or innocence.
Assume, furthermore, that a general mood of skepticism permeates
the ideology of adversary procedure. This skepticism would then relate
not only to the possibility of establishing the truth, but also to the
"morality and utility of the criminal sanction." 208s If there is a measure
of truth in this and similar contentions, then there are other factors
rendering the adversary ideology more tolerant of restraints on the
search for the truth, or, in other words, more committed to the pursuit
of other values.
3. Commitment to Truth Examined in the Light of
Historical Considerations
In attempting to trace the history of attitudes toward the search
for the truth in the criminal process, I need not go so far back into
the quicksands of history as to speculate on the possibly disparate
role of the Norman idea of trial by battle played in England and on
the Continent. Nor need I linger on the controversial problem whether
the vacuum created by the papal prohibition of trials by ordeal was
filled by more rational procedural devices in thirteenth century
England or in thirteenth century Central and Western Europe.20 9 For
my limited purposes it suffices to touch briefly on a less controversial historical development.
Because its verdict is not subject to attack, the English jury has
possessed for at least three centuries the power to pardon the criminal
sub rosa by acquitting him against the weight of evidence. This power,
indeed, was used where jurors believed that the punishment was unduly severe, and at times even where the statute sought to be enforced
was unpopular 10 This could not have failed to affect the perception of
207 This phrase is borrowed from Marx's essay on the parliamentary debate concerning the bill on larceny of firewood. See 1 K. MARx & F. ENGELS, SoCmNmaA [COLLECTED
WoRns] 157 (2d ed., 1955). Although frequently used in the opposite sense, the phrase
was 20
in fact used in a context sympathetic to "formal barriers."
8H.PACKER, supra note 171, at 170. See also Schwartz, Book Review, 120 U. PA.
L. REv. 584, 596 (1972).

209 Some food for thought on this point can be found in T. PLuCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY Or THE CommoN LAW 125 (5th ed. 1956). On the importance of this crossroad
in procedural history see G. Mur£LER & F. LE PooLE-GRTTrms, COzPARATIVE CRnTINAL PROCEDURE 3-6 (1969).
210 L. RADzINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH

CRzImNAL LAW 91-97 (1948),

relates

the role of the jury as a check on harsh and unpopular laws. The role of the jury in the
struggle against political oppression is much less important than is commonly assumed.
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the aims of the criminal process. Gradually the idea evolved that
criminal procedure may quite justifiably be used to frustrate as well
as to enforce the substantive criminal law. In any event, the criminal
trial ceased to be conceived solely as a vehicle to apply the substantive
criminal law to concrete instances of its breach.
This curious phenomenon has no real counterpart in continental
history of criminal procedure. 1 It is true that continental substantive
law was very harsh until the Age of the Enlightenment. The usual
punishment (poena ordinaria) for the majority of serious offenses was
the death penalty. As in England, this harshness seemed unduly severe
to continental adjudicators. But, on the Continent, since there was no
jury, alternative ways of coping with this problem were developed.
Not a single one of them called for acquittals against the weight of
evidence, with the complementary concept of frustrating the enforcement of the substantive criminal law. Perhaps the most important
device of mitigation was the so-called extraordinary punishment (poena
extraordinaria),*22Where capital punishment was, strictly speaking,
mandatory, but the judges felt that it was unduly severe in light of
the circumstances of the case, they would, rather than acquitting the
guilty defendant, simply disregard the sentencing provisions and impose a milder punishment. It is another irony of history that this
practice, lambasted by the eighteenth century reformers as arbitrariness violating the defendant's rights, was in actual practice predominantly a mitigating device. Moreover, borrowing an idiom of modern
But there are some cases in which the jury has acquitted defendants in political cases,
and these rare instances gain in significance when assessed against the background of
continental political cases of the times. It is precisely because of the belief that the jury
is a better guarantor of justice in political cases that jury trials-not very popular on
the Continent-have been advocated elsewhere for political trials. For an example of
attitudes in Tsarist Russia in favor of juries in political cases see S. Kuc.a=ov, THE
ORrAos or SovmT AniumsmAoiT

or

JuSCa

339 (1970).

The power of the jury to acquit against the weight of the evidence seems clear at
least since Bushel's Case, Vaughan 135, 6 Howell's State Trials 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006
(1670).
211 The closest parallels are the experiences with the transplanted jury trial in Tsarist
Russia, see S. KUCHEROv, CoRTms, LAwYERs, AND TRALs UNDER THE LAST THREO TsARs
69-70 (1953), and in France, especially before the reform of 1941. See note 4 supra.
It was, indeed, one of the most frequent criticisms of the jury trial that jurors tended
to acquit against the weight of the evidence if they sympathized with the defendant.
Even after the reforms, patterns of jury verdicts in France seemed to display traces of
acquittals based on sympathy for the defendant. See G. SmEA= & G. LEvAssEUR, supra
note 5, at 470. Thus, for example, women are more often acquitted than men (14% as
opposed to 4% in 1967, 13% as opposed to 6% in 1968, and 27% as opposed to 5% in
1969). For this information I am endebted to Mlle. Yvonne Marx, Centre Franqais
de Droit Compar6, Paris.
212A succinct history of poena extraordinariawith particular reference to its use
as a mitigating device can be found in E. Scamar, EniwaumR
nG DiE GEsCImcH
DER
DuTscHmN STRAsEmEsCHSFLEGE 166-69, 183-86 (3d ed. 1965). See also Sax, supra note 78,
at 157. For other devices, such as directives from the monarch affecting specific cases,
to mitigate the severity of criminal laws see 2 WAuLBERG, GmsA=
TE 3mEnERE
ScHRu=N "ER STRAERECHT 138 (Vienna 1877).
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criminology, poena extraordinaria was frequently used to make the
punishment fit the offender.21 3 There were, however, other factors
operating against the acquittal of guilty defendants. The continental
bench was bureaucratic and there were no laymen among the adjudicators. In such an institutional setting the idea of "sabotaging" unpopular laws could hardly have gained ground. Moreover, there was
little sympathy for the plight of the defendant. The professional
adjudicators were subjected to the usual process of case-hardening,
and the boundaries of social class which existed between the defendant
2 14
and his judges contributed to a lack of compassion.
In sum, the idea that criminal proceedings could justifiably be
used for purposes other than those of establishing the truth and
enforcing the substantive criminal law is simply not part of the continental legal tradition. 21 5r By contrast, it is an ide recue in the com213 Thus, extraordinary punishment would be imposed on minors, people with an
unblemished record of prior behavior, and, quite frequently, in the presence of other
strong mitigating circumstances. The ill-famed French medieval lettres de cachet, often
used to crush political opposition, were also sometimes used as an instrument of
mitigating harsh substantive criminal law which rigidly prescribed capital punishment.
See Dession, Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE LJ. 319,
319-20 (1938).
214A good example is the use of torture as a legal means to obtain incriminating
evidence. Those who experience difficulty in comprehending the cruelty of this "factfinding" device should examine, for a sense of the spirit of those times when moral
sensitivities did not prevent a very lighthearted and unconcerned attitude toward the
torture of defendants, the passages from Racine, Moli~re and Madame de Sevign6
quoted in A. Esrxnm, supra note 10, at 348-49. But, and this seems to be often overlooked, certain categories of defendants were exempted from torture save in grave cases
of what we would term today political offenses (crimina lesae maiestatis). If we look at
the authorities we find, from the 13th until the first half of the 19th century, that these
privileged defendants were almost exclusively noblemen or members of the social elite
(e.g., doctors of law). See LAS SIEa PARTmAS, PartidaVII, titulo 30, ley 2, in 1 CoDIGOs
ANTIGUOS DE ESPARA (Alcubilla ed., Madrid 1885) (promulgated in 1265 by Alfonso
X of Castile and Leon), translated, LAS SnmcE PARTmAS (published for the Comparative
Law Bureau of The American Bar Association, 1931); B. CARPzov, supra note 78, Pars
I, questio 118, nos. 65-76; I. KAssIcs, LAuREA ViRTuTis SEU TRACTATUS DE PRAEROGATIVIS NoBILIUM INcLYTI REGNI HUNGARIAE 11, 61 (Pestini (Budapest) 1826). The
reasons advanced for this privileged status were almost invariably related to the
"dignitas rei," the defendant's dignity. See B. CARPzov, supra note 78, Pars IlI,
questio 118, no. 65. Thus, humane feelings did exist, but were extended only to the
dominant social group.
The relationship of the existence of torture within the framework of inquisitorial
proceedings and commitment to truthfinding is often misunderstood. Many consider the
use of torture as proof of lack of concern for reliability of factual findings. On the
contrary, it may be said that torture resulted in fact from over-commitment to the
discovery of truth. As I have attempted to demonstrate, the medieval system of legal
proof was too demanding. Note 10 supra. The rejection of circumstantial evidence as
sufficient proof of guilt made the use of coercion to extract a confession a practical
necessity of the administration of criminal law in those days. See, e.g., P. F. MuYART
DE VoUGLANs, INsTiTUTEs AU DRorr CimunmL, Partie VI, 341 (Paris 1757); A. Esmxm,
supra note 10, at 276, 282. Commitment to truth discovery and success in attaining it
should not be confused.
215 Consider the situation in continental jurisdictions following the abolition of
torture in the 18th century. Those who administered the criminal process feared that,
as a result, the reliability of adjudication might be imperiled. They therefore continued
to permit various types of pressure to testify, usually in the form of disciplinary punishment, e.g., for "obstinate lying," etc. See note 41 supra. Moreover, while conviction on
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mon law tradition. Perhaps the view of criminal procedure as much
more than a device for the application of substantive law is stronger
in America than it is elsewhere. 216 In part a result of the peculiarities
of legal development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, this
view is constantly revitalized in the American consciousness by the
discrepancy between a number of criminal offenses and the values
shared by substantial segments of the population.
4. A Final Caveat
A comparison of the history, the ideological preconceptions, and
the procedural structure of the Anglo-American adversary system and
the continental non-adversary system reveals that the latter exhibits a
greater commitment to the pursuit of historic verity. A natural outgrowth of this disparity in the two systems' commitment to the pursuit of truth is a disparity in evidentiary barriers to conviction. The
Anglo-American adversary system's commitment to values other than
the pursuit of truth has caused it to erect higher evidentiary barriers
than its continental non-adversary counterpart.
At this point, one question remains. Is the system which places a
higher premium on the discovery of truth for that reason better
equipped to achieve precision in its factual findings? My argument
can easily be interpreted to imply an affirmative answer to this quesmere circumstantial evidence became legal in ordinary cases, only direct evidence (e.g.,
a confession or testimony of eyewitnesses) could support a conviction where capital
punishment was threatened. This exception to the continental principle of "free evaluation of evidence" remained the law in some European countries until well into the 20th
century. The heavy emphasis on untrammelled pursuit of the truth began to undergo a
change at the time of the French revolution, when English criminal procedure was
transferred to France. This transplantation signaled a period of general lessening of
commitment to the discovery of truth in criminal cases on the Continent of Europe.
But there are few instances of this lessening of commitment without accompanying
"withdrawal symptoms." Both the rejection of the English procedure in France, and
the almost universal dissatisfaction with the transplanted jury trial in the rest of
continental Europe, can at least partially be explained along these lines.
216 It would be erroneous to assume that this perspective of the criminal process
dates from pre-Revolutionary days. In early Massachusetts, for instance, there was little
fear that criminal law enforcement posed a threat to civil liberties because of the
courts' lack of power, which was attributable to the unquestioning acceptance of British
precedent. Procedure was attuned to finding the truth. Concern about procedural safeguards became pronounced only later when government developed great interest in the
outcome of cases and the courts, by deciding hitherto nonexistent challenges to the
substance of the law, developed their power to affect the outcome of cases. Nelson,
Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical
Perspective, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 450, 468-81 (1967).
The disparate emphasis placed on various purposes of the criminal process is reflected
even in the context of legal education. If a continental law teacher is exposed to course
offerings in criminal procedure in an American law school, his first reaction will be one
of great bewilderment. "This is a course in adjective law only in a very minor way," he
will probably say. "Rather than teach students how to apply substantive law to cases
of its breach, American instructors concentrate to a great extent on problems leading
to the frustration of the implementation mechanism, and problems of ascertaining guilt
or innocence are overshadowed by other considerations."
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tion. As I am, thus, courting a serious danger of being misunderstood,
a final word of caution is needed before I close.
While commitment to the discovery of truth in criminal cases and
success in attaining it are related, they are obviously distinguishable.
Motivation is surely important for the success of such an endeavor,
but it is by no means a sufficient condition for it. As with all values,
truth may be loved unwisely or too well. Thus, if the non-adversary
system in its continental variant is indeed more committed to ascertain
historic verity, this does not mean that its factual findings are ipso
facto more reliable. 17 Which of the two rival systems is better adapted
to factfinding precision has been the subject of great dispute at least
since the nineteenth century. 1 In the heat of the debate the narrow
issue of adversary versus non-adversary presentation of evidence has
frequently been confused with the larger question of analyzing the
cognitive potential of the two systems in toto.2 19 Until we learn much
more from behavioral sciences, especially from psychology, this debate
will not be put to rest. 220 But-to avoid a final misunderstandingeven if one of the two systems is found to be better adapted to the
discovery of the truth, this will not be decisive. In the dialectics of
of the criminal process there is always a point where factfinding precision must give way to other societal values.2 1
At times opinions will be voiced in both systems that one type of
procedure is superior to the other both in terms of its fact-finding precision and in terms of its fairness. These views, often in panegyrical
217 An example from the past which presents the issue in cameo is the demanding
standard of proof-sufficiency in medieval law, designed to decrease false convictions,
which led to the use of torture in criminal proceedings, a practice which undoubtedly
increased false convictions. See note 214 supra.
218 Many famous German lawyers of the 19th century thought that the presentation
of evidence through direct and cross-examination was a psychologically preferable
method of ascertaining the truth at trial. See note 38 supra; Jescheck, supra note 55,
at 239.
219 In addition to the presentation of evidence, the larger question embraces also
the impact of stipulations, formal pleadings, preclusions, admissibility, rules of evidence,
discovery, etc.
On the narrow issue of proof-taking by the judge as opposed to party-presentation
of evidence, opinions are almost evenly divided. The superiority of partisan presentation
of evidence is, of course, the predominant view in common law jurisdictions. See, e.g.,
Fuller, supra note 86, at 39-40. But cf. K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 157, at 447-48.
With important modifications, adversary presentation of evidence is sometimes thought
preferable even by continental lawyers. See Jescheck, supra note 55, at 250. But the
contrary view still prevails in the civil law system. See E. Scnr rT, supra note 128,
at 201-02 (1970). See also R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 344 (3d ed. 1970).
220For examples of this empirical approach, probably more promising than speculations by lawyers, see Marshall, Marquis & Oskamp. Effects of Kind of Questions and
Atmosphere of Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness of Testimony, 84 HARv. L.
Rv. 1620 (1971); Thibaut, Walker & Loud, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal
Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. Rav. 386 (1972); Walker, Thibaut & Andreoli, supra note 48.
2.1 On this difficult question see particularly notes 214, 196-97 supra & accompanying
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form, must be examined with suspicion, for it often happens that what
is gained on one front is lost on another. Thus, in the criminal process,
concern for individual rights will often set limits to the pursuit of truth
and conflict with the desire to establish the facts of the case. This
potential "zero-sum" effect is denied mostly by those who claim that
they have established an ideal social order. Actual failure to realize the
ideal leads them to idealize the real.

